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Abstract
This thesis asks and responds to the question 'why and how did the European 
Community intervene in Central America in the 1980s?' In order to provide a useful 
response to the question a description and analysis of the policy is presented. The 
conceptual context utilised is of EC foreign policy making and the historical and 
geographical context is of EC Latin American policy.
European Community policy towards Central America has been commonly described 
as a 'surprising' example of an independent EC policy vis-a-vis the United States, partly 
because it involved the institutions of the Community in Latin America, a region which 
the US had considered since the advancement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 as their 
domain. Even more surprisingly still (superficially) was the choice of Central America 
for active intervention. Not only had the EC since its creation displayed minimal 
economic or political interest in the region, but it also risked conflict with its ally and 
partner, the United States, which did have very specific political and strategic interests 
in Central America.
In the thesis two levels-of-analysis are utilised. The first is that of the EC as 
international actor and as the primary unit of analysis. The second is that of the 
member states or the sub-units of the EC.
The conclusion is that while the EC and its member states were motivated by shared 
strategic interests with the US (anti-Communism) they had differing views as to how 
to pursue those interests. The EC (and the member states to varying degrees) became 
involved in Central America in order to a) try to control the revolutionary movements 
of the region but more importantly to b) prevent the US from transforming what the 
west Europeans considered as a regional problem into a major focus of global East-West 
confrontation.
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Introduction
This thesis is a study of European Community (EC) foreign policy making. It 
focuses on a specific geographical region - Central America - and a specific 
historical period - the 1980s. It locates the making of EC policy within a study of 
the strategic issues involved in East/West and West/West relations. The overall 
context is of East/West relations but the specific context for the thesis is of 
West/West relations.
In terms of the overall context the 1980s were characterised by a Cold War 
between two superpowers which battled to extend their influence worldwide. The 
Cold War was transmuted into numerous ’hot* conflicts in regional wars throughout 
the world - in Africa, Asia and Latin America. One of the most controversial of 
these regional wars was fought in Central America. This war captured the world's 
headlines for nearly ten years - throughout most of the 1980s.
What became known as 'the Central American crisis' was fought in three major 
theatres of conflict. These were in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua - although 
neither Costa Rica nor Honduras, particularly the latter, remained immune from the 
fighting. In the 1980s some 160,000 people (out of a total regional population in 1986 
of some 23 million) were killed and hundreds of thousands forced into internal or 
external emigration.
From the late 1970s the major domestic protagonists in El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua were the governments and the revolutionary movements which 
opposed them. After the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) took office in July 1979 
the crisis escalated as the United States grew determined to prevent 'another Cuba'
in this area which it knew as the Caribbean Basin (Central America and the 
Caribbean). US policy towards the Nicaraguan revolution and the rest of Central 
America, particularly after the advent of the Reagan administration in 1981 was 
based on the use of the military instrument. It involved providing arms and finance 
for the counterrevolutionaries (contras) which from 1981 made serious attempts to 
destabilise and overthrow the Nicaraguan government and the arming of ’friendly1 
governments.
US intervention in turn precipitated the involvement of other international 
actors in the region. These actors either opposed, sought to moderate or supported 
US policy. Somewhat unexpectedly, one of the most active opponents of US policy 
in the region was the European Community. Central America was a region where the 
Community and its member states possessed few direct interests in contrast to the 
United States, its major ally, which did perceive the region as of primary security 
significance. The first questions therefore, that this thesis seeks to respond to, are 
why and how the EC became involved in Central America. It will ask why the EC 
risked conflict with its major ally on this issue which was of little intrinsic 
importance for the EC. This study will describe and analyse the Community’s 
policies, activities and objectives in order to try to provide a useful response to 
these questions.
A logical corollary of the last question is whether EC intervention in Central 
America in the 1980s mattered and to whom? To what extent did EC policy and 
activism contribute to the attainment of its own objectives and to desirable 
international outcomes, which were in this case the promotion of peace and stability 
in Central America?
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These la tter questions are difficult to answer in that because the Central 
American drama involved a multiplicity of actors it is difficult to single out any one 
factor as a singular cause leading to a particular outcome. In order to offer an 
informed judgement as to the relative efficacy of the EC’s policies there would be 
a need for a thorough analysis of the activities of every important actor in the 
crisis. This is not the intention of this study which is an analysis of the actions of 
just one of the actors involved, the European Community. Given this caveat 
however, some attem pt will be made in the conclusion to this thesis to assess the 
importance of the EC's contribution to promoting peace and stability in Central 
America.
This study concentrates on the Community’s policy making towards one 
specific area of the world but it will attempt to utilise the research in order to 
consider how this particular experience of foreign policy making may have affected 
the EC's foreign policymaking processes as a whole. It will address the question of 
how EC foreign policymaking may have altered as a result of the Central American 
policy. A further question that will be asked is whether any tentative generalisations 
can be made on the basis of this study about EC foreign policy in general. In other 
words it will ask if there are any theoretical conclusions about the nature of EC 
foreign policy which can be drawn from this study?
The Literature
Analysis of the EC's foreign policy activities in international crises has 
hitherto concentrated on the EC's contribution to the various efforts made in the
11
1970s to bring a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflicts. The 
EC entered into the 'Euro-Arab dialogue' in the mid-seventies and in 1980 issued the 
'Venice declaration' which placed on the record a commitment to support both 
Israel's right to security and the rights of the Palestinians.* The EC's involvement 
in the Middle East prefigured its involvement in Central America in the 1980s in 
that it raised questions about the nature of the different and sometimes conflicting 
different interests from its closest ally the United States. There were some basic 
differences in the two foreign policy areas however in that in the Euro-Arab 
dialogue the EC became involved primarily out of economic necessity and was 
reluctant to take on board the political ramifications of closer relations with the 
Arab states. By contrast the Central America policy was a predominately politically 
inspired policy in which economic considerations were minimal.
Also by way of contrast was the EC's ability to sustain a policy towards 
Central America which provoked hostile reactions from the United States, 
particularly given that US antagonism to EC 'interference' in the Middle East had 
contributed to the virtual demise of EC contributions to efforts for peace in that 
region. This is one of the reasons that the policy towards Central America has 
commonly been described as 'surprising' or 'remarkable'.
The policy appeared surprising and remarkable partly because it involved the 
Community in Latin America, a region which the US had considered since the 
advancement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 as their political domain. Even more 
surprisingly still (superficially) was the choice of Central America for active 
intervention. Not only had the EC since its creation displayed minimal economic or 
political interest in the region, but it also risked conflict with its ally and partner,
the United States, which did have very specific political and strategic interests in 
Central America.
Few analysts have recognised the extent to which the European Community 
established an institutionalised role for itself in Central America in the 1980s. For 
instance, in the context of a discussion of west European policy towards Nicaragua 
published in 1988 the Latin American Bureau (LAB) referred simply to faf meeting 
of the European Community member state foreign ministers and their Central 
American and Latin American counterparts in San Jose, Costa Rica which had taken 
place in September 1984. This reference came after four inter-ministerial 
meetings (1984, 1985, 1987 and 1988) within what had become by 1988 an 
institutionalised political and economic EC/Central America/Contadora Group^ 
dialogue sanctified by a ratified treaty between the Community and the members 
of the Central American Common Market and Panama and known as the San Tos6 
process.
Some studies have been made of the broader subject of West 
European/Central American relations or aspects of those relations. The most useful 
and probably the most extensive of such analyses emanate from the independent 
research organisation based in Madrid, the Institute for European-Latin American 
Relations (IRELA) which was set up in 1984 and which is funded by the European 
Community. IRELA has published a number of studies, in English and Spanish, of 
European/Central American relations although only one, rather speculative piece, 
has been produced specifically on the subject of the San Jos6 process.
Studies have also been made of the impact of the European involvement in 
Central America on European/United States relations. A number of such studies have
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resulted from US conferences or research activity which for the most part reflected 
the concern of political elites within the United States that the European allies 
either did not understand or were not doing enough to support US goals in Central 
America.^ The ECfs role is hardly mentioned except by German Christian Democrat 
Alois Mertes in his essay published in Andrew Pierre's useful discussion, Third World
Q
Instability: Central America as a European-American issue.
Other studies of Europe's relations with Central America and of Central 
America as an issue in Europe/ US relations - from those more critical of US policy 
in Central America - have also tended to either not mention, underplay or 
misunderstand the role of the European Community in the Central American crisis. 
The 1988 LAB publication has already been referred to but other studies which have 
failed to recognise the extent of the institutionalised links between the EC and 
Central America include scholarly analysis published in cities as disparate as 
Amsterdam, Paris and New York. The Amsterdam based Transnational Institute in 
a study of West European aid to Nicaragua, published in 1988, also identifies the
Q
first of the San Jos6 meetings as a singular event. A 1986 study, published in 
Paris, referred to the 1984 and 1985 EC/Central America/Contadora conferences but 
did not allocate any significance to them other than as an indication of ad hoc 
activity by the EC towards Central America.*® Nadia Malley, in her comments on 
Nicaragua's relations with the European Community, which were published in 1985 
in an article contained in Thomas Walker's often-quoted publication, Nicaragua: The 
First Five Years, almost seems to argue that an EC policy towards Central America 
did not exist. She says that 'i t  is difficult to pinpoint a specific "European 
Policy"'.**
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Studies of the Central America conflict itself have focussed on the major
actors which were conventionally perceived as the United States government and the
Sandinista government. In this context the European Community is often not
mentioned at all or referred to in parenthesis. David Close's study of Nicaragua is
12an example of the former approach. Holly Sklar's study entitled Washington's
13War on Nicaragua is an example of the second.
The other area of scholarly literature in which there might be expected to
have been studies on the role of the EC in Central America is in the field of EC
foreign policy making and European Political Cooperation (EPC). The major
textbooks contain few references to the Central American policy .^  The exception
is the eight page discussion by Simon Nuttall in his 1992 publication, European
1*5Political Cooperation. Within the EPC literature there appears to be only one
article in English and no published book on the subject apart from a collection of
conference papers (see below). The one article, 'Relations with Central And South
America: a question of over-reach?' is by Wolf Grabendorff and is contained in the
edited volume by Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger entitled Europe's
Global Links: The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation. Grabendorff
provides a short description of the San Jose process and notes among other things
that a renewed political dialogue with Latin America arose because of the joint EC/
Contadora group efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Central America 
18crisis.
It would be misleading however to focus entirely on the predominant approach 
within the literature. A few scholars have identified the European Community as 
worth investigating in terms of its role in the Central American crisis. One of the
15
earliest references to the potentially important role of the EC is contained in a
pamphlet published by the Washington DC based Institute for Policy Studies entitled
17Outcast Among Allies. Another analysis by Luis Carvajal-Urrestia published in 
1985 in Paris also recognised the central role played by the European Community in
IQ
Central America which is distinct and separate from that of the United States.
More recent scholarship has also sought to inquire into the nature of the EC's 
involvement in Central America. A published scholarly investigation of the San Jos& 
process and one of the few sustained descriptions and analyses of the European 
Community's role in Central America can be found in an article, written in Spanish
I Q
and published in 1988 by Professor Rafael de Juan y Pefialosa. Another article
written in German and published in 1989, by Doris Eschke, indicates that German
20scholars have taken some interest in the subject. A more recent 1992 book
length publication The Reconstruction of Central America: the Role of the European
Community, brought together 26 papers which had been delivered a t a conference
21in Miami in March 1991. The conference and the book reflected, almost for the
first time in scholarly circles, an understanding of this previously neglected area of
study. However the book sacrificed depth for breadth and among other things
suffered from a poor translation from the original Spanish. There are some
indications however that interest in this issue will be sustained given the recent
publication of Laurence Whitehead's article entitled 'Europe and the Central
American Conflict: A Retrospective Assessment' which considers the subject central 
22to this thesis. Whitehead's investigation of why the EC became involved in 
Central America includes some of the themes present in this thesis but his 
conclusion is somewhat different. He argues that 'the San Jos§ process was driven
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by a logic internal to the European integration process rather than by Central 
American needs'. This thesis will consider what Whitehead characterises as the EC's 
integrationary logic (and this thesis might characterise as the EC's capability of 
action) as one aspect of the multidimensional causation process vis-a-vis the EC's 
intervention in Central America.
Overview
This thesis therefore attempts to explain the European Community's policy 
towards Central America in the 1980s.
The conceptual context utilised for this study is of EC foreign policy. The 
historical and geographical context utilised is of EC Latin America policy.
Two levels of analysis are utilised in looking at EC policy. The first is that 
of the EC as international actor and as the primary unit of analysis. The second is 
that of the member states or the sub-units of the EC. It is a truism to state that the 
international system provides the context for the EC as a foreign policy actor. In 
this thesis however the international context of interest is of 'West-West relations' 
or the sub-svstemic context. This study will primarily focus on the relationship 
between the unit and the sub-svstemic levels of analysis; the relationship between 
the EC as international actor within the context of 'West-West' relations - more 
specifically within the context of EC/US relations. For analytical purposes Central
2<i
America is viewed here as primarily the object of EC (and US) policy.
Chapter 1 provides the empirical framework for the thesis in that it 
summarises significant contextual issues. These are US policy towards Central
17
America, the international relations of the Nicaraguan revolution and the Latin and 
Central American peace processes.
Chapter 2 examines the foreign policy making capacity of the European 
Community. Two interrelated problems are discussed. The first is that of the 
analytical distinction between European Community ’external relations1 and 
’European Political Cooperation’ (EPC). The second more important discussion 
relates to whether or not the EC can be conceived of as a foreign policy actor a t all, 
a t least in the sense in which a foreign policy actor is conventionally conceived. The 
chapter also examines the development of EC foreign policy in terms of its relations 
with West Europe's major ally, the United States. In other words the development 
of EC foreign policy is considered partly as a function of the EC/US relationship.
Chapter 3 offers an historical and geographical context for the thesis through 
a summary of the EC’s policy towards Latin America. The chapter also evaluates the 
relationship between the EC's Latin American policy and its decision to become 
actively involved in Central America in the 1980s.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the development of EC interest in Central America 
and presents an exposition of the various policy objectives of both the Community 
as a whole and its three most important constituent parts - the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament. Chapter 4 discusses the early ad hoc responses by 
the Community to the problems of Central America. It further discusses the 
coalescing and consolidation of the Community’s policy in respect of Central 
America which took place in the mid-1980s. Chapter 5 considers the implementation 
of the EC's Central American policy and how that policy changed through the late 
1980s.
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The evidence obtained suggests that there were two major related reasons for 
EC interest and activity in the region in the 1980s. The first reason for involvement 
was as an attempt to deal with the revolutionary movements in the region and in 
particular the revolutionary government in Nicaragua (1979-1990). The second issue 
of concern to the EC was US policy to the region and its impact on West-West and 
East-West relations.
Chapter 6 tests these two assumptions by examining the foreign policies of 
four of the member states in respect of Central America and in particular 
Nicaragua. It also considers the relationship of these four states to the United States 
in the context of the US’ Central American policy. The aim is to try to explain EC 
policy by considering how the interests and policies of its component parts might 
have converged to allow for the EC’s intervention in Central America in the 1980s. 
The second aim of Chapter 6 is to try to counter any methodological bias towards 
overestimating the role of the European Community in Central America by changing 
the level of analysis of the central problem addressed in this thesis, that is 'why did 
the EC intervene in Central America in the 1980s?\
19
Notes to Introduction
1. For discussion of EC involvement in the Middle East in the 1970s see David Allen 
and Alfred Pijpers (eds), European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984).
2. For examples of this terminology see Erik Jan Hertogs, 'Western European 
Responses to Revolutionary Developments in the Caribbean', in George Irvin and 
Xabier Gorostiaga (eds), Towards an Alternative for Central America and the 
Caribbean. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 77; Hertogs comments are cited by 
Wolf Grabendorff, in 'The Central American Crisis: Is there a Role for Western 
Europe?', in Millennium. Vol. 13 No. 2, Summer 1984, p. 213; Nadia Malley, 
'Relations with Western Europe and the Socialist International', in Thomas W. Walker 
(ed), Nicaragua The First Five Years. (London: Praeger, 1985), p. 485. A 1988 study 
refers to the 'remarkably constant' assistance by the EC to Nicaragua. See Solon 
Barraclough et al., Aid that Counts: The Western Contribution to Development and 
Survival in Nicaragua. (Amsterdam: TNI/CRIES, 1988), p. 83.
3. James Ferguson, James Painter and Jenny Pearce, 'Under Attack: Central 
America and the Caribbean', in James Ferguson and Jenny Pearce (eds), The 
Thatcher Years: Britain and Latin America. (London: Latin American Bureau, 1988), 
p. 39.
4. The Contadora countries were Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. See 
Chapter 1 for discussion.
5. By December 1991 IRELA had published 35 'dossiers' on various subjects including 
debt, the situation in various countries such as Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico. 
IRELA has also published several 'working documents' on subjects equally varied. For 
a list of Dossiers see appendix to IRELA, Towards a North American Trade Bloc? 
The NAFTA. Latin America and Europe. Dossier No. 35, (Madrid: IRELA, 1991). For 
a list of working documents (up to and including 1990) see Appendix to Francisco 
Villagr&n Kramer, Encazamiento v Posible Solucidn del Conflicto Centroamericano: 
El Panel de Europa v de las suoerpotencias. Working Document No. 22, (Madrid: 
IRELA, 1990). IRELA also produced a number of summary papers of conferences held 
on various issues.
6. See IRELA, San Tos6 III: Possibilities for Cooperation between the EC and the 
Central American Isthmus. Dossier No. 9, (Madrid: IRELA, 1987). The most useful 
of the more general publications is Francisco Villagr&n Kramer, Encazamiento v 
Posible Solucidn del Conflicto Centroamericano: El Panel de Europa v de las 
supernotencias. only available in Spanish.
7. The best of these is Andrew J. Pierre (ed), Third World Instability: Central 
America as a European-American Issue. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 
1985): See also Joseph Cirincione (ed), Central America and the Western Alliance
20
(eds), (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985); Wolf Grabendorff and Riordan Roett (eds), 
Latin America. Western Europe and the U.S.. (New York: Praeger, 1985); Wolf 
Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede, J6rg Todt (eds), Political Change in Central 
America: Internal and External Dimensions. (Boulder: Westview, 1984); Ottfried 
Hennig, ’Western Europe and Central America*, in Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Dur&n 
(eds), Conflict in Nicaragua: a Multidimensional Perspective. (Boston: Allen and 
Unwin. 1987), pp. 237-247; Howard J. Wiarda (ed), Rift and Revolution: The Central 
American Imbroglio. (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1984).
8. Alois Mertes, ’Europe’s Role in Central America: a West German Christian 
Democratic View*, in Andrew J. Pierre (ed), Third World Instability: Central America 
as a European-American Issue. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985), pp. 
120-123.
9. Solon Barraclough et al., Aid that Counts: The Western Contribution to 
Development and Survival in Nicaragua, pp. 76-77.
10. Michael Stuhrenberg and Eric Venturini, AmSrioue centrale: la cinauifeme 
fronti&re. (Paris: La D6couverte, 1986), p. 297.
11. Nadia Malley, ’Relations with Western Europe and the Socialist International', 
in Thomas W. Walker (ed), Nicaragua The First Five Years, p. 487.
12. David Close, Nicaragua: Politics. Economics and Society. (London: Pinter, 1988).
13. Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua. (Boston, MA: South End Press, 
1988).
14. Juliet Lodge's textbook study of 'inter-regional diplomacy outside Europe' 
mentions an EC link with Latin America 'through ANDEAN and the younger 
Contadora Group' but provides no references to analysis of these relationships. See 
Lodge, 'European Political Cooperation towards the 1990s', in Juliet Lodge (ed), The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future. (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 
239. There are also scattered references to the Central American policy in Roy 
Ginsberg's recent study of EC foreign policy actions. See Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign 
Policy Actions of the European Community. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989).
15. Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 
222-230.
16. Wolf Grabendorff, 'Relations with Central and South America: a question of 
over-reach?', in Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger (eds), Europe's Global 
Links: The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation. (London: Pinter, 
1990), pp. 84-96.
17. Daniel Siegel and Tom Spaulding with Peter Kornbluh, Outcast Among Allies: The 
International Costs of Reagan's War against Nicaragua. (Washington DC: IPS, 1985), 
pp. 11-14.
21
18. Luis Carvajel-Urrestia, 'L'Europe occidentale: temoin e t complice*, in Marie 
Duflo and Frangoise Ruellan, Le Volcan Nicaraguaven. (Paris: La D6couverte, 1985).
19. Rafael de Juan y Penalosa, ’La Comunidad Europea y Centroamerica: Un ensayo 
de cooperacion global e integradora1, in Informacidn Comercial Esparto la (ICE). No. 
664, (Madrid: Ministerio de Economla y Hacienda, December 1988), pp. 157-177. The 
Spanish of this author is not sufficiently fluent to make good enough use of this 
article except to note that a short but useful chronology of EC/Central America 
cooperation is included (pp. 158-159). Penalosa concludes that in the San Jos6 
process the EC has engaged in *a new type of relationship - more complete and more 
integrated - with developing countries*, (p. 177, my translation).
20. Doris Eschke, 'Die EG und ihre politische Rolle in Mittelamerika', in IPW 
Berichte. Vol. 18, No. 3, 1989, pp. 15-21. The title  of the article in English is 'The 
EC and its Political Role in Central America'. This author does not read, write or 
speak German. Therefore, the significance for this study is less its content and more 
the fact that it is the only article cited in the Social Science Citation Index 1985- 
1992 on the subject of this thesis.
21. Joaquin Roy (ed), The Reconstruction of Central America: the Role of the 
European Community. (Miami: Iberian Studies Institute/European Community 
Research Institute, 1992).
22. Laurence Whitehead, 'Europe and the Central American Conflict: A 
Retrospective Assessment', in The Oxford International Review. Vol. Ill, No. 3, 
Summer 1992, pp. 2-5.
23. Central America was of course subject as well as object of the EC/Central 
America relationship. I indicate in Chapter 1 some of the activity in which Central 
American actors were involved. The focus of this thesis however is of an analysis of 
European Community actions and perceptions.
22
Chapter 1 The Empirical Framework
The European Community's policy towards Central America and intervention in 
Central America developed as a result of both factors internal to the member states 
and as a result of external inputs. The most important of the latter was US policy 
towards the region. Also of significance was the Nicaraguan revolution and the Latin 
and Central American peace processes. This chapter provides a short and necessarily 
derivative discussion of these issues in order to provide an empirical context for the 
following, more detailed chapters which review, inter alia, the Community's 
response to those inputs.
US Policy towards Central America
The predominance of United States power in respect to Central America is a 
twentieth century phenomenon. US dominance was consolidated after 1945 with the 
establishment and sustenance in Central America of governments which were, in the 
main, prepared to subordinate their interests to those of the United States. Costa 
Rica was the major exception to this rule throughout the post-war period - although 
Costa Rica certainly remained sensitive to US security and political objectives. Up 
until the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution the other exception was Guatemala during the 
period of the reformist Arbenz government which was overturned by a US sponsored 
military coup in 1954.*
The US took from the British, the previous Central American hegemon, the same 
choice of instruments, that of economic and military mechanisms of persuasion and
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coercion. Compared to the British however the US means of enforcing compliance
were crude. The British had relied on economic leverage backed up by gunboat
odiplomacy with the occasional military foray into the mainland. The US employed 
'dollar diplomacy' in Central America in the twentieth century in that Central 
America became reliant on US trade and credit. But 'dollar diplomacy', especially 
in the period prior to World War II, was supported by the frequent use of either 
direct military interventions to replace governments deemed unfavourable to US 
interests and/or finance, logistical help and political backing for indigenous military 
putsches against legitimate governments along with substantial military and financial 
support for 'friendly' governments. The post-war period was characterised by the
o
latter two usages of the military instrument. The exception to this rule was the 
US invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (see below).
US foreign policy objectives in respect of Central America after 1945 were 
based primarily on security and political interests. Although Central America was 
not important for the US economy as a whole, certain sectional economic interests, 
particularly the multinational fruit companies, have influenced US policy in the 
region.^ The often stated objective of US policy was to prevent Communist 
'subversion' and after the start of the Cold war and the 1959 Cuban revolution to 
prevent what for US policymakers were synonymous - Soviet and Communist 
expansionism.
Central America did not however remain important to successive US 
administrations because of factors intrinsic to the region. There were two less 
immediate but crucial reasons for US concern. The first was a geostrategic issue. 
Central America was the gateway to South America and the Caribbean and was
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proximate to the Panama canal, the US' most important strategic asset in Latin
America. Central America was also a symbol or microcosm of US power
internationally. If the United States could not ensure a quiescent 'back-yard' how
could it prove to its allies that it could maintain a US led order internationally?
External involvement and/or domestic political instability within the region was
therefore viewed by the US as a threat to overall US foreign policy objectives - so
that for the United States Central America was of quintessential foreign policy 
5importance.
US concern to maintain domestic political stability which for the US meant the 
maintenance of governments supportive of US objectives resulted in US support for 
anti-democratic and dictatorial regimes in Central America. The most notorious of 
these was the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua. Reformist governments such as that 
led by Arbenz in Guatemala were viewed as inimical to US interests. With the 
intensification of the Cold War any suggestions of reform particularly agrarian 
reform were seen by the US as attempts by external Communist governments to 
foment 'subversion1. This in turn contributed to a polarisation within Central 
American societies as reformist movements were either forced into illegality and 
thus radicalised or annihilated (often physically). The result was the formation at one 
and the same time of both pro-US elites and their radical opponents - professedly 
anti-imperialist guerrilla movements which were the only political forces seemingly
n
able to work for socio-economic structural change. And in the Central American 
context anti-imperialist meant anti-US government. The major exception to this 
pattern was again Costa Rica and this was partly a result of the relatively fair land 
tenure system thus giving less cause for dissatisfaction than in the other four
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republics. In the 1970s in Guatemala and in the 1980s in El Salvador the class 
based nature of this polarisation became more visible as both elites and liberation 
movements adopted nationalist, anti-US stances but still remained in conflict over 
socio-economic issues at the core of which was the problem of inequitable structures
Q
of land tenure.
There were two US attempts in the post-war years to offer more progressive
policies to the region. The first was Kennedy's Alliance For Progress and the second
was Carter's human rights policies as applied to Central America. Both had limited
success because both administrations never abandoned the national security rationale
for US policy. The Alliance for Progress programme, born as a reaction to the Cuban
revolution, led to the US providing economic support for local governments which
because of the corrupt and grossly inegalitarian class structures ended up by
disproportionately benefitting those least in need of relief. When protest movements
erupted the US finished by providing material and political support for repression of
what were seen by wide sectors of the population as legitimate demands.*^*
Carter's human rights policies were faced with much the same contradictions
although by late 1979 - partly as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - the
Carter administration's policies began to seem confused and consistent as well as
immanently contradictory.** This was particularly obvious in Nicaragua. Carter
attempted to pressurise Somoza to respect human rights but was loath to accept the
consequences of the policy which was an increasing weakening of the Somoza
12dynasty and a strengthening of the revolutionary opposition.
Another reason for the slide back towards the classical US approach to the 
region was because of US domestic pressure on Carter from the increasingly
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vociferous New Right headed intellectually by Jeane Kirkpatrick and politically by
J O
Ronald Reagan. Reagan's attachment to this strategy was more than simply a 
generalised reassertion of Republican values. A central plank of Reagan's successful 
presidential campaign had been that of opposition to the Panama canal treaties.*^ 
Reagan's appreciation of the popularity of this campaign may have contributed to 
his decision to elevate the objective of the roll back of Communism in Central 
America as a major foreign policy of his administration.
One of the Reagan administration's first acts, implemented just three days after 
the President took office, was to carry out a series of measures designed to express 
disapproval of the Nicaraguan government. These included the blocking of the 
remaining $15 million of a tied aid package of $75 million which the Carter 
administration had approved for Nicaragua and the cancellation of credits for wheat 
shipments. The administration injected military and economic aid into El 
Salvador whose revolutionary movement had failed in its 1980 'final offensive' but 
which was still a viable and active political and military force. Military aid to El 
Salvador rose from $6 million in 1980 to $35.5 million in 1981.***
The Reagan administration adopted an approach designed to roll back the 
Central American revolutions. The major strategic goal was to try to change the 
'present structure' of the government of Nicaragua - the policy was intended to 
terminate the revolutionary experiment in Nicaragua and to discourage the other 
revolutionary movements in the region, the political and diplomatic aim was to 
isolate and delegitimise the Sandinista government. The preferred means of 
implementation was through the provision of military and economic support to all 
the governments in the region bar Nicaragua and through support for the contras -
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the armed bands formed from the remnants of Somoza's National Guard which were
attempting to destabilise the new Nicaraguan government. The US also attempted
to build a diplomatic bloc of the four non-revolutionary Central American
governments to exert pressure on Nicaragua. Internationally the US government
attempted to persuade its allies to cease aiding Nicaragua and to accept the US view
17of Nicaragua as an 'outlaw' state.
The rationale and rationalisation for the policy changed over time. The US
charged the Sandinistas with exporting arms to the Salvadorean revolutionaries,
threatening the peace and stability of the neighbouring republics and finally in 1985
as constituting ?a security threat to the [Central American] region and, therefore,
to the security and foreign policy of the United States*. The reason given for
intervention from the mid-eighties onwards was to support the ’democratization* of 
19Nicaragua. What remained constant however was the US administration's view 
that the Sandinistas were at the root of all of Central America's problems. An 
internal White House briefing paper stated in 1985 that
'It has been the consistent view of the United States that the domestic and
foreign policies of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) are the root
source of inter-state tensions in Central America. Sandinista policies are also the
cause of the internal conflict in Nicaragua.. Sandinista backing of insurgent groups,
in the form of organization, command and control, training, communication and
logistical support, has been the major factor in the level and duration of conflict
20elsewhere in the region, especially in El Salvador.' u
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Both the economic and military foreign policy instruments chosen proved 
controversial domestically and internationally. The economic aim was fto make the 
Nicaraguan economy scream1. The US stopped all development loans to Nicaragua 
and suspended export-import credits. In 1982 Standard Fruit unilaterally abrogated 
its contractual commitments to purchase Nicaraguan bananas and in 1983 the US cut 
Nicaragua’s sugar quota to the US. The US administration pressured commercial 
banks not to lend to Nicaragua and in 1983 the US Treasury made public the 
administration’s decision to oppose all loans from multilateral agencies such as the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. On 1 May 1985 in Bonn the 
US government announced a complete trade embargo on Nicaragua and abrogated
o i
the 1956 US/Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. In order 
to carry out these policies the Reagan administration declared a 'national
9 9
emergency’ in the US.
US military involvement intensified in the aftermath of the Falklands/Malvinas
war of 1982 after the contras’ Argentine advisers were withdrawn and US passive
support to the counterrevolution changed to a more active and open policy of
23training, arming and financing the contras. The policy divided Congress and 
public opinion in the US and in late 1982 the Chair of the House Intelligence 
Committee, Edward Boland pushed through Congress an amendment which prohibited 
the administration from providing any military assistance to any group ’for the
OApurpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua’. Domestic unease with 
Reagan's policies sharpened in 1984 when it was discovered that the CIA, without 
informing the Congressional Intelligence Committees, had mined Nicaragua's 
harbours. The CIA had thus broken US domestic law by ignoring the Boland
29
Amendment and international law because of its direct military intervention in the
o e
affairs of a sovereign and officially at least ’friendly' country. One of the
consequences of the increasing difficulties that the president faced in securing
funding for the contras from a Congress which from 1986 was controlled by the
Democrats was to force funding underground into the now well known 'guns for
26hostages', 'Contragate' or 'Irangate' operation. Oliver North's privatised foreign
policy network succeeded in providing more finance to the contras but ultimately
in contributing to a discrediting of Reagan's Central American policies with broad
27sections of US and international opinion.
Another reason for domestic controversy in respect of Reagan's Central
American policies was the cost. Taking into account the costs of direct support for
the contras, military and economic aid for Central American governments and the
costs of the frequent US exercises in Honduras and the Caribbean two US scholars
calculated the annual expenditure in the mid-eighties as a t $9.5 billion annually.
Other scholars have estimated annual expenditure ranging from $7 billion to $19
billion annually. The administration admitted to spending some $1.2 billion per
28annum to finance its Central American policies.
The Reagan administration complemented its regional policies with a concerted
diplomatic campaign to try to win support from its allies. A high level delegation
which visited the major European capitals soon after Reagan's inauguration surprised
the European governments by insisting that Central America be placed top of the 
29security agenda. Pressure on the European allies to cease aid to Nicaragua 
continued. Some of that pressure was via normal diplomatic routes. The 
independent Latin American Special Report noted that 'the US felt it necessary to
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fill its European embassies with Central American experts and aim a heavy
01
propaganda campaign towards the European press, at least until late 1985. US
diplomats were periodically dispatched to west European governments in an effort
00to persuade them to refrain from direct involvement in Central America.
Some pressure however was exerted via more indirect mechanisms orchestrated 
by the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC). In October 1984 for instance 
the NSC approved a document entitled fPlans to Provide the Facts to the 
International Community'. The document included a detailed programme designed 
to encourage West European (and Latin American) government leaders, political 
figures, trade unions, intellectuals and academics and media sources to take a more 
sympathetic view towards US policy towards Central America.*^
The Reagan administration did not develop a specific policy to respond to the 
EC's activities in Central America and this in part reflected the Reagan 
administration's preference for bilateral West European relationships. It was the 
administration of President Bush which gave more importance to the relationship 
with the EC at the same time as giving a decreasing priority within US foreign 
policy to Central America. Both these changes evolved as a reaction to a number of 
extraneous factors. Central America became of less importance for the US during 
1989 as the regional peace process seemed to make some progress (see below). The 
region assumed even less importance for the US after the Sandinistas were defeated 
in the February 1990 elections and the strategic goal, to change the 'present 
structure' of the Nicaraguan government, was achieved. With the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in November 1989 Nicaragua was no longer by definition a Cold war problem 
(as there was no longer any Cold war). On the other hand the potential instability
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in the East and the increasing problem facing all the G7 countries of recession 
propelled the US into more collaborative arrangements with the EC.
The Nicaraguan Revolution
Nicaragua was governed by the Somoza family dictatorship from 1937 to 1979 
when a broad-based revolutionary movement led by the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) assumed power after a two year insurrection which had cost 
some 50,000 lives (out of a population of only two and a half m illion).^ Having 
achieved a political revolution with mass support the FSLN judged that it would be 
possible to move rapidly to instigate a social and economic transformation of
oo
society. Socio-economic reforms and the institutionalisation of a particular 
conception of democracy which included participatory and representative forms were 
the basis of domestic policies. Non-alignment was the policy chosen internationally. 
Sandinista attempts to radicalise the revolutionary process coincided with the onset 
of the ’second cold war* and in practice the FSLN in government was forced into a 
position whereby throughout its years in office the priority was to respond to an 
aggressive US policy the open objective of which was to overturn the Sandinista 
government.
The FSLN countered the US campaign with a social, economic, military, political 
and diplomatic strategy designed to garner support for the revolution and to try to 
delegitimise US action - domestically and internationally. At home, the FSLN 
altered and accelerated its land redistribution programme. The original plan had 
been to introduce agrarian reform via cooperatives but the demand from the
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peasantry was for individual plots of land. The FSLN therefore distributed land to 
both cooperatives and individuals - arming the farmers in the war zone so that they 
could defend their newly acquired property.
Politically a system of democracy was introduced which incorporated a multi­
party system but with representatives appointed from sectoral constituencies 
(including political parties to the Left and Right of the FSLN) to a co-legislative 
(with the three person executive) Council of State. In 1985 after the November 1984 
elections the FSLN adopted much more of a representative model with members 
representing political parties elected from geographically based constituencies to 
a parliamentary assembly. Efforts to maintain an element of 'participatory
democracy' within the system were confined to encouraging the activity of the
37'mass' or 'popular' organisations.
The FSLN sought support for the revolution internationally from a broad range 
of governments. Where governments were not sympathetic the FSLN sought to rally 
support from within those societies with the aid of solidarity groups, trade unions, 
church-based organisations and other groups and individuals which might be broadly 
in agreement with the Nicaraguan revolution.
Attempts had been made to establish friendly relations with the US with a senior 
delegation of FSLN leaders visiting Washington in September 1979 to request aid for 
reconstruction including support for reorganising and equipping the re-formed 
Nicaraguan armed forces. Although there had been some sympathy within the Carter 
administration for a policy which would have offered positive inducements to 
prevent the Sandinistas from adopting pro-Soviet policies, the advent of Reagan 
precipitated a deterioration in relations. As the war escalated FSLN diplomacy
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concentrated on three related objectives. The first was to prevent the US from 
isolating the Sandinista government internationally. The second was to gain 
international support for Nicaraguan and Latin and Central American peace 
initiatives. The third - in a counterpoint to US policy towards Nicaragua - was to 
attem pt to discredit and delegitimise US policy towards Central America.
Nicaraguan diplomacy coalesced around a strategy designed to emphasise the 
illegality of US policy. The FSLN called for an end to US sponsorship of the contras 
and intervention on the basis of international law as outlined in the Charter of the 
United Nations. The revolutionary government called for support for the self- 
determination of the Nicaraguan people, for respect for the territorial integrity of 
the nation, for non-intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and for the US 
to adhere to the doctrine of the juridicial equality of sovereign states irrespective 
of size or power. Alejandro Bendaria, the former Secretary-General of the 
Nicaraguan foreign ministry stated that
’We are making our defence on the basis of very conservative principles. For a 
revolutionary nation we are calling for law and order on an international scale and 
this is something which a broad range of sectors and governments can and indeed 
feel compelled to identify with.''*®
The FSLN backed up the diplomatic offensive with an expansion of the military, 
introducing conscription in 1983. The belief was that,
’Success in foreign policy is basically a function of success in military policy.
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Had we three times the creativity and brains., yet somehow on a military level we 
had faltered, somehow our people had not stood up to the military and economic 
pressure, all of this would have collapsed. Foreign policy in and of itself would not 
have been able to sustain it.
In 1982 Nicaragua was elected to the Security Council despite US opposition and 
used its position to announce various plans for peace. From 1983 however Nicaraguan 
diplomatic efforts concentrated on support for the Contadora and Esquipulas peace 
plans (see below). By 1987 opinion in Washington was shifting in favour of the 
Esquipulas peace plan with senior Democrat Jim Wright stating in public that US 
presidential advisers seemed to be trying to topple the peace process.^® By 1987 
all of the US' allies were also supporting the Central American peace plans. 
International support for the peace plans was important to the FSLN not just 
because of the intrinsic merit of the promotion of peace, but also because whatever 
criticisms of the Nicaraguan government the plans contained, they all recognised the 
legitimacy of the Sandinistas as the party of government. Bendafia stated that
'Diplomacy has enabled., other Central American countries, the prime US allies, 
to recognise, as they did in Esquipulas, the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan revolution, 
to recognise the Nicaraguan government as a legitimate government. This is 
something the United States fought tooth and nail against. We have been able to 
gather together one of the broadest anti-interventionist international fronts in 
modern times.
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The radicalisation of the revolution had contributed to the change in US policy 
from relatively passive to active hostility. It also contributed to a distancing from 
the revolution of former allies which included the European and Latin American 
member parties of the Socialist International (see Chapter 6). But despite the 
misgivings of Western governments (and the outright hostility from the US), a 
politically catholic range of governments chose to maintain diplomatic and economic 
relations with Nicaragua and continued to regard the Sandinistas as a legitimate 
government. It could perhaps be concluded therefore that in terms of the 
international legitimacy of the FSLN government it was Sandinista diplomacy had 
succeeded and US diplomacy had failed.
The Latin and Central American Peace Processes
The genesis of what evolved as a succession of Latin American and Central 
American initiatives for peace came partly from Nicaragua's initiatives in the 
Security Council and elsewhere which in February 1982 were given influential 
backing when the President of Mexico, Jose L6pez Portillo called for support for his 
own peace p lan .^  The Mexican president’s proposal was followed by a September 
1982 letter to the presidents of the US, Nicaragua and Honduras from the presidents 
of both Mexico and Venezuela, who announced that they were concerned that armed 
border clashes between Nicaragua and Honduras might turn into a 'conflict that 
could extend to the whole region'. The two Latin American presidents called for 
peace talks to establish 'a global agreement that might provide true peace talks to 
establish 'a global agreement that might provide true peace between Nicaragua and
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Honduras and which will bear a positive result in a framework of world tensions and
JO
confrontations.'
Venezuela and Mexico pursued their peace efforts, joining with Colombia and
Panama in January 1983 to form the Contadora Group - called after the Colombian
island where the four countries first met to discuss the Central American crisis. The
Contadora Group’s objectives were set out in a draft twenty-one point peace treaty
in September 1983 which was drawn up after consultation with the Central American
republics. The recommendations included the withdrawal of all foreign military
advisers from the region, the end of support to irregular forces and the cessation of
tension-generating military manoeuvres in the border regions. The ’Document of
Objectives’ was primarily concerned with security issues although the draft treaty
included some references to internal issues such as promoting national
reconciliation, the establishment of 'democratic, representative and pluralistic
systems' and respect for human rig h ts .^
The Contadora initiative was accompanied by intensive regional and international
diplomatic activity. The Contadora group met eleven times in 1983. The Central
American foreign ministers met six times as part of the Contadora process and the
technical commission, composed of representatives from all the Central American
countries met four times. In September 1983 the Latin American Economic System
(SELA) gave its support to the Contadora process and set up the 'Committee of
Action and Support for Economic and Social Development in Central America'. In
January 1984 the Contadora Group and the Central American nations attempted to
strengthen the process by creating three joint committees to deal with security,
45political and social and economic issues.
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This intensification of diplomatic activity took place within the context of an 
increasingly militaristic posture by the United States towards the region. Bellicose 
speeches by President Reagan threatening military action against Nicaragua were 
followed by invasion, not of Nicaragua, but a much smaller Grenada (population 
100,000) on October 25 1983. In February 1983 and again in February 1984 the US 
also carried out large scale troop exercises near the Nicaraguan border in Honduras - 
the ’Big Pine I* and 'Big Pine II' manoeuvres. The US illegally mined Nicaragua’s 
ports in February and March 1984 (see above) and in April 1984 began more military 
exercises, 'Granadero I', in Honduras. These military exercises were followed by US 
naval exercises off Nicaragua's coasts, involving 30,000 troops and 350 ships.
The Contadora Group continued to pursue its peace efforts and in June 1984 
presented its 'Draft Act on Peace and Cooperation'. Amendments from the five 
republics were incorporated and in September 1984 Guatemala and Costa Rica 
agreed to sign the revised Act. Of the five governments Nicaragua had been one of 
the most critical of the revised Act,
'disliking the Act's proposal for international monitoring of internal political 
processes and openly unhappy at the prospect of establishing regionally-defined force 
limits while direct US military pressures and the war with the 'Contra' rebels 
continued.'
On September 21 1984 however it was the Nicaraguan government which became 
the first of the five to sign the Act. This entirely unexpected decision resulted in 
a United States diplomatic offensive designed to encourage the other four republics
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to reject the Contadora Act. Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica responded by 
agreeing amendments - published in the October 1984 ’Tegucigalpa Document' - 
which if agreed would have weakened the provisions within the Contadora revised 
Act designed to prohibit military forces and bases from the region. A leaked US 
National Security Council document concluded that through the use of intensive 
regional diplomacy the US had 'effectively blocked efforts made by the Contadora
A 7Group to impose their second version of the Contadora Act'.
The Contadora Group continued to meet throughout 1985 although it faced 
continued difficulties because of US wariness in respect of the Contadora proposals 
and because of the continued US military activity in the region. In April 1985 the 
United States suggested that the peace process be transferred from within the 
framework of the Contadora process to the Organisation of the American States 
(OAS). Support for this unsuccessful proposal came from Honduras, El Salvador, 
Costa Rica and the now pro-US Grenada. The Contadora process was given fresh 
impetus in 1985 however when Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay agreed to form 
themselves as a support group for the Contadora process, calling themselves the 
'Lima Group'. Collectively the Contadora and Lima Groups became known as the 
'Group of 8' (renaming itself the Rio Group in 1986). Attempts by the United States 
to enlarge the group to include the more pro-US Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic were unsuccessful.
The Contadora and Lima Groups continued to meet through 1985 presenting yet 
another draft Act in September. This time Nicaragua objected given that the 
proposed treaty allowed for the continuation of US military exercises and gave no 
guarantees as to the cessation of US funding for the contras. Instead Nicaragua
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proposed that a direct dialogue between itself and the US take place and called for 
a general treaty to be negotiated for all the Central American counties to be signed 
at a meeting of the Central American presidents scheduled for May 1986.
The next step in the peace process was taken at Caraballeda, Venezuela with the 
issuing of a statement from the Contadora and Lima Groups in January 1986. The 
Caraballeda Declaration called on the United States to resume talks with Nicaragua 
(unsuccessful bilateral US-Nicaraguan talks had taken place in 1984 at Manzanillo, 
Mexico), to suspend aid to the contras and to withdraw its troops from the region. 
All five Central American presidents supported this declaration as did the major 
political parties in Western Europe. The Group of 8 pressed their proposals at a 
meeting with Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington in February 1986 but 
were informed that the United States would only talk directly to the Nicaraguans 
when the Sandinista government talked directly with the contras. The US rebuff of 
these latest Contadora proposals combined with the continued increase in the US 
military presence in the region meant that the peace process made little progress 
in 1986 although the Contadora Group continued to meet throughout that year.
The May 1986 meeting of the Central American presidents a t Esquipulas, 
Guatemala achieved little. The discussions centred on relatively narrow economic 
issues, partly because the newly elected President Arias of Costa Rica was reluctant 
to undertake broader discussions which would include the Nicaraguans and which 
would appear therefore to concede democratic legitimacy to President Ortega.^® 
The only agreements made were to meet again the following year and to create a 
Central American Parliament.
Some impetus to the Latin American efforts for peace was given in November
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1986 when the Secretary General of the United Nations and the OAU, Javier P6rez 
de Cuellar and Joao Baena Soares launched a joint initiative, designed to put both 
international organisations at the disposal of the peace process. Another 
development which had a significant impact in both mobilising international support 
for the peace process and isolating the United States in respect of its policy towards 
Central America was the final judgement of the International Court of Justice issued 
on June 27 1986. The judgement stated, inter alia, that the United States was in 
breach of international law because of its support for the contras and its military 
and economic intervention against Nicaragua (see above).^
Tensions rose to new heights in December 1986 with a series of border clashes 
involving Nicaraguan and Honduran troops. The United States moved its troops to 
within 40 km of the Nicaraguan border in December 1986 and the Nicaraguan army 
responded by mobilising its army to carry out exercises just 10 km from the 
Honduran border. The Nicaraguan government invited the UN, the OAS, the 
Contadora Group and the Lima Group to send an investigation team to the border 
zone and at the end of 1986 the Contadora Group was supporting this idea, proposing 
the establishment of a peace commission comprising the foreign ministers of the 
Group of 8 and the General Secretaries of the UN and the OAS.
Despite the general lack of progress in 1986 in terms of the peace process there 
were changes occurring within the Central American polities which pointed to a 
more hopeful political environment. In January 1986 President Cerezo took office 
in Guatemala as a civilian head of state and with a commitment to restoring 
democracy and working for peace. President Arias, who was elected in May 1986, 
committed his government to actively work for peace. President Azcona of Honduras
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pledged that he would rid his country of the contras. President Duarte in El 
Salvador, having been unable to control either the economic crisis or the death 
squads at home, may have considered that he could gain some credibility for his 
beleaguered (from the Right as well as from the revolutionary movement) Christian 
Democratic party from a regional peace settlement which also might contribute to 
ending the murderous Salvadorean civil war.
In the first half of 1987 President Arias put together the first version of his 
proposed plan for peace. Guatemala rejected this version as being discriminatory 
towards Nicaragua and suggested a number of modifications. The revised plan called 
for the withdrawal of all foreign military advisers from the region, a complete 
cease-fire and the holding of free and pluralist elections in all of the countries of 
Central America, despite President Reagan's personal disapproval and his last 
minute intervention supported by senior Democrat J im Wright, the Central American 
presidents ratified their own proposals for peace. On August 7 1987 the five 
presidents signed the 'Procedure for the Establishment of a Strong and Lasting Peace 
in Central America' - more commonly known as the 'Esquipulas II' peace 
agreement.
The Esquipulas agreement acknowledged that the root causes of the conflict 
were due to social and economic factors. It also asserted the necessity for 
representative and participatory democracy and called for respect for national 
independence. The Central American nations committed themselves to a process of 
national reconciliation, to take measures to bring about a cease-fire, to declare 
amnesties for political prisoners, to end any states of emergencies or states of siege, 
to hold free and pluralist elections, to stop all aid to irregular forces, to refuse to
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allow their territory to be used by irregular forces and to set up National 
Reconciliation Commissions. The Accords were to be overseen by an International 
Verification and Follow-Up Commission (CIVS) which would be comprised of the 
foreign ministers of the Group of 8 and the Central American republics, and the
ei
Secretary General of the UN and the OAS. The Esquipulas Accords received 
widespread international support including from important sectors of US public 
opinion. Jim Wright abandoned his opposition and adopted a stance of active support 
for the Esquipulas proposals. President Arias was awarded the 1987 Nobel peace 
prize in recognition and in support of this new plan for peace.
In January 1988 the CIVS reported back to the third Central American 
presidential summit (Esquipulas III). The CIVS spoke positively about the Nicaraguan 
efforts to implement democratic reforms and criticised other, unspecified countries 
for human rights abuses. The Commission also openly criticised the US for its
KOcontinued aid to the contras. These actual and implied criticisms of the US and 
its allies were not well received and this summit seemed likely to have ended 
without advancing the peace process further until the Nicaraguan government 
announced a series of unilateral actions including the surprising (and in Nicaragua 
controversial) decision to talk directly to the contras. Nicaragua was also forced to 
concede the abolition of the CIVS and its replacement by a monitoring team
CO
composed of the five Central American foreign ministers. The peace process 
thus continued throughout 1988 albeit losing some momentum as all sides waited to 
discover who would be the next president of the United States - envisaging a possible 
change of policy.
The February 1989 summit of the Central American presidents took place at a
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particular hiatus in the peace process, before the new US president appeared to have 
formulated any clear policies for the region. This summit brought another surprising 
development with all five Central American presidents displaying unprecedented 
independence from Washington. The five presidents, a t the request of President 
Azcona of Honduras agreed a plan which was intended to disarm and demobilise the 
contras within ninety days of the summit. Guatemalan President Cerezo reflected 
the prevalent mood in his comment that
'the truth is that events are imposing peace on us. To do the contrary, to 
continue violence, is to go against development and the solution to the region's 
economic and social problems.. We reached the Esquipulas 2 agreement that frankly 
set the bases for a new phase in international policy. Now we talk about negotiation, 
and the mechanism of confrontation and war is rejected.
However the Central American peace process of itself did not bring peace. The 
Bush administration devised a 'bi-partisan accord' between Republicans and 
Democrats who in April 1989 agreed to provide some $50 million in 'humanitarian 
aid' for the contras. The Salvadorean war did not come to an end until a UN 
brokered peace deal succeeded in 1991. The Guatemalan peasantry, particularly the 
Indian population, remained the subject of military repression (see Chapter 5).
However peace of a sort did come to Nicaragua in 1990 after the defeat of the 
Sandinistas in the February elections. This election result, combined with the 
redirection of US priorities to the Middle East and Europe, resulted in a cessation 
of aid to the contras and the latter's demobilisation.
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The peace process did succeed in so far as it helped to dissuade the US from 
launching a full scale invasion of Nicaragua (as happened in Panama in 1989) and 
therefore the consequent conflagration that had been envisaged for Central America 
was avoided. While invasion was never the only US option, it is reasonable to suggest 
that without external pressure it would have been more likely.
That the peace process maintained the momentum it did was partly due to 
international support - arguably the most important sources of that support being 
from within the United States for instance from members of Congress, churches, 
labour unions, solidarity groups, municipal authorities - and from similar sources 
within West Europe.
The major difference between the US and the EC in terms of the sources of 
support for the peace process was that the former government attempted to block 
and stall the peace process and the latter organisation and its member states 
actively backed both the Contadora proposals and the Esquipulas II initiative. This 
was because the US was opposed to a settlement which would have granted 
legitimacy to the Sandinista government and the latter organisation and its member 
governments were (reluctantly in some cases) prepared to concede legitimacy to the 
FSLN in order to help the peace process succeed.
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Chapter 2 European Community Foreign Policy
This chapter outlines the basic theoretical assumptions which will be utilised 
throughout this study.
The chapter reviews the history and development of European Community (EC) 
foreign policy. This sketch of EC foreign policy relates to the EC as an international 
actor, that is the unit level of analysis. The EC as unit of analysis is however viewed 
within a systemic context, in this case a two-layered systemic context. The 
overarching systemic context is the international system as a universal system. The 
more immediate systemic context is a delimited international system; that of West- 
West relations, and in particular, that of European Community-United States 
relations. For the purposes of this study EC/US relations form an important sub- 
svstemic analytical context.
Two interrelated problems in the study of EC foreign policy are discussed. The 
first is the analytical division between two aspects of the EC's external activities; 
the 'external relations' of the EC and 'European Political Cooperation' (EPC). The 
argument is, that at least by the mid-eighties, the analytical distinction between the 
two had declined. The suggestion is that a more appropriate conception of these two 
activities is of two institutionally and theoretically interrelated components of an 
EC foreign policy.
The second, more important, problem is the issue of whether or not the EC can 
be considered as possessing a foreign policy, in the sense in which that term is 
normally conceived. The conclusion is somewhat agnostic (and open), for two 
reasons. Firstly, a judgement about the nature of EC foreign policy is inextricably
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related to the paradigm selected for interpretation of EC ’actorliness' and activities. 
Secondly, the historical record demonstrates that the EC faced an unresolved 
contradiction at the heart of its foreign policy activities; how to accommodate itself 
to the security leadership of its ally and partner the United States within the 
context of West-West relations, while at the same time permitting the growth of an 
autonomous, independent (of the United States if necessary) foreign policy. The 
argument is that this practical obstacle - of how to find a way to work 
independently of, yet in partnership with the United States - as much as any 
theoretical or institutional issue, caused a major dilemma which mitigated against 
attempts to consolidate European Community foreign policy capabilities.
The chapter therefore presents a review of the historical development of EC 
foreign policy which focuses on these two theoretical problems. The contradictory 
historical and institutional development of the EC's external relations and EPC are 
reviewed in terms of the trends towards convergence of these two related external 
activities. Institutional and historical developments are related to the shared 
interests, and the difficulties and contradictions of the EC's relationship with the 
United States.
Definitions and concepts
This section outlines four theoretical assumptions which will be utilised as basic 
conceptual 'building-blocks'. These are - the EC as international actor; a definition 
of 'foreign policy'; the notion of 'foreign policy decision-making analysis'; and the 
distinction between 'foreign policy' and 'international relations'. The section
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postulates a distinction between decision-making and structural analysis in the study 
of EC foreign policy and proposes a conceptual schema for further analysis of 
structural factors in the study of EC foreign policy.*
A perhaps not uncontentious assumption which underpins this study is that the
European Community was an international actor possessing at least the potential
capacity to operate within the international system as an integrated body and
consequently with a potential foreign policy capacity similar to that of the nation 
ostate. The thesis however, does not rest on the assumption that the EC has 
operated in a similar fashion to the nation state in contemporary international 
relations. Instead, there is an attempt to explain the unique features of the EC's 
actor capacity in international relations and how those unique features were 
operationalised in foreign policy terms. One reason that the EC was unique as an 
international actor was because of its differences, as an actor which makes and 
implements foreign policy, as well as its commonalities with the nation-state. This 
chapter therefore contains an assessment of the scope and nature of actually- 
existing EC foreign policy. EC foreign policy is considered as the dependent variable; 
not the independent variable, the development of which is assessed either implicitly 
or explicitly in order to better understand the progress of the EC towards union or 
integration.
Without precluding any final assessment of the utility of the terminology, the 
term 'foreign policy' is utilised here to describe the EC's international activities. 
This does not imply a defence of the idea that the above mentioned EC policies can 
be categorised as 'foreign policy' in the same sense that the nation state  has a 
developed foreign policy (the obvious difference is the EC's lack of a centralised
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military instrument controlled by a centralised government). Nor is the argument 
made here that the EC’s purposive policies directed beyond its borders necessarily 
could or should be evaluated as a sui generis foreign policy.
One widely accepted definition of ’foreign policy1 is ’governmental activity 
which is concerned with relationships between the state  and other actors, 
particularly states, in the international system’.* For the purposes of this study the 
foreign policy of the EC is thus understood as ’European Community activity which 
is concerned with relationships between the European Community and other actors, 
particularly states, in the international system’. European Community foreign policy 
had two strands to it; European Political Cooperation and 'external relations' (see 
below).
This study analyses EC foreign policy at both the level of the unit and the level 
of the system. At the unit level the focus of the study is on foreign policy decision­
making. and consequently the how and whv questions in respect of EC behaviour in
e
international relations.
At the systemic level the study will focus on both decision-making and structural 
analysis. The suggestion proposed in this study is that in theoretical terms, 
structural affects or the structural impact of the EC on third countries (excluding 
the member states) came about either because of the position of the EC in the 
international system relative to other actors, or because of unintended or 
unanticipated affects on third parties of EC international and domestic policies. 
The further suggestion is that, for analytical purposes, the former type of structural 
affect can be termed a positional affect, and the latter a contingent affect. 
Positional and contingent structural factors can be separated analytically although
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in practice it is likely that the structural impact of the EC in the international 
system would combine both factors.
A structural positional affect can be exemplified through reference to the 
consequences which have arisen from the position of the EC in the international 
system as a prosperous, relatively cohesive, political and economic unit, which have
o
included both emulative and reactive responses from other international actors. 
For example the growth of regional blocs such as the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the revived Central 
American Common Market (CACM) came about partly due to a desire by small 
states to emulate what was perceived as the successful regional integration
Q
undertaken by the EC. Applications to join the EC from the East European 
countries, Turkey and Austria, among others, were examples of reactive linkages to 
the EC.
An example of the contingent structural affect of the EC’s domestic policies 
might be the impact of the enlargement of the EC on citrus fruit growers in the 
Third World. Although the inclusion of Spain and Portugal was not designed to make 
Third World producers of citrus fruits economically weaker, this was an unintended 
consequence of enlargement. This structural contingent affect had a direct foreign 
policy ramification for the EC because Third World producers wanted to renegotiate 
trading agreements with the EC.
In sum, foreign policy decision-making responses were required or elicited from 
the EC in all the examples cited above of structural affects. One likely consequence 
therefore of structural factors is pressure for foreign policy decision-making 
reactions from the EC.
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Fred A. Sondermann’s analytical distinction between ’foreign policy* and 
'international relations' is utilised in order to further clarify the conceptual 
framework used to separate the unit and systemic levels of analysis. Sondermann 
stated that 'a country's projection of policies beyond its borders is a "foreign policy" 
when considered from the point of view of the country itself, and an "international 
relationship" when considered from the point of view of the larger system.'*®
In conclusion, the argument presented is that given the EC uncontestably does 
engage in formation and implementation of policies that are directed beyond its 
borders, it can be said to have a foreign policy. The important question is not the 
semantic issue. More interesting is the theoretical question as to what extent that 
foreign policy can be considered in any way analogous to the foreign policy function 
of the nation state. The answer to this questions partly emerges from an assessment 
of the extent to which the EC had developed as a cohesive, autonomous, 
international actor. In order to make that assessment this chapter reviews the 
historical development of the actor capacity of the EC in international relations.
Historical development of EC foreign policy
Historically, the foreign policy of the EC developed via two institutionally 
separate, if increasingly interrelated spheres of activity; the EC's 'external 
relations' and 'European Political Cooperation' (EPC). Although, for analytical 
purposes it has been conventional to separate the discussion of EC external relations 
from the discussion of EPC, this analytical practice has not been without its critics. 
For instance Juliet Lodge referred to this distinction as 'artificial'.** Although
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this chapter will adopt the conventional methodology, it will also contain a critique 
of it.
The function and role of the EC’s external relations were related to the EC’s
specific economic policy responsibilities and competencies as set out in the Treaty
of Rome. However it was difficult for EC (and member state) policy-makers to
confine the ramifications of EC external activities solely to the economic or
functional competencies on which they were founded. The EC's external economic
relationships had political ramifications beyond the EC's borders. For example sugar
policy which was a clear EC responsibility under the Rome Treaty provisions
relating, inter alia, to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) became in practice,
EC sugar policy a contentious foreign policy issues vis-a-vis relations between Third
World sugar exporting nations and the EC and its member states. It has also caused
12political controversy between the member states.
The second sphere of EC foreign policy activity was that of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). EPC emerged the 1969 Summit of Heads of State and 
Government (HSG) and was institutionalised in the 1987 Single European Act (SEA). 
EPC was conventionally considered as synonymous with the direct foreign policy 
function of the European Community. In fact, EPC, as the name implies, 
encompassed a wider political function than simply the development of a 
harmonised, coordinated or common foreign policy. As Philippe de Schoutheete 
stressed in his seminal work, La Cooperation Politioue Eurooeenne. political 
cooperation included two areas other than foreign policy harmonisation efforts. 
These were the attempts by EC member states to create a ’European judicial space’ 
and the systematised cooperation in the field of public order, the la tter initiated in
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1976. As De Schoutheete reported, the 1970 Luxembourg Report which set out the 
basis for EPC practice, envisaged that foreign policy cooperation would be only the 
beginning of efforts by member states to try to coordinate and work together in
IQ
other areas of political activity.
Both EC external relations and EPC possessed a wider remit than pervasive 
theoretical interpretations commonly admit. The question is whether there were 
significant variations in the practice such as to make the theoretical distinction 
between the two categories either untenable, or of decreasing explanatory utility. 
Using the conventional distinction however, the following sections trace the 
historical development of both strands of EC foreign policy separately in order to 
try to examine how the EC operated purposefully beyond its borders. Comment is 
made on how and where both strands converge.
European Community external relations
The European Community (EC) is an amalgam of three different institutions. The 
first to be set up, in 1951 by the treaty of Paris was the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The second and the third, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were created by the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. The three Communities were amalgamated in 1967.
Like all international organisations the EC emerged from and was shaped by 
specific historical conditions. The historical circumstance in which the Community 
was created give some indication as to why foreign policy competencies were 
excluded from the 1957 Treaty.
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The precursors of European Community foreign policy cooperation can be traced 
to post-war West European efforts to establish cooperation in defence matters. The 
first fruits of such coordination were the Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty signed on 4 
March 1947 and the Brussels Treaty signed by Britain, France and the Benelux 
countries on 17 March 1948. Both these treaties were specifically directed against 
Germ any.^ France, and to a lesser extent Britain, placed a high premium in their 
foreign policies on the containment of renewed German expansionism.
For the United States, post-war political priorities coalesced around anti­
communist objectives. The threat of German resurgence was considered a secondary 
issue compared to the importance of defending the West against Soviet or 
Communist (these terms were used more or less interchangeably in US government 
pronouncements and policy declarations) encroachments. US post-war strategy was 
to encourage the development of West European integrationist efforts whereby 
Germany could be allowed to reindustrialise and partially rearm in order to better 
provide a stronger, more cohesive West European element to the united Western 
front against Soviet expansionism. Post-war institutionalised West European 
cooperation which included Germany began therefore as a result of United States 
pressure.
The US encouraged European cooperation by making the European Recovery
Programme (ERP or Marshall Aid), conditional on West European coordination and
1 5cooperation in respect of its disbursement. In 1948 the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created to carry out this function. In 
1950, an offshoot of the OEEC, the European Payments Union (EPU), was set up in 
order to support increased intra-European trade and by so doing reduce West
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European dependence on US exports and dollars. According to one scholar, Amitai 
Etzioni, the success of the EPU, laid the basis for the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.*® The ECSC incorporated the six 
countries which were to become the founding members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957; France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
the Netherlands.
The ECSC was created as an institutionally independent West European
organisation although it was politically and initially financially supported by the 
17United States. Its remit was specific and linked to narrow economic issues but 
the rationale for its establishment was predominately political. The ECSC was a 
concrete manifestation of US policy which was to support a reindustrialised Germany 
as part of a European bulwark against Communism. French fears of resurgent 
German militarism were to be allayed by incorporating an element of French control 
over German industrial policy vis a vis the supranational elements of the Paris 
Treaty which established the ECSC.*®
French supervision of German rearmament, intended to parallel the supervisory 
capabilities over German reindustrialisation, which had been established via the 
mechanisms and the institutions of the ECSC, was intended to occur via the 
establishment and institutionalisation of a European Defence Community (EDC) and 
the putative European Political Community (EPC) (envisaged in Article 38 of the 
draft EDC Treaty). The EDC was strongly supported by the United States which was 
particularly anxious to strengthen the European contribution to Western defence in 
the aftermath of the Korean war - which seemed, to a United States which 
considered it had just 'lost' China - yet another example of the dangers of
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expansionist Communism. However, despite US pressure, both the EDC and its
potential partner, the European Political Community, were stillborn in 1954 when
IQthe French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC Treaty.
Defence issues and priorities for Western Europe were resolved in 1955 to the
extent that Germany was accepted into the US dominated North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). All participants in this new organisation, which had been
established in 1949, accepted the strategic goal of the containment of Soviet
expansionism. Thus by 1955, just a decade after the Second World War, old enemies
were now allies (somewhat reluctantly in the French case) and an ex-ally was now
the main enemy. Anti-Communist objectives, initially promoted most vigorously by
the United States, were now accepted as the shared strategic priority of both sides
of the transatlantic alliance.
The implication for evolving West European integrationist efforts of both the
failure of the EDC and the placement of strategic policy making within a
transatlantic organisation was that consideration of West European defence and
political cooperation (including foreign policy cooperation) was postponed. A
gradualist approach to further European integration was adopted, based on what was
widely seen as the success of the ECSC - an organisation with modest and apparently
20achievable objectives.
This gradualist perspective informed the discussions that laid the foundations for 
the Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957.
’The treaty amplifies close targets and underplays more remote and more 
difficult goals, allowing time for adjustments to new arrangements and to the partial
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21loss of sovereignty that the new institutions entail/
The Treaty committed the founding members to the broad generality of progress 
towards ’ever closer union*. It was only specific about limited economic objectives, 
including, inter alia, the gradual attainment of a quantitative and qualitative trade 
barrier-free Community. The Treaty envisaged that the ’ever closer union’ would 
develop by way of incremental steps which would involve the creation of a free 
trade area, a customs union, common market and possibly at later stages, economic, 
monetary and finally political union. But even these limited economic competencies 
had external ramifications. The EC, because of its domestic functions, would 
necessarily function as an international actor - if not an international actor with the 
same capabilities and responsibilities as that of the nation state.
From its inception the EC assumed four specific external relations functions. 
The first was the task of developing and implementing a Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP). The CCP would necessarily be complemented by a Common External Tariff 
(CET) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to tra d e .^  Tariffs and NTBs by their nature 
are not neutral instruments. They are directed against trading partners and in the 
case of the EC in support of the economic prosperity and development of the
no
member states. Trade barriers were likely to affect the EC’s political allies 
given that the USA and Japan evolved into the other two major trading blocs in the 
contemporary international political economy. Any vigorous measures by the EC 
either to promote its own exports or to limit its competitors imports - particularly 
in those sectors which were in direct competition with Japanese and US export 
sectors - would be likely to provoke at least an economic response and probably a
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political backlash from the EC's major a llies .^
The French insisted on the creation of a second external relations responsibility 
which was a recognition of the member states historical with certain developing 
countries. Part IV of the Treaty contained provisions which provided the foundations 
for the later creation of the extensive institutionalisation of links between the EC 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the four Lom6 Treaties (1975, 
1979, 1984, 1989).25
The third external relations responsibility allocated to the EEC was the power 
to negotiate association and preferential trade agreements with third states and 
international organisations. As a result of this competence the EC acted on behalf 
of the member states in international organisations ranging from the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the North Atlantic Fisheries
net
Organisation. Even where the EC did not replace the member states it
sometimes achieved a permanent place in multilateral decision making fora. For
instance the EC was granted observer status at the United Nations. At the meetings
of the Group of 7 industrialised countries (G7), the Community became the only
international actor, apart from the group's constituent members, which was
27permitted to participate.
A fourth EC competence which has external relations implications was contained 
in Article 237 which provided for the EC to negotiate accession with potential new 
members. This competence was exercised with respect to Britain, Ireland, Denmark 
and Norway (Norway later leaving the EC after a referendum voted to reject EC 
membership) which acceded to the EC in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and 
Portugal in 1986.
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In addition to the four specific EC competencies, other spheres of EC activity
as laid out in the Treaty, were likely to have indirect consequences in respect of an
increasing necessity for the EC to consider the external ramifications of domestic
policy responsibilities. Two such policies, that of agriculture and nuclear research,
28were identified by Christopher Hill and William Wallace. These less specific 
competencies assumed a greater significance in 1976 when the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) ruled that fonce an internal power has been used, the respective 
external power exclusively stays with the Community, a t least as long as the
oq
internal order requires a unitary use of external powers towards third states.
An attribute of the EC's external relations capacities was a discernible 
tendency towards multilateral diplomacy. The Commission took part in the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), the Euro-Arab dialogue, 
the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) and as previously noted the Commission plays a
Oft
major role in both GATT and the G7. One reason for the EC's tendency towards
multilateral diplomatic fora and initiatives was that as a multilateral institution
itself, the Community found easily identifiable organisational compatibilities with
other multilateral institutions.
In terms of the 'reach' and the 'impact' of the EC's external relations the
Community's activities could broadly be divided into the following four geo-political 
01
regions. The first of these was the industrialised, capitalist north including the
US and Japan. The Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) would also later share
oocertain interests with these major industrial powers.
The second of these regions included the geographically proximate nations such
oo
as the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the
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Mediterranean and Arab states. The existence of the neighbouring European 
Community, the largest trade bloc in the world, was likely to create at minimum 
structural positional affects. The third geo-political grouping comprised the 
developing economies whose states were likely to look for EC markets, investment 
and aid.
The fourth geo-political region was that of the Socialist bloc which could not be 
immune to the reverberations of the creation of the EC. The Rome Treaty 
committed the EEC to the promotion of free enterprise and free trade - the 
antithesis of the principles on which the Socialist countries had built their 
economies. It would be a worthless teleological thesis to argue in hindsight that the 
attraction of EC prosperity would act as a catalyst to the changes which did take 
place in Eastern Europe in 1989. It would be fair comment however to note that an 
expanding and prosperous EEC would be bound to evoke some sort of political 
reaction - whether defensive as was the case with Soviet attitudes to the EC until 
the mid-eighties - or as a pole of attraction - which appeared to be the case for 
some of the pre-1989 dissidents who later became leaders in their own countries 
(Havel and Walechsa for instance).
As the Community developed and expanded, its representatives increasingly 
viewed the Community as a role model for other groups of states. Community 
policy-makers espoused the value of bigger domestic markets in order to encourage 
economic expansion. Politically, Community representatives pointed to the success 
of the Community as providing a forum and institution which its advocates claimed 
had helped in the post-war period to prevent the resumption of armed conflicts 
between the ex-colonial European powers. They argued that regional integration had
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advanced such as to make inconceivable war between the member states. These
factors help to explain why the Community actively encouraged the formation
and/or consolidation of other regional associations.*^ These included ASEAN, the
Andean Pact, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the wider grouping which brought
together the 69 ACP countries via their participation in the Lom6 structures.
Other nations responded to the European Community as an international actor
to the extent that 141 states had established diplomatic relations with the
Community, independently of their diplomatic links with the member states, as at
October 1990.^ Conversely the EC was independently represented in 93 third
37countries and 4 international organisations as at June 1991.
For many Third World nations their Brussels representation was as important as 
their Washington DC, London or Tokyo diplomatic representation. This was partly 
because for poor, economically less developed nations, the 'low' politics of aid, trade 
and development were inseparable from the fhighf politics of security, defence and
OQ
foreign policy. Arguably it was also because the Community was increasingly 
viewed as an important political actor on the world stage.
The external (and internal) perception of the EC as to a greater or lesser extent, 
an important actor in international relations, was not a new phenomena. In 1973, 
Ralf Dahrendorf, the Commissioner responsible for trade and external affairs, in a 
disquisition on the EC's role in the world, unselfconsciously entitled 'The Foreign 
Policy of the EEC', referred to the desire of countries in Latin America, South East
OQ
Asia and Africa to maintain some form of relationship with the Community. In 
his opinion, the EC was already a significant international actor, partly because it 
was perceived as such by the First, Third and Socialist worlds. Dahrendorf testified,
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perhaps rather disingenuously, to what he considered to be the
'extraordinary image which the European Community continues to have 
throughout the world. This is true for the Commonwealth countries, whatever their 
natural advantage or stage of development. It is true for our partners in world trade, 
the major industrialised nations. And it is true for those countries in the world which 
have different economic, social and political systems from ours.'^®
From the end of the Cold war in 1989 the Community adopted an increasingly 
more obtrusive role in world affairs and in July 1989 the G7 allocated to the 
Community the role of aid coordination role towards Eastern Europe. In this respect 
the Commission was expected to make political judgments as to which governments 
would receive assistance. Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission told the 
European Parliament on 23 January 1991 that fIt was logical that this aid should go 
first to the countries which had progressed furthest along the rocky road to 
democracy - namely Poland and Hungary - before being extended to the other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.'^*
The Community was also given the task by the European Council of coordinating 
Community aid and cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. The political 
nature of the Community's involvement was again apparent. Delors stated that 'the 
Community cannot possibly ignore internal political developments in the Soviet 
Union, and its ability to push through reform without civil strife, when deciding on 
the extent of its com m itm ent'.^
Thus from its inception the EEC's external policies had at minimum, economic
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foreign policy ramifications - and if one accepts the liberal, interdependence, 
interpretation of international relations - significant political ramifications in 
certain issue a re a s .^  At minimum the EC’s external activities had a structural 
impact in international relations, which in some circumstances led to pressures for 
a foreign policy decision making response.
Besides this sometimes indirect political impact of the Community in 
international relations the Community also operated as a self-defined and self- 
conscious political international actor, vis-a-vis the mechanisms of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). This was the other, more visible arm of Community 
foreign policy.
European Political Cooperation
(i) Historical development
In 1952, the six member states of the ECSC asked the High Authority of the 
ECSC to draw up a draft Treaty for a European Political Community, which would 
parallel the proposed E D C .^  Although the EDC collapsed and with it any serious 
pressures or support for European federalism, the idea that Community economic 
decision making should be complemented by some form of common foreign policy 
making machinery was never abandoned. The question that remained was as to how 
that objective should be achieved. Would the foreign policy making component be 
that of a loosely coordinated intergovernmental machinery such as that envisaged 
by De Gaulle, a Europe des Patries. which the ill-fated Fouchet plans of 1961 and
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1962 were designed to accomplish?^ Or would the political community necessary 
to achieve foreign policy coherence contain mechanisms whereby the EC would 
undertake a t least a coordinating role and which would therefore encourage the 
development of the Community as a supranational entity?
These two questions and their underlying philosophies - of intergovernmentalism 
or supranationalitv have delineated the terms of the debate on European Community 
foreign policy throughout the history of the EC. The development of the EC's 
explicitly political foreign policy making mechanism - European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) - is traced below therefore in the context of these theoretically 
divergent, although arguably in practice increasingly convergent, approaches to EC 
foreign policy.
The reason for the failure of the Fouchet Plans was not that the Plans 
themselves were not susceptible to compromise and therefore could not have been 
accepted by all the member states. The main problem was the deeper rifts between 
the member states over more fundamental concerns. These differences related to 
the question of the powers of the Commission, in other words the supranationalitv 
issue, and to the question of enlargement which was essentially the issue of British 
membership. On both these issues France, led by Charles De Gaulle, was at variance 
with the small states in the Community, particularly Belgium and Holland. De Gaulle 
wanted to promote a strong 'Europe' of the Six but a Europe which would not be 
directed from Brussels, that is a non-supranational Europe. De Gaulle was not willing 
to countenance British membership of an expanded EC because of what he saw as 
Britain's overriding loyalties and links to the United S ta te s .^  Belgium and Holland 
however were concerned that without either Britain in the Community or an
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extension of the Commission's powers qua the Community - the Europe that De
Gaulle envisaged would be implemented in the form of a hegemonic Franco-German
Andirectoire which would preside over the new European construction.
Belgium and the Netherlands sought assurances that the new Europe, as
envisaged by De Gaulle, would not seek to disassociate itself from NATO. French
defence policy from as early as 1956 had included a commitment to the development
and maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent. De Gaulle's personal antipathy
towards NATO had been well known even prior to his return to power in June 1958.
From 1958 De Gaulle took successive steps, culminating in the formal withdrawal
from the military command structure in 1966, to diminish French participation in
the North Atlantic organisation.^®
The inability to agree on the Fouchet Plans for a political community was
symptomatic of the inability to agree on these fundamental concerns. Neither were
these questions resolved in the 1960s. Instead the Community became further and
openly preoccupied with the previously unresolved domestic disputes which had been
at base the reasons for the collapse of the Fouchet Plans. These issues, which
throughout the 1960s were the subject of acrimonious discussion, related to the
49questions of British membership and the powers of the Commission.
The latter issue was more or less resolved under the terms of the 'Luxembourg 
Compromise' of 1966 which resulted in a strengthening of the role of the member 
states in decision making at the expense of the Commission. British applications for
i
membership were vetoed by De Gaulle in 1963 and 1967.
The completion of the customs union and the establishment of the Common 
External Tariff (CET) in 1968 indicated that the first phase of the 'ever closer union'
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envisaged in the Rome Treaty had come to a successful conclusion. The issue for 
decision makers in the member states and in Brussels was how to build on the 
achievements of the first phase in order to further develop the Community. The 
questions of widening (enlargement) and deepening (adding further responsibilities 
on to the Community framework) of the Community were again on the agenda.
The Hague Summit of December 1969, called at the initiative of the new French 
President, Georges Pompidou (De Gaulle had resigned in April 1969) marked an 
important new stage in Community cooperation. Three major proposals were agreed. 
The first was enlargement (to include Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway). The 
second was an agreement to move towards economic and monetary union. The third 
was the launch of a new effort to promote foreign policy cooperation and to move 
towards a common foreign policy. Because the Hague Summit unblocked the previous 
decade's logjam of unresolved issues it is commonly considered as signifying the 
'relaunch1 of the European venture.
Although the idea of a common foreign policy had not been forgotten during the 
1960s none of the various ideas proposed had resulted in any concrete initiatives
c n
until the Hague Summit. At the Hague, not only did the Heads of State and 
Government (HSG) rhetorically look forward to 'a United Europe capable of assuming 
its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution 
commensurate with its traditions and its missions' but in more practical terms, they 
also instructed the Foreign Ministers to produce a report outlining how political
ct
unification could be advanced.
The report on EPC commissioned by the HSG was the first of a number of 
reports which established and institutionalised the mechanisms and philosophy of
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EPC.
(ii) Institutional framework
The Davignon report - also known as the Luxembourg report - was agreed by the 
Foreign ministers in October 1970. The report set out the basic objectives of 
contemporary EPC. These were to try to harmonise points of view between member 
states, to work for a 'concertation' of attitudes, and when it was possible or 
desirable to initiate common action. The only assumed obligation on the member 
states was to consult on all important questions relating to foreign policy.
The Commission was to be associated with EPC should areas of EPC relate to 
the competencies of the Community. The President of EPC was required to report 
every six months to the Political Committee of the European Parliament on an 
’informal1 basis. The Presidency was also required to submit a report once a year to 
the European Parliament.
The Foreign Ministers were to meet at least once very six months. The Chair and 
President would be the Foreign Minister of whichever country was President of the 
Council of Ministers and as with the Presidency of the Council, the incumbent would 
change every six months. EPC was to be serviced by political directors (senior civil 
servants) from each of the member states' foreign ministries who were to meet at 
least four times a year in the 'Political Committee'. The political directors were 
made responsible for convening working parties to study specific foreign policy 
issues as required.
Although the machinery established was separated from Community decision
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making mechanisms, the Luxembourg report made clear the location of EPC within 
the Community context. It stated that 'the ministers underline the correlation which 
exists between the structure of the European Community and participation in the 
above activities [EPC] which will allow for progress in the domain of political 
unification '.^
The subsequent Copenhagen report of November 1973 followed the pattern of the 
Luxembourg report. It produced a mix of supranational rhetoric combined with 
cautious, evolutionary (as opposed to revolutionary) proposals for further 
consolidation of EPC. The 1973 report formalised the pragmatic developments which 
had occurred in the practice of EPC since 1970.
Foreign Ministers were to meet four times a year. The Political Committee was 
to meet as and when necessary. Authorisation for the Political Committee to set up 
working groups was confirmed. The designated national foreign ministry officials 
which had been given a liaison role with EPC were institutionalised as the 'Group of 
Correspondents'. The report also called for the setting up of a confidential telex 
exchange system (COREU) between the foreign ministries of the member s ta te s .^
The Copenhagen Report marked the institutional consolidation and clarification 
of the role of the Presidency of EPC. The 1970 Luxembourg report had stated that 
the role of the Presidency was to include the convening and organising of meetings, 
the secretarial role, the responsibility for communication with the European 
Parliament, and a responsibility for contacts with candidate countries. The 
Copenhagen report emphasised the central role of the Presidency and devoted a 
separate section to the duties and role of what Philippe De Schoutheete, quoting 
Helen Wallace and Geoffrey Edwards, called the 'elusive and complex responsibility'
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of the Presidency.^
The Copenhagen report was mainly concerned with institutional matters but it 
was important because, unlike the Luxembourg report, which could have been just 
one of many proposals to try to make EC foreign policy a reality, the Copenhagen 
report confirmed that this new venture was actually operable. The Foreign Ministers 
stated their satisfaction with the results achieved from the ’pragmatic* and 'flexible* 
mechanisms of EPC.
The modest aims of EPC were reiterated in the first part of the 1973 report. The 
concerns were
'to  secure by inquiry and regular consultations a better mutual comprehension 
about important international political problems;
to intensify solidarity between the governments by working for a harmonisation
of points of view, a concertation of attitudes and, if it is possible and desirable, 
.56common actions.
The 'pragmatic' mechanisms of EPC remained fundamentally unchanged, 
although some minor institutional amendments were agreed in the 1981 'London 
report'. The confidential 'Gymnich-type' meetings (named for the town where 
ministers had met for closed discussions) were formalised. The Presidency's role in 
terms of contacts with third countries was clarified as was the procedure for 
political cooperation in third countries. The Presidency was allocated support from 
civil servants from the member states of preceding and succeeding Presidencies. A 
crisis procedure was formalised whereby the Political Committee or a Ministerial
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meeting could be convened within forty-eight hours a t the request of three member 
states.
The report described the increasingly close contacts between EPC and the
European Parliament, including the fact that these contacts had been extended to
include formal meetings between the Foreign ministers and the leaders of the
political groups within the Parliament. The report recognised the essential role of
the Commission as a partner in EPC. It stated that 'the Ten attach importance to
the Commission of the European Communities being fully associated with political
•57cooperation, at all levels.'
The report reiterated the cautious and limited commitments of EPC which had
CQ
been enunciated in the previous Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports.
'In particular they [the Foreign ministers] underline the importance of 
consultation among the Ten, which lies at the heart of European political 
cooperation. They emphasise their commitment to consult partners before adopting 
final positions or launching national initiatives on all important questions of foreign 
policy which are of concern to the Ten as a whole. They undertake that in these 
consultations each Member State will take full account of the position of other 
partners and will give due weight to the desirability of achieving a common 
position.....
At the same time they emphasize that not merely a common attitude but joint 
action, which has always been an objective of European political cooperation, should 
be increasingly within the capacity of the Ten.'**^
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The next major change in the mechanisms EPC was in its institutionalisation in 
the Single European Act (SEA), which came into force in 1987. The SEA was 
implemented after a decade and a half of EPC operations. Before commenting on 
the SEA therefore both the practice of EPC in the late 1970s and 1980s and the 
development of the underlying philosophy of EPC are discussed below.
(iii) Philosophical framework
In 1973, the same year as the Copenhagen report was agreed, the Foreign 
Ministers produced another document which outlined the philosophy of EC 
interrelations with the rest of the world. The December 1973 ’Document of the 
European Identity* was a statement of intent in terms of the Community’s self­
definition and projection of its role in the world. Although aspirational in tone (some 
have argued that the document contained mainly vacuous rhetoric) this document 
was important for three reasons. Firstly, it set out how the EC perceived its present 
and future position in international relations. Secondly, it set out the basis for future 
EC relations with the rest of the world on a systematic basis. Thirdly, as there were 
no fundamental changes in either rationale or philosophy, the Document provides a 
useful guide to the Community perspective and approach to international relations 
from 1973.®°
De Schoutheete argued that the document responded to two issues. One was that 
the member states wanted to make the point that they were not a 'heterogeneous 
or accidental grouping' because their unity rested on an agreed idea of societal 
fundamentals. The second theme was that European unification did not merely serve
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the interests of EC member states but had international benefits. The member states 
claimed that they had a unique contribution to bring to the management of 
international affairs.
This contribution was based upon what was described in the Document as the
(JO
'fundamental elements of the European identity'. These fundamentals included 
principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice, economic 
progress and respect for human rights. The Document articulated a generalised 
commitment to a European civilization composed of a variety of cultures but 
upholding common values, principles and concepts of life. The Document also
(JO
referred to a European awareness of possessing 'specific common interests'. 
These 'specific interests' were not in fact specified but presumably related to the 
'fundamentals' previously delineated.
The 'European construction' as the Community was termed in the Document, 
would be open to other European countries 'which share the same ideals and 
objectives'.^
The Document outlined the strategic considerations which underlay the member 
states' decision to try to develop the Community as a more or less cohesive 
international actor. The Document noted that individual European countries had 
historically functioned as Great Powers. But in contemporary international relations 
European nations could only regain their former influence if they could combine and
( j r r
learn to 'speak with one voice'.
The Document was notable for its attempts to spell out the Community's 
relationship with the United States - an ally which had supported the establishment 
of the EC - but which was increasingly troubled by the EC's assertions of
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independence in international affairs. The United States had proclaimed 1973 'the 
Year of Europe' although Henry Kissinger had offended the West Europeans by trying 
to insist that Europe limit its role to regional issues, leaving the United States to 
deal with the West's global responsibilities. In October 1973, the Community and the 
US also disagreed over the question of the October Arab-Israeli war, with the EC 
calling for a solution which would take into account Palestinian rights.
In fact, the December 1973 'Document on the European Identity' was essentially 
an attem pt to define and clarify the Community's role vis-a-vis the United States 
in the context of the Western alliance (West-West relations). The publication of the 
Document in 1973 at the early stages of EPC activity provided a framework for 
EC/US political relations (even given the caveat that each member state had 
additional, sometimes very strong bilateral relations with the US).
The Foreign Ministers, via the 'Document on the European Identity' 
acknowledged their appreciation of the protection given to Europe by the continued 
stationing of US troops and nuclear arms in Western Europe. They mentioned the 
'close links' between the US and the member states of the EC, based on shared 
'values and aspirations founded on a common h e r i t a g e . A t  the same time the 
Document contains a subtle warning that the EC did not intend to subordinate itself 
to the United States in the sphere of international relations. The EC intended 'to 
maintain a constructive dialogue with the United States and to develop cooperation 
with them on a basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.
Although the EC manifested an intent to operate in the international system as 
an independent actor in practice, any EC moves towards independence of action 
would be difficult to achieve in respect to its major ally. The US after all, provided
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the defence and security component of the Western Alliance within which the EC 
functioned as an international actor. Unless the EC was both willing and able to 
develop its own security and defence capabilities, either on a more autonomous basis 
within NATO, or a t the extreme independently of NATO, it would be difficult for 
the EC to take on the independent international role which it envisaged for itself 
within the 1973 Document.
In the short term  US/EC frictions of the 1970s were resolved by the ’Gymnich 
Agreement1 of April 1974, whereby the EC agreed to consult with the EC on foreign
CO
policy issues. In the longer term EC/US political and economic divergences 
remained until the fall of the Socialist governments in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 
1990. International instability in this period galvanised the EC and the US into new,
CQ
more cooperative and institutionalised political relationships. (See the thesis 
Conclusion)
(iv) Substantive issues
The ’Document on the European Identity' had not conceived of a limited regional 
role for the European Community in international relations and emphasised the EC's 
view of itself as a global actor with global interests. The text contained a list of the 
various parts of the globe with which the EC intended to develop relationships. It 
included a reaffirmation of links with the Council of Europe countries and a 
commitment to cooperation with African and Mediterranean nations and the Middle 
East. It declared the EC's intention to cooperate with the other industrialised 
countries, including the US, Japan and Canada. The Nine (member states) declared
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their intention to continue to support detente with the USSR and Eastern Europe and
70to continue to develop links with China and other Asian countries. The
Document committed the Nine to develop relations with Latin America and to work
with other Third World nations in the 'struggle against underdevelopment'. The Nine
also stated their intention to pursue a global role, not only in terms of relations with
third countries, but also within the context of international organisations, in
71particular the United Nations. 1
In practice however, EPC did not live up to these global aspirations and EPC
72activities internationally remained limited. EPC activities were cautious and 
substantive involvement occurred in just a few areas of the world. Even the official 
documentation did not attem pt to claim that EPC ever developed as a fully fledged 
foreign policy but instead lists the areas of the world in which EPC had some 
involvement. According to the documentation EPC could be credited with developing 
relationships with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe (prior to 1989) and 
played a major role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). EPC took positions on regional conflicts in the Middle East, South Africa, 
Central America and Afghanistan. The official documentation also referred to the 
attention given by EPC to Asian issues (Cambodia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines); 
Africa (the Horn of Africa, the Front-line states, Sudan); Cyprus and South America, 
particularly C hile .^
This same documentation referred to three issues as being important elements 
in EPC. These were human rights, the fight against terrorism and support for nuclear
7 Anon-proliferation measures. On a more mundane level, the official record 
emphasised the cooperation that the Member states were able to achieve via EPC
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7*5in international fora and in third countries.
Not every EPC activity carried the same weight although most EPC actions took
the form of demarches or statements of opinion. Some however involved active
diplomacy and sometimes the implementation of either positive or negative
economic sanctions. EPC activity in respect to the Falklands/Malvinas war was an
example of the latter, more active approach. (See Chapter 3)
In terms of scope and scale any comparison of EPC as foreign policy to that of
the member state 's foreign policy would indicate that the former is limited indeed.
However if external relations activity and EPC were both taken into account, the
record of the EC as a foreign policy actor would be somewhat more substantial. Roy
Ginsberg measured the EC’s foreign policy activity through a collation of what he
termed as ’joint actions' and found that 480 of these 'joint actions' took place
7fibetween 1958 and 1985. A foreign policy action was a 'specific, conscious, goal-
77oriented undertakings., such as the EC Afghan Peace Plan'. These many actions 
compared with what he considered were few actual foreign 'policies'. He 
differentiated a 'joint action' from a 'foreign policy' in that he conceived the latter 
as 'a composition of mutually related joint actions that set forth a unified position 
intended to serve predetermined objectives - for example, the EC Middle East 
Policy'.^®
Ginsberg's analysis however admits a conflation or subsumption, in practice if 
not in theory, of external relations and EPC competencies, into a broader 
categorisation which he terms 'foreign policy activity'. This conflation or 
subsumption is considered below.
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'External relations1 and EPC: points of convergence
'External relations' and EPC were initially separated in both institutional 
practice and analytical theorising. However there have been a series of de facto 
developments and some conscious attempts to fuse external relations and EPC, or 
to at least bring the two into a closer relationship.
Member state involvement in EC external relations activities, that is the
international responsibilities bequeathed to the Community under the terms of the
Rome Treaty, took place via the 'Article 113 Committee'. This committee was
comprised of representatives from the member states. The committee had the right
to 'assist' the EEC in its external trade negotiations. The Commission normally
reported to the Article 113 Committee the results of any trade consultations in
which the Committee had not been represented. The Article 113 Committee acted
as a conduit for the transmission of opinion and information both to the Community
7Qfrom the member states and from the Community to the member states.
The Article 113 Committee acted as a specific means of interrelation for the 
Community and the Member states in respect to external relations. It thus provided 
one mechanism for linking the policies and actions of the member states acting in 
EPC (and the member states bilateral foreign policies) with the Community's 
external relations.
A more general liaison role between the Community and the member states was 
played by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). COREPER was 
composed of representatives from member state governments whose job it was to 
represent their government's views on Community business. COREPER in practice
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acted to try to provide consensual solutions, acceptable to the Community and all 
member states, in respect of Community policy. COREPER m et formally at least 
twice a week and its members and their ancillary officials were engaged in regular 
interreaction (formally and informally) in Brussels. This resulted in what Juliet 
Lodge has identified as fengrenage - the intermingling and enmeshing of civil 
servants at all levels and across the ever-widening range of EC decisionmaking.'®® 
Thus COREPER provided an additional institutional linkage between Community and 
member state policymaking.
In terms of the intergovernmental arm of EC foreign policy, that is EPC, the 
Community via the Commission has been involved since the beginning, despite the 
reluctance of some member states, particularly France, to include the Commission. 
The Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports both recognised that the Commission had 
at least a limited role to play in EPC. As noted above however, it was the London 
report which marked the Commission's acceptance into EPC as a necessary 
component of EPC. Since 1983 when the Commission was accepted as a participant 
within the Troika (combining current, preceding and succeeding Presidencies of 
EPC), the Commission was represented a t every level of EPC diplomacy.®* The 
Commission was only absent from EPC diplomacy when the Presidency acted 
alone.®^
The Commission also provided an element of continuity to EPC. As Simon
Nuttall commented, unlike the Presidency of EPC, which changed every six months,
the Commission was the only permanent representative in EPC (at least for the
duration of the Presidency of the Commission) within the Troika and the full
83Conference of Foreign Ministers. This factor was of some importance in terms
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of international perception of EPC as the Troika and the full Conference of foreign 
ministers acting in EPC comprised the public and visible negotiating body in 
dialogues with other regions and countries.
The pragmatic and gradualist inclusion of the Community in the institutions of 
EPC was matched by a pragmatic and gradualist merging of Community and EPC 
activity in certain areas of foreign policy. The most noticeable merging of 
Community external relations/ EPC activity was in the region to region diplomacy 
increasingly practised by the Community (as previously noted) and in the use of 
Community instruments in the implementation of EPC.
Region to region diplomacy, combining both economic (Community) and political 
(EPC) goals and means, had its origins in the 1963 Yaounde agreement which linked 
18 former colonies of the six member states of the EC (18 African countries and
p i
Madagascar) to the Community via an association treaty. The 1975 Lome treaty 
replaced Yaounde to provide the basis for what was by the signing of Lome IV in 
1989 the biggest of the EC's region to region links. During the 1970s and 1980s 
region to region diplomacy grew in importance as in addition to the EC/ ACP 
institutionalised linkage, diplomatic and economic institutionalised relations were
DC
created with 13 other regional groups. These included groupings of Third World 
nations such as ASEAN, other first world industrialised nations in EFTA, and Eastern 
European and Socialist countries organised within the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON).
EC economic and political relations with regional groupings, although based on 
differing legal bases (the Rome Treaty and the SEA for the economic aspects - and 
EPC agreements and declarations and also Part III of the SEA for the political
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aspects) displayed a tendency to merge in what Catherine Flaesch-Mougin identified 
as a globalisation or integration of the political and the economic. This did not 
necessarily mean that member states relinquished sovereignty over foreign policy 
towards those regions like the ASEAN countries or Central America where an 
intensified 'globalisation* of EC policy did occur. It may be a more appropriate 
interpretation to view the Community involvement as the member states utilising 
the Community as an instrument for foreign policy formation and implementation, 
in areas where, for whatever reason, the member states have chosen to permit a 
collective foreign policy to override strictly national or bilateral concerns.
The member states acting through the Community increased their global reach 
when they acted collectively, as long as they were able to 'speak with one voice'. 
Twelve states united in a collective institution did not just have the added advantage 
of greater diplomatic weight than one state acting alone in international relations. 
They also theoretically had access to the power capacities of 12 states as opposed 
to one, and to the power resources of the Community itself.
One feature of globalisation was the use of Community instruments (power 
resources) to implement EPC decisions. These economic instruments included aid, 
trade and cooperation agreements as well as economic sanctions. The use of 
Community economic instruments to complement diplomatic negotiations was 
particularly in evidence in relationship to Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin 
wall in November 1989. The Commission was given the job of coordinating aid to 
Eastern Europe on behalf of the 'Group of 24' industrialised countries and used 
Community resources and channels to implement the strategy. It also used the 
promise of association agreements which would incorporate further economic support
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as instruments to achieve political and economic foreign policy goals. These goals
were made explicit by the EC and included respect for the rule of law and human
rights, the creation of multi-party systems in Eastern Europe, the holding of free
87elections and economic liberalisation prior to introducing market economies.
One other factor which both demonstrated and helped to explain the convergence 
between the Community's external relations and EPC was the evolving role of the 
European Parliament in foreign policy. The Parliament was created as a consultative 
body to provide some form of democratic input into Community procedures and 
policies. However since 1979 and the first direct elections the Parliament broadened 
its remit to include foreign policy and since 1987 it has gained some decision-making 
powers within the Community. The Parliament sent and received numerous political 
delegations from governments, liberation movements and other prominent 
international actors such as the Pope. In this way its evolving role contributed to a 
further blurring of the boundaries between Community issues and those such as 
foreign policy which were considered as the prerogative of national governments and 
national parliaments.
The management of convergence - from the European Council to the Single European 
Act
Pragmatic developments which indicated that some form of convergence had 
occurred between external relations and EPC included 'mixed agreements' with third 
states which involved both the Community and member states as signatories and the 
'bicephalous' presidency (of the Council and the Commission) which increasingly
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represented the Community abroad. These pragmatic mechanisms reflected some 
institutionalisation of the convergence of Community and EPC activities within 
Community structures. Such institutionalisation partly came about because of the 
perceived need to achieve consistency between EPC and external relations 
activities.
The first institutional effort to achieve a degree of harmonisation between EPC 
and external relations took place with the establishment of the European Council in 
1974. The European Council initially met at least three times a year (since the SEA 
it must meet at least twice a year) and was designed to bring together Heads of 
State and Government (HSG) to provide a coordinating body for Community/ 
member sta te  activities on Community issues, EPC and other non-Treaty matters. 
European Council functions, according to Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels 
included Community problem solving, defining guidelines for further integration, 
general policy orientation, coordination and monitoring, informal exchange of views
OQ
as well as the issuing of foreign policy demarches.00 Given that the European 
Council, which met only infrequently, carried out this multiplicity of functions, the 
task of achieving consistency between EPC and external relations did not emerge 
as a priority, although the very existence of the European Council served to provide 
at least for basic coordination on some issues.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the Community's 
fragmented response to it, gave some fresh impetus to the member states led by 
West Germany and Italy, to try to find some way of providing an effectively 
coordinated foreign policy response to future foreign policy crises. The initial result 
was the Genscher-Colombo initiative which was formally launched in November 1981
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and was designed in part to harmonise Treaty and non-Treaty aspects of the EC. 
The major points of the Genscher-Colombo initiative were presented in a draft 
'European Act' which included among its aims the enabling of member states 'to  act 
in concert in world affairs so that Europe will be increasingly able to assume the
i
international role incumbent upon it by virtue of its economic and political
importance'.(Clause 2 ii)^  An additional, more controversial aim was the clause
relating to 'the coordination of security policy'.(Clause 2iii)^*
The outcome of the Genscher-Colombo initiative was the 'Solemn Declaration
on European Union', adopted by the Stuttgart European Council on 19 June 1983. In
effect, the Declaration marked a continuation of the cautious and pragmatic
approach to foreign policy cooperation which had been further codified in the 1981
London report. Radical suggestions for security and defence cooperation were
rejected but the Declaration did contain a commitment by the member states to
92coordinate positions 'on the political and economic aspects of security'.
The 1983 'Solemn Declaration' did not mark the end of pressure for a new treaty 
and by no means all of the calls for a new Treaty were due to perceived gaps in 
foreign policy and security structures and policies. In the early and mid-eighties 
there were a diverse set of EC related issues which appeared to warrant resolution. 
These issues included whether or how to advance economic and monetary union, the 
reform of EC institutions - in particular the Parliament, and calls for effective 
regional and social policies. Nevertheless a common theme of debates and 
declarations was the issue of how to improve foreign policy and security 
coordination. The theme revolved around the question of whether or not or to what
QO
extent the EC/12 could achieve a common foreign policy.
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In February 1984 the European Parliament adopted a report approving a ’Draft
treaty  establishing the European Union'. Included in its provisions were clauses which
specifically allowed for EPC to be integrated within the EC framework. In 1984 the
European Council appointed an ad hoc committee (the Dooge Committee) to consider
ways of improving EC (including EPC) processes. The Committee issued its final
report in March 1985. The Dooge report suggested, among other things, that EPC
should be strengthened by the creation of a secretariat and that EPC rules should
be codified. The Milan European Council of June 1985, despite the opposition of
Britain, Denmark and Greece, responded to this plethora of activity vis-a-vis a
possible new treaty by calling for an Intergovernmental Conference, to meet later
the same year, in order to report to the December 1985 European Council meeting.
One of the issues that the Intergovernmental Conference was mandated to consider
Q4was how to strengthen political cooperation.
All ten member states and Spain and Portugal, the candidate members, 
participated in the Intergovernmental Conference which met in September, October, 
November and early December of 1985. The result was the Single European Act 
(SEA) which was signed in February 1986 by all member states and which came into 
force in 1987. The Act included provisions which tended towards modest 
improvements in both efficiency and democratisation of the Community institutions 
- both objectives which were considered desirable by a wide coalition of opinion. The 
Act also institutionalised both the European Council and the developments in EPC 
which had hitherto only been sanctioned by the various political cooperation reports. 
It gave a legal basis to EPC, bringing EPC into a Treaty-based Community 
framework.
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The Act contained three types of reference to foreign policy. The first was the 
ideological, or the philosophical basis of EC foreign policy. The second was the 
political recognition that both the Community’s external relations activities and 
EPC were interrelated. The third reference was to institutional changes necessary 
to improve coordination and effectiveness of the EC/12's role in the w orld .^
On the philosophical front the EC reiterated phraseology which had emerged 
most strongly in the 1973 'Declaration on the European Identity' and which had 
become an integral part of EC declarations on foreign policy. The Preamble of the 
SEA contained a reference to the aspiration of 'speaking ever increasingly with one 
voice'. It also mentioned the 'fundamentals' iterated in the 1973 document; including 
commitments to 'principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with 
human rights'. The concluding Declaration to Title III (the section on EPC) confirmed 
an 'openness to other European nations which share the same ideals and objectives'.
The SEA acknowledged the political reality of the interrelationship of the 
Community's external relations and EPC. The attitude embodied in the SEA was that 
efforts should be made to ensure consistency and improve coordination between the 
two aspects of Community foreign policy. This was a major change from the attitude 
of some member states in the 1970s who had sometimes gone to ridiculous extremes 
to try to ensure that a constitutional separation was maintained between the 
two. Title 1 spelt out that 'The European Communities and European political 
cooperation shall have as their objective to contribute together to making concrete 
progress towards European unity'. The Commission was to be 'fully associated' with 
EPC. In addition, the SEA endowed the Presidency (of EPC) and the Commission 
with the specific responsibility to ensure consistency between EC and EPC policies.
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The Act stated that EC external policies and EPC ’must be consistent’.(Title III, 
Article 30, clause 5).
The SEA also contained a commitment to ’coordinate... positions more closely 
on the political and economic aspects of security*.(Title III, Article 30, clause 6a). 
This was a reaffirmation of the commitment adopted in the 1983 Solemn 
Declaration. It hinted at the benefits to be gained from closer cooperation in the 
fields of security and defence but shied away from any commitment which would 
have meant challenging the EC/12’s dependent security relationship on the United 
States within NATO.
The SEA contained one major institutional change which tended to reinforce the 
location of EPC within the Community framework. An EPC secretariat which had 
been suggested by the Dooge Committee was established in the Council of Ministers 
building in Brussels. Its first appointed head (for a term of two and a half years) was 
Signor Giovanni Jannuzzi, Deputy Political Director in the Italian Foreign 
M inistry.^
A Community foreign policy?
The term  ’foreign policy’ has so far been used to describe the EC’s purposive 
policies beyond its borders. The argument has been that although EPC was limited 
in its areas of concern, were we to consider the EC as a foreign policy actor taking 
into account the practice of both external relations activity and EPC, its record 
would appear more substantial.
However even if the above was conceded it would still be necessary to offer a
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theoretical and practical critique of EC foreign policy on two interrelated grounds. 
Firstly it is still not apparent that the EC can claim to possess a foreign policy in 
the sense that the word is normally used; that is in terms of its association with the 
nation state. Nor is it necessarily proven that the term ’foreign policy* is apposite 
in terms of a description and guide to an understanding of the totality of the 
EC/12*s activities.
A previous section of this chapter included a parenthetical reference to the 
major difference between EC foreign policy and that of the nation sta te  which is 
that the nation state  possesses a centralised military instrument controlled by a 
centralised government. This is an important issue as the classic Political Realist 
interpretations of international relations almost would by definition disallow the EC 
from being considered as a foreign policy actor, because of its lack of a military
QQ
instrument and the lack of centralised authority in a state-like authority.
However there are other permissable interpretations, arising from different
paradigms, of EC foreign policy. As has been noted earlier, the liberal,
interdependence approach, allows a consideration of the EC as a foreign policy actor
in certain issue areas, utilising economic and diplomatic instruments, in a world
characterised by complex interdependence, where there is no hierarchy of problems
and consequently security is not always the paramount concern of foreign policy.
This latter understanding of foreign policy permits a refutation of the criticism
that the EC cannot be considered to possess a foreign policy because of the limited
or partial scope of its external activities. According to interdependence theories the
EC could possess a foreign policy, using the instruments a t its disposable, and could
qq
operate in the international arena on some issues.
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This last explanation allows the consideration of the EC/12 as a valid foreign 
policy actor in respect of economic, political and diplomatic issues. There is a 
problem with this approach however in any attempts to explain security related 
aspects of the EC’s activities.
The EC has engaged in security related foreign policy activity irrespective of the 
fact that it has no direct control of the military instrument. The EC has given 
diplomatic support to the use of the member states' military forces in the pursuit 
of an EC foreign policy. This was in 1981/82 when the ten member states endorsed 
the participation of France, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands in the multilateral 
peace-keeping force in the Sinai. Perhaps the fact that this type of activity has only 
occurred infrequently only serves to demonstrate the difficulties inherent to the 
EC/12's attempts to strengthen their foreign policy positions on security issues by 
incorporating the decentralised military instruments available to them.*®®
It could be argued that many states in the international system do not possess 
effective enough military instruments in order for them to make to make 
interventions in international security m atters such that they could significantly 
influence outcomes. In this sense the EC/12's foreign policy attributes can only be 
said to differ from the foreign policy of the nation state  in the mode of operation - 
in that military operations are decentralised. Only in the sphere of economic and 
diplomatic operations is the mode of operation similar to that of the nation state in 
that the instruments of economic statecraft and diplomacy are available to the 
EC/12.
Similarly it could be argued that in the post-second world war period most 
nations of the world (including the West European nations) have been subordinated,
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in security terms, to the superpowers; either the Soviet Union prior to 1989 or the 
United States. In this sense whether or not the EC had direct access to a military 
instrument by which it could directly pursue its own interests is irrelevant.
Given the above perspective there is no reason not to consider the EC as a 
foreign policy actor with many similar attributes to that of the nation state as a 
foreign policy actor. After all control and possession of armed forces is not a 
necessary attribute of the state  as foreign policy actor. Costa Rica for instance has 
not had an army since 1948 yet it has undoubtedly engaged in foreign policy activity.
Another perhaps more important aspect of a nation sta te 's foreign policy making 
capacities is the existence of a centralised administration and sovereign government 
which can direct the multitude of societal interests into a policy in order to serve 
the 'national' interest. The EC does not have a similar centralised bureaucracy and 
sovereign government but nevertheless this has not prevented 'pooling' of the 
member states sovereignty on certain domestic and international issues. Trade is the 
best example of this. In this sense the EC can only operate as a foreign policy actor 
when the sovereign states abrogate sovereignty to the Community on particular 
issues. Again providing the theoretical perspective permits an idea of 'shared 
sovereignty' there is no reason to deny the EC foreign policy 'actorliness' simply 
because the Community is not sovereign in every issue. In practice member states 
have been very flexible in allowing certain areas of international policy such as the 
GATT negotiations to be led by the Community.
The main problem for EC foreign policy has not however been a theoretical 
issue. What has caused the most difficulties for the EC and what remained as the 
unresolved contradiction at the heart of EC/12 foreign policy was the relationship
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with the United States. The EC/12 was not content to remain as ’just another state* 
in the international system. Inherent to its commitment to 'speak with one voice' 
was the objective of regaining the influence within the international system that the 
European nations individually possessed in the nineteenth century. In practice that 
influence could only be demonstrated at the expense of others; both enemies and 
allies. As already noted, EC/12 independence of action would be most difficult to 
implement in respect of the United States because of the practical political reality 
that the EC/12 continued, throughout the post-war period to rely on the United 
States for security leadership within the Western Alliance.
Not that the EC/12's relationship with the United States needed necessarily be 
an obstacle to the development of an EC/12 international identity - perhaps as a 
civilian power. F r a n c o i s  Duchene, the first protagonist of this concept as a 
way to both describe and explain the EC's international role firmly linked the 
development of the EC's capacity to operate as an influential (civilian) power to the 
EC's continued security relationship with the United States. DuchSne also rejected 
European neutralism in military and security matters as clearly as he rejected the 
idea of a European nationalism which might encourage the development of a 
'European super-power'. The Community could become a civilian power because of 
its reliance on the United States' defence umbrella.
'In the circumstances, joint action with others, notably the United States, in
security and economics, is profitable for Western Europe and any divergence from
it can involve heavy losses in wealth, safety and, paradoxically, freedom to choose
102one's own priorities.'
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But European leaders have not always held such a sanguine view about the 
security dominance of the US in West-West relations and the implicit, occasionally 
explicit US attitude to the EC that seemed to place the Community and the member 
states in a secondary political role. Even if the EC/12 had wished to further develop 
an independent security and defence policy, their current security status (with the 
partial exception of France) was as dependent allies on the US within NATO (even 
though Ireland is not a member of NATO there are persuasive arguments that the 
Republic benefits from NATO's western hegemonic leadership). They could not adopt 
responsibility for security and defence, even to the extent of creating a stronger 
’European pillar' within NATO), without renegotiating the NATO structure - an 
objective which was not seriously pursued by any of the member states, until after 
the 1989 changes in Eastern Europe and the 1991 Gulf War forced a wholesale 
reconsideration of Western security arrangements on to the agenda. Instead the 
EC/12 tried to look both ways at once.
The wording of the Single European Act was an attem pt to reflect the 
prevailing, contradictory, political reality. The EC/12 emphasised their independence 
and political autonomy; included within the SEA was the stated intention to work 
more closely together 'on the political and economic aspects of security'. This 
potential declaration of EC/12 independence was mitigated by the admission that the 
EC would continue to operate within the post-war institutions of Western security - 
that is a security context defined and dominated by the United States. The SEA 
stated that 'Nothing in this Title [Title III of the SEA] shall impede closer 
cooperation in the field of security.... within the framework of the Western European 
Union or the Atlantic Alliance' (SEA, Title III, Article 30, clause 6c).
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The Single European Act did not however mark the end of the contradictory 
relationship between the development of EC/12 foreign policy and EC/US relations. 
In November 1988 Mr. Pangalos, the Greek President-In-Office of EPC, expressed 
concern about the limitations of EC/12 foreign policy.
fFrom time to time, situations have arisen in which the superpowers, the Soviet 
Union and the United States, might have solve their international problems on 
European territory without asking our opinion, and exclusively with their own means 
of defence. I think that such a situation, that of being the victim of circumstances, 
the object of developments as opposed to the subject in control of them, is 
something which a Europe in the process of uniting and gradually acquiring an 
autonomous political will should avoid at all costs.1
To a great extent EC/12 foreign policy defined itself in relationship to US 
foreign policy. It shared the same strategic agenda - of anti-Communism and support 
for the liberal, free-market, international trading system - but a t the same time it 
was reflective of different interests and historical experiences. These different 
experiences were channeled into a specifically ’European' way of dealing with 
international conflict, which was different from the US approach to international 
conflict. This different position arose not only because the EC 'made a virtue out 
of necessity' because of its lack of a centralised military instrument. The West 
Europeans considered that a more useful approach to the strategic problem of 
containing Communism, than that of the purely military option, was to offer 
diplomatic and economic sanctions (positive and negative). For the EC/12, the
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successful experience within Europe of preventing a Communist takeover in Portugal 
after the 1974 revolution and the pragmatic dealings with Eastern Europe which they 
considered helped instigate the ’peaceful revolutions* of 1989, were evidence that 
the ’European’ approach worked.
The objectives of a 'European' actor in international politics, as spelt out in 
numerous preambles to the various reports and statements on the European 
Community’s position in the world, did not therefore represent empty rhetoric. The 
rhetoric, in the references to ’democracy, respect for the rule of law and human 
rights', represented a view which can be contrasted with a US approach which was 
to more openly tolerate a lack of democracy, an absence of the rule of law, and 
human rights abuses, in the interests of achieving the strategic objective of anti- 
Communism.
A crucial determinant therefore for understanding EC/12 foreign policy was the 
nature of the systemic relationship between the EC and the US. This became 
particularly important in the 1980s when the EC appeared to be adopting a stance 
which hinted at the possibilities of an increasing independence of action vis-a-vis the 
United States. From the late 1970s onwards the EC's relationship with the US was 
riven with disputes on trade and foreign policy issues. The Community which based 
its prosperity on trade was reluctant to go along with economic embargoes declared 
by the Reagan administration whose policies it disagreed with in a number of 
different areas and issues including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martial law 
in Poland, the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline, the Middle East and Central 
America.
One of the clearest ways in which these differing approaches could be seen was
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in respect of EC/12 and US policy towards revolutions. Neither the US or the EC/12 
supported revolutionary change in the world. Yet they opted for different 
mechanisms to try to control and contain revolutions. These different tactics arose 
from different interpretations of the causes of revolutions. The US viewed 
revolutions as being the product of Communist (Soviet) instigation and the EC/12 
generally considered that revolutions had at their roots socio-economic causes. The 
US favoured the use of the military instrument (Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Grenada) or diplomatic and economic boycotts (China, the Soviet Union) while the 
EC/12 (inclusive of a sometimes reluctant Britain) pursued an approach which 
depended on the selective use of economic instruments (positive and negative) and 
diplomatic activism.
This study utilises a theoretical framework which allows strategic interests of 
EC (and US) foreign policy, that is their commitment to anti-Communism, as a key 
variable for understanding EC foreign policy. It seeks to understand EC foreign 
policy, not in an Idealist fashion, as a ’superpower in the making’, b u t  through 
a careful, empirically based study, of the often contradictory, historically developed, 
economic and political interests of those domestic and international actors which 
had some affect on EC policy. The study will seek to focus on conscious and where 
possible, articulated choices made by decision makers, and their respective 
perceptions.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined two theoretical ’problems’ in the study of European
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Community foreign policy; the dichotomy between 'external relations' and EPC, and 
the nature of EC foreign policy.
With an examination of the historical, philosophical and institutional 
development of EC foreign policy, the two divergent strands of EC foreign policy 
making, that of external relations and EPC, have been shown to converge. The study 
of EC policy towards Latin and Central America in the following chapters is utilised 
in part to assess whether the conventional analytical distinction remains of 
explanatory utility.
However the second 'problem' posed is probably of greater theoretical interest, 
even though the answer proposed may be less definitive. There are a number of 
theoretical and practical difficulties in terms of any consideration of the totality 
of EC external activities (external relations and EPC) as an EC foreign policy. 
Nevertheless it is necessary to reach at least some tentative conclusions about the 
nature of EC foreign policy in order to provide some form of theoretical context for 
the discussion in subsequent chapters of the substantive issue of this study; an 
explanation of the nature of EC foreign policy in and towards Central America. One 
conclusion, in respect of the question asked at the beginning of the chapter as to 
whether or not the EC could be considered as a valid foreign policy actor must be 
that 'it  all depends'.
Firstly, it depends on the comparison chosen. Should the EC's foreign policy 
capacities be compared to a weak subordinated nation-state or to the EC's 
pretensions which are to attain independent European influence in the system? If the 
comparison is to the former the EC is (arguably) as much a 'fully-fledged' 
international political actor as say India or Iceland. It is not a superpower however
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and so far has shown few signs of being able or willing to operate within the system 
other than as a junior partner in the West-West alliance. In this sense it is not a 
’fully-fledged1 international actor.
Secondly and more importantly, it depends on the paradigm adopted to guide 
analysis - a Political Realist would answer the question in the negative, an 
interdependence theorist in the affirmative. The Realist almost by definition rules 
out consideration of international organisations as important political actors akin to 
the state. The Pluralists might choose to use the example of the EC as an obviously 
significant international actor, as evidence of the multiplicity of actors thesis which 
forms part of the theoretical construct of the interdependence approach.
The structuralist approach has less to say in respect of the problem as stated, 
that is in the affinities or not of EC foreign policy to nation-state type foreign 
policy (given that the structuralist adopts class as the significant unit of analysis, 
not the state). The structuralist argument would accept that in the modern inter­
state system the legitimated use of force is a necessary component of a state-type 
actor. However the structuralist analysis, mainly drawn from the Marxist influences 
on the discipline, does not regard inter-state relations as the primary focus of 
analysis. Inter-state relations are given due importance but are regarded 
conceptually as secondary factors compared to the focus on socio-economic forces 
as the more significant level of analysis. A structuralist approach to the problem 
might be
a) that the EC and the US possessed different types of organisational bias - most 
notably in that the EC does not possess direct control of the military instrument and 
was not headed up by a sovereign government
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b) that nevertheless the EC was a powerful political actor by virtue of its own 
economic strength, its decentralised military apparatus and its links via NATO to 
the US security umbrella
c) that the US and the EC shared common strategic interests based on an anti­
communist perspective
d) that the US and the EC may have had differences of approach arising from 
different local historical interests and experiences and on occasion these interests 
could be conflictual
e) that the question as to whether or not the EC can be viewed as a bona fide 
foreign policy actor (vis a vis the nation-state) was of little  importance while strong 
enough common interests remained (as in 'c ' above’) and the US continues to provide 
a security umbrella the EC.
This question of the EC’s foreign policy ’actorliness’ could however be an 
interesting theoretical question for theorists working in all three paradigms. The 
Political Realists for instance might wish to refute the idea that the EC possesses 
international actor 'credentials'. The interdependence theorists have an open interest 
in international organisation. And an interesting question for the structuralists is 
how the EC reacts to revolutions or to potential changes in the international balance 
of social forces and to what extent and why EC policy is different from US policy.
This study utilises insights from both Political Realist and the Liberal, Pluralist 
paradigms but will also offer comments from within the structuralist perspective to 
try to explain how the very diverse interests of the European actors coalesced to 
allow for a more or less cohesive policy towards Central America in the 1980s. The 
thesis will seeks to show, inter alia, how that policy developed in contradistinction
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to US policy towards Central America.
The following chapters offer a consideration of the differing approaches of the 
EC and the US towards the same strategic objective - anti-Communism - in the 
context of an investigation of EC policy towards Central America in the 1980s. 
Given the assumption that the contradictions and problems of EC/US relations were 
a major, if not the major obstacle to the development of a more self-confident and 
coherent EC foreign policy is warranted, the question that is posed in this study is 
evidently a puzzle worthy of investigation. Why did the EC choose to intervene in 
Central America - an area which had historically (at least since the Spanish- 
American war of 1898) been accepted by the Western powers as part of the United 
States sphere of interest and which the US regarded as of primary security interest?
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provides an exceptional treatment of EPC in what he terms a 'more realistic 
approach'. See Christopher Hill, 'Against power Politics: Commentary on 
'Reflections on the Future of western Europe', by Johan K. De Vree', in J.K. De 
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Chapter 3 European Community policy towards Latin America
The 1957 Treaty of Rome which inaugurated a European Economic 
Community of six states contained provisions within the Treaty which were to 
permit the European Community of 12 states to emerge as a global actor in the 
1980s. Included in the Treaty were specific provisions relating to the EC’s 
relationship with the member states' ex-colonies; provisions which were to allow for 
the formalisation of these relationships within the four Lom§ Treaties. As the EC 
grew so did the numbers of ex-colonies which were eligible for membership. The 
geographical scope of the Lom6 Treaties extended until by 1989, with the signing of 
the fourth Lom6 Convention, the 69 member countries included all those Third World 
countries eligible for membership from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the 
ACP countries). By 1989 therefore only Latin American and Asian (LAA) developing 
countries were excluded from the Lom6 arrangements.
This does not mean to say that the LAA countries did not develop 
relationships of their own with the EC; ASEAN/ EC cooperation is an example of a 
particularly durable and relatively successful EC/ non-ACP developing country 
cooperation arrangement. The first EC/ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in 1978; 
followed in 1980 by the signing of a Cooperation agreement, a Joint Statement on 
Political Issues, and a Joint Statement on economic and technical cooperation.* 
Despite some tensions including particularly ASEAN resentment against perceived 
EC protectionism, the relationship continues to expand; one significant deepening 
of the relationship occurred in 1988 when the EC inaugurated its 'EC International 
Investment Partners' (EC-IIP) project which offered all those developing countries
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which had signed cooperation agreements with the EC (including ASEAN) access to
a financially backed scheme which would have the affect of encouraging private EC-
based financial investment in those countries. Indonesia and Malaysia have already
benefited; the former with assistance for the furniture industry, and the latter with
2support for a toxic waste treatment plant.
In this chapter however the focus will be on EC policy towards Latin 
America; its history, the major issues involved, the pressures leading to cooperation, 
the constraints militating against cooperation, and the outcome of those factors in 
the EC/Latin American relationship of the 1980s. An evaluation will be proposed as 
to the success of the EC/Latin America relationship in terms of whether or not the 
objectives of both partners were achieved.
EC policies towards Latin America can be considered as arising from two 
kinds of relationship; the economic and political. The distinction is used here for the 
sake of analytical clarity and is of course not meant to imply that in reality these 
two relationships adopt discrete and distinct trajectories.
The chapter will respond to two issues. The first is the question of the 
development of EC foreign policy. How did EC relations with Latin America affect 
the general operation and development of EC foreign policy? It should be noted that 
this chapter seeks to analyse the EC as a unit by focusing on one of the ECfs two 
important sets of sub-units. The first important set of sub-units is that which is 
composed of the member states. The second important set of sub-units is that which 
is comprised of the institutions of the EC. It is this latter set of sub-units which 
forms the focus of analysis in this chapter. An assessment will be made as to what 
extent, if at all, EC policy towards Latin America has reflected a common approach
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from the three most important institutions of the EC (Council, Parliament and 
Commission). (Chapter 6 considers, inter alia, the degree of harmonisation of 
member-state foreign policy on Central America vis-a-vis the European 
Community's policies). The primary focus of this chapter therefore is on an 
assessment of how successfully the institutions have coordinated policy towards 
Latin America. The question that is asked therefore is to what extent has the EC 
acted as an institutionally cohesive foreign policy actor in Latin America? A 
preliminary assessment is also made of the impact of the EC's foreign policy 
practice in Latin America on the development of institutional cohesion of EC foreign 
policy in general. (Fuller observations are set out in the conclusion to this thesis).
The second issue to which this chapter will seek to respond is the question of 
what relationship, if any, the history and development of EC/Latin American 
relations had to the intensive EC activity in Central America in the 1980s? What 
impact did the broader region to region relationship (EC/Latin America) have on the 
development of the region to sub-region (EC/Central America) partnership which 
prospered in the 1980s?
Definitional problems and their consequences
Any analysis of the changing nature of EC/Latin America relations needs to 
begin with a clarification of what is meant by the terms European Community and 
Latin America. Both were perceived as different geographical, institutional, and 
political entities by different observers a t different times.
It has already been noted that in 1957 the EC comprised six member states.
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In 1973 Britain, Ireland and Denmark were added to the Community's membership; 
followed in 1981 by Greece; and in 1986 by Spain and Portugal. In institutional terms 
the ECSC, the EEC and Euratom began as separate Communities - merging in the 
mid-1960s to form the European Community. For the purposes of this thesis the use 
of the term EC will indicate a reference to all three Communities but, given the 
centrality of the European Economic Community, the thesis will adopt as its 
historical base the foundation of the second two Communities by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Unless otherwise stated the EC will refer only to the Community as 
an institution - not to the more cohesive member-state/ Community grouping which, 
as has previously been argued, began to emerge in the late 1970s/ early 1980s. Any 
reference to the latter entity will be signified by the adoption of the term the 
'EC/12'.
In summary the term 'European Community' describes the agglomeration of 
the institutions of the three Communities. The term 'EC/12' describes the former 
entity and the member states. This definition is not unproblematic. The putative 
Latin American partners demonstrated a persistent tendency to conflate the 
institution of the European Community with its limited powers and resources, with 
the second notion of a more comprehensive entity, the EC/12. In this notion of 
'Europe' EC representatives, whether they be Council, Commission or 
Parliamentarians, were often perceived as being able to speak and take action on 
behalf of both the EC and the member states. This is not to say that Latin American 
leaderships in practice were not aware of the differences between EC and member 
sta te  powers and responsibilities. However there was a surprisingly prevalent 
assumption, even among Latin American Elites, that the EC institutions had attained
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influence over the direction and setting of member state policies to the extent that 
the EC could be viewed as a unitary, independent (sometimes of member-states) and
o
relatively homogeneous actor in international relations. One common example of 
these illusions or misperceptions emerged in discussions held a t a conference 
organised by the Council of Europe and the Madrid based Institute for European- 
Latin American Relations (IRELA) in June 1986.
'In response to the repeated calls made by various Latin American 
participants for a massive programme of economic cooperation between the two 
regions, Commissioner Chevsson stated that Europe was not in a position to make 
concrete offers in this field, and that it would not be realistic for him to propose 
such a programme.'^
Conversely the term Latin America was used to describe differing 
geographical, and to a lesser extent, differing institutional entities; depending on the 
perspective of the observer. The terms 'Latin America' was for Latin Americans 
(and some Europeans) almost a mythological construct which encapsulated an
e
aspiration for unity most famously articulated by Sim6n Bolivar. In July 1991, 
somewhat outside the time-span reviewed in this thesis, but nevertheless making the 
point that throughout the period Latin American integration only ever achieved the 
level of aspiration, occurred the first Ibero-American Summit at Guadalajara, 
Mexico. Heads of State and government from 21 Latin American states (including 
Cuba), Spain and Portugal met to discuss, among other things, how to attain both 
unity and integration.
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There were no Latin American regional institutions which could lay claim to 
represent the interests of all Latin American nations although the Latin American 
Economic System (SELA), which was established in 1975, had in 1989 the most 
comprehensive geographical scope with 26 Latin American and Caribbean 
members. The declared aims of SELA included the objective of presenting a 
common front to third countries. In practice SELA operated as a coordinating body 
and mechanism for consultation rather than as an effective negotiating body with 
third states.
The regular European Parliament (EP) calls throughout the 1980s for an EC/ 
SELA cooperation agreement were misconceived in that SELA was not an equivalent
o
body to the EC. SELA was not primarily intended as an integrationary institution 
nor had it developed as an integrationary body for Latin America in a similar manner
n
to the development of the EC in Western Europe. Not that the EP could perhaps 
be entirely blamed for its illusions about SELA's potential as an EC partner. The 
Inter-Parliamentary Union meetings between Latin American and European 
parliamentarians also called for such an agreement.*®
For the EC, as for other international actors, the term 'Latin America’ was 
relational and changed in respect to the EC's changing relationships with other 
international and Latin American regional actors. Latin America could sometimes 
include every independent state south of the United States in the Americas, 
including the Caribbean islands. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) was more or less based on this vision of Latin 
America except that it also incorporated the USA, five European members and three 
associate members (Montserrat, Dutch Antilles and the Virgin Islands).**
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The term 'Latin America* was most often used by the EC however to denote 
all those independent nations south of the United States which were not members 
of the Lom& convention. This latter definition described a changing, rather than a 
fixed territorial entity. In 1989, the Dominican Republic and Haiti joined the Lom& 
Convention, thus excluding them from, in EC terms, being considered as part of 
'Latin America'. Two other groups of territories were excluded from the EC's 
version of 'Latin America'. The first was the group of non-independent nations like 
Bermuda, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands. The second was the group of overseas 
French dfepartements (French Guyana, Martinique and Guadaloupe). The latter group 
is part of France and therefore part of the European Community, although physically 
based in the Americas. The terminology also responded to more direct political 
considerations. Cuba did not appear on the EC's list of Latin American developing 
countries until after the establishment of EC/ Cuban diplomatic relations in 
1988.12
In 1986 therefore the EC delineated a Latin America which included 19 
independent states; Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Haiti. By 1990 there were
18. The Dominican Republic and Haiti were now in Lom& and Cuba was now 
included.^
In this thesis European Community relations with Latin America are 
considered in terms of EC relations with all non-Lom6 independent states south of 
the United States and exceptions to this rule are made clear. In this chapter 
therefore Latin America as already delineated will be considered as the regional unit
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of analysis. Additional sub-regional levels-of-analysis will be introduced. The two 
most important are that of Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua) and South America (Latin America as defined minus the five 
Central American republics but inclusive of Mexico). This thesis identifies a sub­
regional level-of-analysis (Central America) as the major focus of analysis.
A major reason for the methodology proposed is that in practice both the 
United States and as we shall see later, the EC, developed differentiated policies 
towards South America (including Mexico) and the Central American region. US 
strategic concerns precipitated a series of direct interventions in Central America 
from the late nineteenth century onwards. Intervention on this scale did not 
occur elsewhere in Latin America. (See Chapter 4 for further discussion.)
There are theoretical, methodological and practical points which should be 
made in respect of the above definitional issues. The first theoretical point is that 
the concepts of European Community and Latin America, particularly the latter, 
were were much based on political assumptions as they are on geographical 'facts'. 
They were also based, particularly the former concept, of European Community, 
sometimes identified as simply Europe, on perceptions which could be highly 
normative in their formation. These concepts were fluid. They could describe 
different entities; geographically, politically, and institutionally, a t different times. 
This fluidity can give rise to certain methodological problems; affecting comparative 
studies and judgments made in respect of both space and time. For instance data on 
EC trade relationships of 1972 (a Community of 6) needs some careful consideration 
(and manipulation) before it can be easily compared with EC trade relations of 1989 
(a Community of 12). Any indicators of economic relations with Latin America also
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need to be carefully evaluated in order to ensure that the Latin America being 
compared in say 1972 is the same Latin America of say 1989. The fluidity in 
conceptualisation is not solely a problem for theoreticians. The practical 
consequence of this definitional slipperiness was that fertile ground was available 
for potential misunderstanding between the two partners in the relationship.
Pre-historv
The historical context of EC/Latin American relations is that of European
colonialism which began less than a decade after Columbus first sighted America on
October 12 1492, at Guanahani, today called the Bahamas.*® Spain and Portugal
dominated continental Latin America until independence in the 1820s while Britain
and France vied for control of the lucrative sugar-producing slave plantation
colonies of the Caribbean. Iberian colonialism was replaced by British capitalist
dominance over mainland Latin America in the nineteenth century, as Pax Britannica
was extended globally, to ensure the continuance of a system of free trade
dominated economically by the City of London and British technological and
industrial hegemony, and militarily by British naval power. France influenced the
continent culturally in that the Latin American intelligentsia of the nineteenth
17century spoke French and deferred to French cultural norms. However it was 
British business which dominated Latin American modernisation programmes and 
which helped to establish patterns of insertion of Latin America into the world 
economy which are still prevalent in the late twentieth century. Latin America 
became an importer of manufactured goods, exporter of raw materials and both
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IQ
importer and exporter of capital.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the US marked its successful 
entry into world politics, at least as a leading Pacific power, with expansion into the 
Phillipines and Cuba. The United States no longer needed to rely on the British navy 
to enforce the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which had declared Latin America 'off-limits1
I Q
for European colonialism, but which had permitted British capitalism to survive
and prosper. Britain had been challenged by other European powers but was
eventually replaced as the dominant extra-Latin American power by the emergent
imperialist United States. From the late nineteenth century British political
influence in Latin America was gradually displaced although its economic links
20remained substantial. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a
growing acceptance by European powers, with the partial exception of Germany and
Italy, that Latin America was part of an US 'sphere-of-interest'. European business
and investors maintained a significant economic presence in Latin America, but left
21political leadership to the US.
The immediate pre-history to EC-Latin American relations therefore is of a 
Europe which more or less accepted US political and security dominance in respect 
of Latin America - although historically grounded economic links between Europe 
and Latin America were to survive throughout. The apotheosis of US superordination
in respect to Latin America and Western Europe occurred at the same time - at the
22end of the Second World war. Latin Americans joined with the United States in 
a regional body designed to deal with political, social, and economic matters. The 
Organisation of American States (OAS), which provided the institutional structure 
to enforce the collective security commitments agreed by the 1947 Rio Treaty, was
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created in March 1948. West Europeans were pushed into cooperation via the US 
supported Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was 
created in April 1948. The West Europeans accepted US security leadership with the 
creation of NATO in 1949. At the same time as the US was asserting itself as the 
global hegemon, it was also consolidating its position within a Western hemispheric 
inter-state system which could without much exaggeration be characterised as a 
unipolar.
US dominance over both the US-West European relationship and the US-Latin 
American relationship combined with the need for Europe to concentrate on its own 
economic and political reconstruction defined the more immediate context of EC- 
Latin American relations. In the decade following the war superpower bipolarity and 
Cold War events in Europe (Czechoslovakia [1948], Berlin [1948/49], Hungary [1956]) 
and Asia (the 'loss' of China [1949], the Korean war [1950-53]) continued to place 
Latin America low on the list of West European geo-political priorities.
Given the these historical factors, Latin America was not high on the agenda 
for the newly created European Economic Community in 1957. In terms of EEC 
external relations priorities, the only explicit commitment to the poorer countries 
of the world was, as we have seen, towards member states' former colonies.
The historical overview indicates however that modern Latin American
politics and economics were shaped by European political, economic and cultural
influences and their interreaction with domestic political forces - which either
supported or opposed European penetration of the continent. The point here is not
to argue whether or not insertion into the world capitalist economy was beneficial
23or not for Latin America but simply to point out that this historical context
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provided contemporary EC/ Latin American relations with both constraints and
possibilities. The obvious constraint was the asymmetrical economic relationship. An
example of possibilities for improving relations provided in part by the historical
context was in respect to Spanish and Portuguese accession to the EC. Accession
was widely perceived within the E C ^  as allowing the Community to strengthen
its links with Latin America, primarily because of historical, language and
cultural links but also because of the relatively higher trading and economic links
26between Spain and Latin America compared to other EC countries.
The EC relationship with Latin America: the philosophical framework
EC policies towards Latin America were developed within a philosophical 
framework which emphasised certain broad principles; respect for human rights, 
pluralist democracy, the rule of law, peace and social justice. These principles were 
made explicit by the Commission. After it iterated the economic foundations of the 
EC's interest in Latin America, a 1985 Commission document stated that,
'The European Community's policy towards Latin America is also based on 
ideological grounds. The Community, itself founded on principles of law, democracy 
and integration, is duty-bound to  support the process of democratization in Latin 
America by its choice of action, political contacts and official policy. Furthermore, 
and thanks to the efforts and perseverance of the European Parliament, the 
European Community firmly upholds respect for human rights in those countries 
where these are endangered. The European Community supports all efforts at
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economic integration taking place in Latin America with a view to regional
27stabilization, both economic and political.
The EC argued in the 1980s that EC/ Latin American relations were based on 
28fa community of values’. These political values were spelt out in the Commission 
Communication to the Council of December 1986, which both consolidated and 
provided a further base for EC policy initiatives towards Latin America.
'We are beginning once again to realize that Europe and Latin America have 
certain values and interests in common and that these justify a substantial 
strengthening of links between the two worlds. We have the same conception of 
society and human rights, similar visions of the political and economic world order 
and, in particular, the same interest in promoting the emergence of strong regional 
e n tit ie s . '^
EC policy towards the two major sub-regional units of South America and 
Central America was based on the same underlying philosophy. In practice however 
the salient issues, policy priorities and methods of operation of the EC were 
differentiated in respect of the two sub-regional entities. In Central America the 
EC developed a fairly cohesive, well-coordinated, systematic policy but in South 
America EC efforts were more piecemeal and, arguably, less effective.
The following paragraphs identify the major economic and political issues for 
EC policy towards Latin America, focusing where appropriate on South America as 
the main unit of analysis. EC policy towards the Central American sub-regional unit
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is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. EC policy and actions are charted in order to 
identify how the Community has played a direct role in areas like trade and aid, and 
how it has exercised influence in a more indirect manner, in areas such as debt and 
investment. The pressures on the EC to deepen its involvement in Latin America are 
described as well as the factors constraining the EC.
Economic issues
The Community’s main concerns in respect of South America were economic 
and mainly in the area of trade. Latin American countries did not become eligible 
for EC aid until 1976. But the increased aid which became available in 1979 in the 
main went to Central America, as opposed to South America. Debt did not become 
a major issue in EC relations with South America until 1982 after the Mexican debt 
crisis. Investment from EC countries remained relatively high in South America - 
but investment policies, as with debt, fell primarily with member-state, as opposed 
to EC, competencies. Economic and political regional integration plans were 
supported by the Community, although again it is Central America, as opposed to 
South American schemes which received the most attention from the Community.
In any assessment of EC/Latin America relations it is important to recognise 
that the scale of economic relations for which the community has direct 
responsibility, that is trade and its own aid programmes, was relatively insignificant 
as far as the West European side of the partnership was concerned. EC trade with 
Latin America (imports from and exports to) fell from 11% of overall extra-EC 
trade in 1958 to 9.5% in 1963 to 5.5% in 1981 (based on the ten 1981 EC
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members).**® Figures based on an EC of 12 members showed a fall in EC trade with 
Latin America from 8.2% in 1965, to 6% in 1983, to 4.9% in 1987.*** The economic 
relationship was much more valuable to Latin America. Again in trade terms, by the 
mid 1970s, the EC received some 25% of Latin America's exports and was the
oo
provider of 23% of Latin America's imports.
(i) Trade
The Treaty of Rome, subsequent secondary legislation and various judgments 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tended to widen the EC's international 
powers and responsibilities but in practice, the EC's major competence remained in 
the area of international trade. Exclusive EC competence over the management of 
member states' external trade was established in Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome 
and the completion of the Common External Tariff (CET) in 1968 enabled the 
Commission to assume the role of international trade negotiator in place of the 
separate member states. Within the GATT the EC had acted on behalf of the 
member states since the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1964-
oo
1967). The perception of the EC as a global actor was enhanced through the 
success of these negotiations although the cause of that success was much more to 
do with the restructuring of the multilateral GATT negotiating rounds than as a 
result of the Community's economic statecraft. That restructuring permitted the 
Kennedy Round to achieve tariff cuts on average of around 36 per cent to 39 per 
cent by the industrial countries and some reductions in non-tariff barriers to trade 
(NTBs).34
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The Community had a wide range of trading responsibilities.
'The Community has a common customs tariff, the necessary corollary of an 
internal customs union, and has responsibility for external trade policy. Acting on 
proposals from the European Commission, it has the competence to negotiate 
international trading rules; to draw up customs procedures, franchises and import 
quotas; to ensure, within the framework of international regulations, protection 
against unfair foreign competition, and so on. The Community negotiates 
international agreements on export credits and its Member States are gradually 
harmonizing their policies in that area. Trade agreements with third countries are
oc
negotiated by the European Commission. u
The point here is that the EC had structural positional and structural 
contingent (see chapter 2) effects on Latin America. Latin America was forced to 
develop a response to the position of the EC as the largest trading bloc in the world. 
For example in 1986, the EC benefited from a 19% share of world trade, as
Off
compared to 17% for the US and 10% for Japan. Latin America was also
affected, arguably adversely, by the unintended affects of EC trade policy,
particularly in respect to agriculture.
EC trade patterns with Latin America from 1957 through 1989 indicate that
(i) EC trade with Latin America was relatively insignificant and steadily decreased
in importance as far as the EC was concerned, and this was demonstrated by the
fact that although EC trade with Latin America steadily increased in volume 
37terms , in terms of percentage of EC global trade, EC trade with Latin America,
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as with the rest of the Third W orld ,s tead ily  diminished; (ii) EC trade with Latin 
America was unevenly distributed in that EC trade was mainly with six South 
American countries - and in 1984 over one quarter of EC trade was with just one 
South American country, Brazil ; (iii) the EC-Latin American trade relationship 
remained asymmetrical in terms of both its value to the respective partners (see 
above), its structure - the EC exported manufactured goods to Latin America and 
imported raw materials, agricultural products and foodstuffs, and semi-processed 
products^®, and in terms of the two partners changing relative share of world 
trade - between 1982 and 1988 the EC's share of world trade increased from 35.7% 
to 39.3% while Latin America's share of global trade decreased from 5.2% to 
4.1%^*; (iv) the European Community ran a consistent trade deficit with Latin
AOAmerica (1958-1987) and (v) growth in EC trade with Latin America took place 
a t a slower rate  than Latin American trade with both Japan and the United 
S ta te s .^
The overall trend was therefore been one of deterioration in significance of 
Latin America for EC traders. This was despite efforts made by various sectors and 
governments within Latin America and despite increasing political interest within 
the Community and numerous reports by the European Parliament and Commission 
which called for EC efforts to increase trade links with Latin A m erica.^  Why 
were the results of these efforts so disappointing? What were the major obstacles 
to improved commerce between the two regions?
One response was to argue that if Latin America's significance as a trading 
partner for the EC has declined, this matched the general decrease in significance 
for the EC of developing country trading partners. It also matched a general
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decrease in the share of world trade for the developing countries. This reply is 
unsatisfactory. It is fair to argue that EC trade with developing countries decreased 
in overall terms but this decrease was uneven. Compared with Asia for instance, 
Latin America fared badly in terms of trade with the EC. Between 1982 and 1986 
Community exports increased to Asia and Community imports from Asia nearly 
doubled in terms of the percentage of Community trade. Latin America also 
fared relatively worse than the developing world as a whole in terms of EC market 
shares. Between 1965 and 1986 Latin America saw its share of total EC trade with 
developing countries decline. In 1965 Latin American imports accounted for 23.3% 
of the EC/12fs imports from developing countries. By 1986 this figure had fallen to 
18.7%. In terms of export trade, in 1965 Latin America received 19.7% of all EC 
exports to the developing world. By 1986 this market share had declined steeply, to 
13.5%. By contrast Latin America's market share in United States trade with 
developing countries started from a higher base. In addition imports from Latin 
America grew as a percentage share of US developing country trade (from 28.4% in 
1975 to 39.4% in 1985) and remained relatively stable as a percentage of US exports 
to developing countries (from 36.8% in 1975 to 36.9% in 1985).^
Another reason often cited for the deterioration in EC trade with Latin 
America, so much so that Latin America fis tending to become a marginal
i O
market* for the EC, was the worsening international indebtedness of Latin 
49America. The argument presented was that as Latin America was forced to 
implement export-led growth strategies based partially on domestic austerity 
measures this had the affect of cutting back on effective demand for EC imports. 
This argument was further reinforced by the fact that although Latin America
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increased its exports between 1980 and 1989 (although volume increases of 57% only
brought a value increase of 24%), the increase in foreign earnings did not serve as
a basis to increase demand for imports as these earnings went to pay off debt
50interest and capital. The debt problem probably therefore contributed to the fall
in EC trade with Latin America yet this global factor was by no means the only
obstacle to increased EC trade with Latin America given that Latin American
exports to the EC might have been expected to benefit from the export-led strategy.
A relevant point to make in this context is that Latin American indebtedness to the
United States banking sector was marginally higher that to the EC/12 banking 
51system, yet the fall in Latin American exports to the United States between for
example 1980 and 1985 was less than the fall in exports to the EC (38% as compared
to 25%). This occurred despite the rise in value of the dollar against the ECU in the
same period - a change in comparative currency value which ought to have made EC
52exports more competitive in respect of US exports. What therefore was
distinctive about EC trading patterns which contributed to this steady drop in EC
trade with Latin America?
One difference between EC trade and US trade with Latin America is Latin
American exports to the EC were comprised mainly of foodstuffs and raw materials
(including an increase in petroleum exports from 4% in 1977 to 23% in 1985). By
531989 primary products accounted for 80% of Latin America s exports to the EC.
This compared to Latin American trade with the US whereby over 30% of exports
(as a t 1985) were industrial products.^ By 1989 Latin America’s exports to the US
included capital goods worth 21% of export trade and consumer goods worth 18% of
55total Latin America/ US export trade.
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There were a number of problems arising from the structure of trade between 
the EC and Latin America. Essentially these difficulties arose because of EC 
protectionism which was directed against Latin American agricultural and 
manufactured trade.
In terms of agriculture Latin American trade was sensitive globally to 
changes in commodity prices and to EC policies. The EC's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) was a major problem for Latin America as were EC policies which 
favoured the EC's Lom6 partners which were commodity producers often in direct 
competition with Latin American exporters. EC/Latin American trade was affected 
by EC policies on manufactured products, the most important of which for Latin 
America was the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).
It has already been noted that there was a steady increase in the value of 
trade between the EC and Latin America - although this was accompanied by a drop
e g
in the percentage of EC trade taken by Latin America. This also occurred
despite the massive increases in export volumes generated by Latin America in the 
571980s. It has also been noted that the debt problem helped to account for the 
low demand for EC exports. It is perhaps a more complex exercise to account for 
the low demand (or supply) of Latin American exports to the EC.
One of the reasons sometimes given is that there was a secular drop in world 
commodity prices which meant that Latin American exports were inherently non-
CQ
competitive on world markets. World Bank figures indicate that there is some 
truth in this analysis for the period 1980 to 1987 but that from 1965 to 1980 and in 
1988 and 1989 global terms of trade were favourable to Latin America's trade. 
Similarly the export prices for low and middle income economies of primary products
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(the EC’s main imports from Latin America) declined only in the period 1980 to 1987 
and showed a steady increase in the period 1965 to 1980 and in 1987 and 1988 (the 
latest figures available). Breaking this figure down into its component parts, the 
price for foodstuffs (50% of EC imports from Latin America in 1989) declined from 
1980 to 1987 but again had increased between 1965 and 1980 and showed an increase 
in 1988. Fuel prices (15% of EC imports from Latin America in 1989) were slightly 
more erratic in that they showed a steady increase between 1965 and 1980, a 
decrease between 1980 and 1987 an increase in 1987 and a decrease in 1988. Non­
food primary, metals and minerals (ore and metal comprised 15% of EC imports 
from Latin America in 1989) followed the overall primary goods pattern in showing 
a decreasing price between 1980 and 1987 but an increase between 1965 and 1980 
and further increases in 1987 and 1988.^
In the period 1980-1987 Latin America also suffered from a decline in price
paid for its manufactured exports. However this decline was much less steep than
that for its primary products, which would help to explain why Latin America-United
fiOStates trade remained relatively more buoyant than Latin American/EC trade.
Secular falls in commodity prices could not therefore fully explain the decline 
in the EC/Latin American trading relationship. Other factors relating to the EC's 
own policies were also relevant. The first and perhaps the most contentious for Latin 
America was the Common Agricultural Policy.
The Community's CAP was essentially a price support mechanism for the 
EC's farmers. One of its intended affects was to discriminate against overseas 
suppliers of agricultural goods in favour of EC producers. This was the basis of 
'Community preference'. One of the most important unintended affects of the CAP
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was to artificially suppress world agricultural prices as the EC subsidised its
farmers' surplus food which was sold on world markets. The first objective may
have been legitimate, even if it was harmful to potential Latin American exports -
particularly in terms of agricultural products which since the accession of Spain and
Portugal could be provided by the Canary Islands, or Spain and Portugal 
SIthemselves. The second affect was also legal, if not considered legitimate by 
many (including many EC policymakers), at least according to GATT's world trade 
rules, because agricultural trade was excluded from GATT's remit. The Uruguay 
Round, which had as one of its at least implicit objectives that of controlling EC 
agricultural protectionism was not able to (as at August 1992) find any resolution to 
the issue. One British-based professor of agricultural economics argued that,
'the pressure of international opinion on the CAP is likely to grow. In part 
this is because as the world's largest food importer and second largest food exporter, 
the EC plays a leading role in the world market. Moreover, the CAP has sought to 
solve many internal problems by treating the world market as residual. It has 
dumped its exports, frustrated lower-priced imports and even, in 1974 when world 
prices of sugar rose, subsidized imports. Other countries do not believe that a fair
CO
trading system can co-exist with the CAP in its present form.
The impact of the CAP on countries like Argentina and Uruguay which were 
highly dependent on agricultural exports was particularly adverse. Latin America's 
agricultural exports were forced to compete with highly subsidised EC agricultural 
produce in the same markets, sometimes even in their own domestic markets. In
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1986 for example the EC exported 200,000 tonnes of beef to Brazil which because 
of subsidies was able to undercut beef prices from producers from Argentina, 
Uruguay and from Brazil itself. According to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics the affect of the CAP was to lower world prices for sheepmeat and beef 
(17% in 1984), wheat (9% - 13% in 1983), other cereals (16% in 1983) and sugar (5% 
to 11% in 1982).®^ CAP tariffs and quotas also militated against entry to the EC 
market of Latin American cocoa, coffee and bananas. All these products were key 
exports for the major Latin American countries who were encouraged to increase 
their exports by the IMF yet in practice were disadvantaged by the EC, whose 
member states are also IMF members, in terms of Latin America's ability to gain 
increased value from its agricultural exports. Perhaps the only mitigating affect of 
the CAP was that some products, such as soya beans from Argentina, Paraguay and 
Brazil, were attracted to the EC market.®"*
During the 1970s and towards the beginning of the 1980s the Commission 
argued in defence of the CAP that overproduction of beef was stimulated by soya 
exports (some from Latin America) which resulted in the EC having to dispose of 
surplus beef on the world market.®'* But at the end of the 1980s both the 
Commission and the Parliament displayed more sensitivity in respect of the negative 
impact of CAP policies for Latin America even if they did not developed a cohesive 
Community response. In October 1987, a t a colloquium on Latin America organised 
by the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, Claude Cheysson, Commissioner 
for Development, responded to the Argentinean Ambassador's criticism of the CAP 
by arguing that - 'I think that he is not wrong. I do not say that because of his 
illustrious name but because of his argument which, in this m atter, is exactly
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right1.66
Cheysson had already argued publicly, at the part session in Strasbourg, in 
January 1987, that a major problem for EC/Latin American relations arose because 
of a Community CAP which could and should not be defended.
fNo, where we should be making our act of public repentance., is in taking 
stock of the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy on certain Latin American 
countries.
We can only acknowledge that, albeit for reasons that are understandable in 
themselves, we are conducting ourselves on the external markets of the Third World 
in a manner that I shall not hesitate to describe as scandalous and revolting, and all 
because of our war with the Americans to maintain our exports. This is serious for 
the countries of Latin America that have been traditional exporters and that have, 
consequently, through our fault, lost the opportunity to export, which is to say the 
opportunity, if not to grow, then at least to survive, in certain sectors.
If we are to advance beyond the present phase in the Common Agricultural
Policy and give our rural world some chance of development, some assurance of
development other than through agricultural production, that will be for reasons
internal to our society, but also because this violation of the rules of the market
economy that we claim to adhere to, this destructiveness vented on the only options
open to certain Third-World countries, cannot for long be tolerated by the
democracies of Europe as the action of a Community that claims to be in the
(57service of development.
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European Parliamentarian, Christian Democrat Marlene Lenz in her January 
1989 review of economic obstacles to democratic development in Latin America 
argued, inter alia, that the Community’s GSP should be altered in order that 
assistance could be given to Latin American agricultural exporters who had suffered 
adverse affects from the CAP.**® By 1990 the Commission recognised that the 
CAP would need to be reformed and that this would help the EC/Latin America 
trade relationship but warned that Latin America (and Asia) would also have to make 
concessions. The Commission's 1990 Guidelines for Cooperation with the Developing 
Countries in Latin America and Asia committed the Community to a reform of the 
CAP which combined with the institution of the Single Market, the Commission 
considered would allow for easier access to the EC for developing country markets. 
The report stated that,
'Integration of the developing countries within the multilateral trade system 
is one of the main objectives in the Uruguay Round: progress achieved in liberalizing 
trade with the more advanced developing countries must be matched by a reduction 
in the tariff and the non-tariff barriers affecting their exports to the markets of the 
industrialized countries, particularly those corresponding to their comparative 
natural advantage.'®®
Latin Americans also expressed concern about the detrimental affects for
Latin American exports of the Community's preferential trading agreements with
70the ACP countries which were institutionalised in the four Lom& agreements. 
The point was well made when it is considered that the raison d 'etre of the Lom6
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trade agreements was to provide preferential treatm ent to ACP exporters over and
against exporters of the same commodities. The ACP countries consistently
campaigned, not always successfully, to maintain preferential access. The EC's
banana market for instance was relatively successfully infiltrated by Latin American
exporters. In 1981, prior to the entry of Spain and Portugal Latin America accounted
for 62% of the EC's banana imports.^* However, the Lom6 IV Convention (1989)
specifically agreed tariffs which would act to prevent Latin American exports having
as easy access to EC markets as ACP countries. South American coffee for example
72faced a 5% surcharge over and above ACP coffee. To take the example that the 
Commission used in its publicity material - 'jams, fruit jellies and some marmalades 
can enter the EEC duty-free from any ACP state, while they enter with an 8% duty 
from say, Brazil or India, and with a 30% duty from the United States of America 
or C anada '.^
But it was also true that Latin America had to a certain extent eroded the 
relative preferences which were supposed to accrue because of developing country 
membership of the ACP grouping. The STABEX system, which was established in 
1975 to provide some stability in agricultural export earnings for ACP countries^ 
was extended in 1986 to include all 'least developed countries', including the poorest 
countries in Latin America and A sia .^  Only Haiti (counted as a Latin American 
country prior to its entry into the ACP group in 1989) was poor enough to qualify in 
Latin America. It received 5.13 million ECUs under this scheme between 1976 and 
1986 (compared to 14.86 million ECUs in the same period received by four Asian 
countries; Bangladesh, Nepal, Laos and North Yemen; and 1,487 million ECUs for 51 
ACP countries between 1975 and 1986).^®
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By the early 1990s there was little sign that the Community was facing up to
this particular contradiction in its trade policy towards Latin America. It had at one
and the same time committed itself to the opening of its markets to Latin America
and to was pledged to protect ACP countries from cheaper Latin American 
77agricultural exports.
Latin America also complained about the Community's policy regarding trade 
in manufactured goods which they argued was protectionist in fact if not in theory. 
A specific target of Latin American textile exporters criticism, because of its
perceived bias towards the interests of the developed countries' textile
78 7Qproducers , was the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) which was set up under
GATT auspices in 1973.
Latin America had some access to the GSP which was established by the EC
in 1971 in order to encourage developing country exports in both manufactured goods
and agricultural products. However although the GSP scheme theoretically allowed
duty free entry into the EC for all industrial products, including textiles, footwear
and steel products, in practice the EC applied quotas and tariff ceilings, which
provided barriers to Latin American exports to the EC. Although all the Latin
American countries made some use of the GSP, Brazil remained the most significant
participant in the scheme. In 1983 and 1984 nearly half of the Latin American GSP
trade was accounted for by Brazil alone. In the mid-eighties Venezuela was the next
largest beneficiary but this was accounted for almost entirely by oil industry
exports. Argentina, Colombia and Mexico were the next largest recipients of GSP
support - although the value of the GSP scheme was not great. To illustrate the
Brazilian dominance over the GSP trade the 1984 figures show that Latin American
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trade benefitted by a total of 3,038.507 million ECUs. Of this total, Brazilian trade
worth 1,252.338 million ECUs benefitted; Venezuelan trade benefitted by some
781.660 million ECUs; Mexico by 225.107 million ECUs, Argentina by 180.559 million
ECUs, Chile by 156.385 million ECUs and Colombia by 138.169 million ECUs.
Peruvian trade received the next highest value of GSP benefits at 75.485 million
ECUS. Nicaragua’s trade received the least amount of support from the GSP system
- at 0.277 million ECUs.80
Although the Community’s general argument was that the GSP could be more
efficiently utilised and this of itself would assist in the expansion of Latin American 
81trade with the EC , it admitted that there were problems, particularly for Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina, in respect of the quantitative restrictions that it placed on 
textile and steel exports from Latin America. In respect to textiles the Commission 
pointed out in 1986 that it had agreed that for a period of five years, from 1987- 
1991, quantitative restrictions would ’only1 be applied to three countries and their 
numbers would be reduced. Brazil would face 9 such restrictions instead of 14. 
Argentina would face 3 types of restrictions (instead of 4) and Peru 2 instead of 4. 
In the case of steel the Commission was less sanguine about future EC-Latin 
American trade. It argued that 'the situation in the Community's steel sector is 
such, however, that it is obliged to maintain provisionally the external aspect of its 
steel policy.’®^
The EC accused Latin America of erecting its own barriers to trade between 
the two sub-continents. One European Parliament report commented that 'tariff (and 
non-tariff) barriers to imports., are among the highest in the world.' The same 
document pointed to the fact that Latin America mainly exported raw materials, the
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world demand for which has slowed. These Community criticisms however, at 
least from the time when Claude Cheysson became Commissioner responsible for 
development, became secondary to an analysis which highlighted the debt burden as
RAthe major problem inhibiting EC exports. These factors however cannot explain
why EC Latin America trade fell to a poor third in comparison to US/Latin America
trade and Japan/ Latin America trade.
In its defence the Community argued that half of Latin America’s exports to
the EEC entered duty-free and of the rest, some 45% were covered by the GSP. The
argument, a t least in relation to Community tariffs, was that there was little  room
85for further Community tariff cuts, given the prevailing structure of trade.
But the Community also responded to criticism. It slowly reduced some duties
and in the late 1980s agreed to cut the number of quantitative limits on some
products. At the same time the Community arranged a series of seminars for Latin
American businessmen in Latin America to try to encourage an improved takeup of
the GSP. At the end of the 1980s the Community tried to phase out national (EC
member sta te  quotas) in order to replace them with 'Community quotas' for
'sensitive products'. The Commission argued that 'in practice this will extend the
86opportunities for access at a zero or preferential rate  of duty'.
The EC's strategy for the encouragement of manufactured and agricultural 
trade with Latin America evolved from an ad hoc approach in the 1960s and 1970s, 
relying mainly on exhortation to utilise the GSP more efficiently, to a slightly more 
sophisticated strategy in the mid-1980s. The strategy incorporated three 
complementary approaches. The first was to encourage a better use of an improved 
GSP. The second was the stated commitment to work towards an open free-trading
142
system - in the late 1980s this aim was focussed on efforts to ensure a successful
conclusion to the Uruguay Round. The third was the EC’s ’economic cooperation
policy’ with Latin America. Together it was argued, ’the impetus provided by the
Uruguay Round and an economic cooperation policy could be used to help diversify
R7the structure of Latin America's exports.
The objective of achieving a more coordinated economic cooperation policy 
was outlined in the Commission's Guidelines for Cooperation with the Developing
oo
Countries in Latin America and Asia, of June 1990. The intention was to 
facilitate direct access by 'economic operators and their intermediaries (chambers 
of commerce, trade associations, etc.)' to Community instruments of cooperation. 
These instruments would include 'technical assistance, organizing meetings, fact­
finding mission, training, financing for studies, e tc .' Economic cooperation in the 
1990s emerged from the Community's earlier efforts to assist commerce between 
the two regions through schemes like the export promotion programme which were 
initiated in 1974. Among other things export promotion support financed a food 
marketing seminar in Panama, a food seminar for the Andean countries in Peru, and
QQ
visits by Latin American exporters to trade fairs in Western Europe.
The Guidelines for the 1990s suggested that economic cooperation should 
take place in energy, industry, science and technology and business development. 
Economic cooperation with Latin America (and Asia) was designed to meet the 
interests of both Latin America and the Community. Trade promotion schemes for 
instance, would be supported in order to assist both Latin American firms exports 
to the EC and EC exports to and investment in Latin America. The EC's resources 
would also be used to help create a favourable macro-economic environment for
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Community trade, in line with the Community's commitment, to the support and 
extension of an open international system based on capitalist, free trade principles.
'In terms of the economic environment, action can be taken to support 
institutions, in the broadest sense, by planning resources, identifying what 
regulations are necessary and laying down rules or standards. The object of the 
exercise - to be achieved by means of dialogue and training schemes aimed at the 
decision-makers in those countries - is to bring about a favourable climate for 
further investment, technological transfer or contacts between firms based in the 
Community and those in the developing countries.'^
(ii) Aid
In 1976 OPEC was the world's largest supplier of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), that is financial assistance in the form of grants or concessional 
(soft) loans, followed by the EC and its member states (the EC/12), and then the 
USA. By 1986, the EC/12 together accounted for the biggest share of the world's 
ODA; the next biggest supplier was the USA. By 1986 the EC/12's ODA as a 
percentage of GNP had risen to 0.51%. This compared to a decreasing percentage - 
down to 0.23% - for the USA and an increasing percentage of GNP for Japan, up to 
0.29%.91
In South America (not including Central America and the Caribbean) EC/12 
ODA represented 53.3% of total ODA received in 1986. The next largest donors were 
the USA at 20.3% of regional ODA, and Japan at 15.6%. The EC/12 were the largest
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donors for most of the individual countries of South America including Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The EC/12 was the second largest (the US 
being in first place) ODA donor for Bolivia and Ecuador.
In fact, these overall figures (from EC official documentation) mask a picture
QQ
which was of disparities in member state  policy and practice towards ODA. Both 
the EC and its member states were aid donors but there was no obligation to 
coordinate ODA policies. Officials from member states participated in an EC 
committee to decide which EC aid programmes should be supported but there were
only sporadic attempts at aid policy coordination between the EC and the member
94states. Aid policies were also relatively uncoordinated within the Community as 
policy and instruments for EC overseas aid had developed in a sometimes haphazard 
manner.
EC development assistance was provided for in the Treaty of Rome but was 
initially confined to the ACP and the Mediterranean countries, whose aid and trade 
relations with the EC were placed on a contractual basis through their associated 
status with the EC. The European Development Fund (EDF) which was set up in 
1958, existed mainly to channel aid to the ACP countries under the Lome 
agreements. The EDF, financed directly from member state contributions, combined 
with the EC's own Development budget were the main sources of EC ODA. In 1974, 
the Commission recommended to the Council that ODA be extended to non­
associated countries, essentially Latin America and Asia. In 1976 the first allocation 
was made for financial and technical aid with non-associated countries and in 1981 
the Council formalised the policy by adopting a regulation. Since 1976 as interest 
in the EC in development cooperation with Latin America and Asia increased, a
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number of Community financial instruments were instituted. The Community’s aid 
policies were directly related to its commercial policies, so much so that a part of 
the ’aid1 budget was assigned to trade promotion and part, perhaps more 
understandably, to STABEX, the export earnings stability fund for the poorest 
countries.
Total EC aid to Latin America for the period 1976 to 1986 amounted to 
1,151.68 million ECUs (compared to a total of 3,257.39 million ECUs for the non­
associated Asian countries). The Community divided its aid monies into three 
separate provisions; development aid, economic cooperation and humanitarian aid. 
Between 1976 Latin America received 1,040.23 million ECUs in development aid; 
58.86 million ECUs in economic cooperation; and 52.59 million ECUs in humanitarian
q e
aid. Development aid was further broken down into financial and technical 
cooperation, which included support for regional integration projects (565.10 million 
ECUs); ordinary (as opposed to emergency) food aid (373.82 million ECUs; STABEX 
(5.13 million ECUs; and co-financing with non-governmental organisations (96.18 
million ECUs). Economic cooperation - ’the only suitable and justifiable form 
of cooperation for the relatively more advanced developing countries which have
i97already reached the threshold of industrialization - was divided into seven 
different instruments. Between 1976 and 1988 trade promotion received the largest 
amount of funding of the economic cooperation schemes for Latin America, a t 16.90 
million ECUs; the next largest amount was for energy cooperation, at 15.04 million 
ECUs; then scientific and technical cooperation at 11.85 million ECUs; training at 
8.75 million ECUs; industrial promotion and investments at 4.89 million ECUs; 
ecology at 1.08 million ECUs; and support for regional integration at 0.35 million
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ECUs. Humanitarian aid was also sub-divided; into emergency aid; emergency 
food aid; aid for refugees and displaced persons; aid for reconstruction and disaster
QQ
prevention; and aid to combat drug abuse.
This rather small amount of aid (an average of approximately 100 million 
ECUs a year for all of Latin America) was mobilised via some 18 different 
Community instruments.*®® The complexity of the Community aid process may 
be one reason why disbursements of aid remained low compared to commitments. 
In the first ten years of EC aid to Latin America (1976-1986) disbursements reached 
only half of commitments. Even accounting for long lead-in times this was a 
disappointing result, especially as the 1988 figures indicated a continuing inability 
to transfer resources committed by the Community In 1988 8.1 million ECUs was 
disbursed compared to 264 million ECUs committed.*®*
Both the low volume of funds available and the poor record on disbursement 
caused concern to the European Parliament. In a 1987 debate on, among other 
things, whether to increase the percentage of aid for Latin America within the non­
associated countries aid budget so that Latin America's share would be the same as 
Asia's instead of the previously accepted 25%:75% allocation, Mrs Garcia Arias, a 
Spanish Socialist commented that
'According to the Commission's data we are dealing with 175 million ECU in
appropriations for payment and with this amount it is not worth the trouble of
discussing whether 75% is to be assigned to one continent and 25% to the other. The
real problem is the paltry sums available to us and the difficulties of the
102Commission's officers in administering and managing these funds properly.'
147
In the same debate Mrs. Simons, a German Socialist, commented that fThe
provision of resources as a whole is so low that one cannot speak of a policy for
10*1Latin America or Asia at all.
Perhaps the saving grace of the Community’s programme was that all
development aid came in the form of grants thus contributing in a small way to the
alleviation of Latin America’s debt burden. There were also examples of individual
countries or sectors which benefitted from EC aid. For instance in 1986 Bolivia
received over 20 million ECUs from the EC. This sum amounting to 42% of total
EC/12 aid to Bolivia in that year.*®"* Community aid concentrated on rural
development projects, regional integration and aid to the poorest sectors in the
poorest countries. The Community also accepted that non-governmental
organisations (ngos) were sometimes able to make better use of limited funds and
to this end gradually increased its budget for co-financing of ngo schemes in Latin
America.*®® In 1988 the sum allocated was 26 million ECUs.*®®
In June 1990 the Commission responded to criticism with new Guidelines for
Cooperation with the Developing Countries in Latin America and Asia. Cooperation
policy was to be restructured to fall into two different areas. Development aid
would be geared towards the poorest countries and population groups and economic
cooperation towards those countries and regions with ’high growth potential, to the
107mutual benefit of those countries and the Community’. In both cases 
environmental issues were to be given some priority. Development aid was to be 
granted in six areas; rural development, the environment, the human dimension of 
development, the structural dimension of development, regional cooperation and 
reconstruction aid. Economic cooperation was to involve three broad categories of
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supportable schemes; ’know-how* sharing in economics, science and energy, the 
economic environment, and business schemes. Together these new policy priorities 
would reflect 'a balanced package of instruments for cooperation*. The Commission 
also called for an increase in finance and for a planned *multi-annual* financial
|  AO
strategy for Latin America (and Asia).
At the same time as streamlining its policies the Commission also proposed 
to streamline its implementation procedures. Payments were to be made more 
quickly and the various cooperation instruments integrated to offer a more efficient 
service. The Commission recommended that EC aid be more closely coordinated with 
member state aid provision, for both economic and political reasons. The economic 
reason was to secure increased efficiency in the use of available resources. The 
political reason was to *reinforce the European presence in the developing countries 
concerned'. *®®
(iii) Regional integration
The EC was not allocated the function of support for regional integration in 
other parts of the world by treaty or even by secondary legislation, yet support for 
regional integration became an important part of its economic and political policies 
(see Chapter 2). One Commission document claimed that apart from rural 
development, regional cooperation was the only purpose for which Community funds 
could be used by Latin America (and Asia).**® This claim must have rested on a 
wide definition of 'rural development' as it clearly ignored at minimum humanitarian 
aid and disaster relief. Nevertheless the hyperbole of the statement gives some
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indication of the importance that the Community attached to regional integration 
programmes.
In Latin America the EC encouraged and supported regional and sub-regional 
cooperation for two interrelated reasons. The first was because of Community 
philosophy which regarded regional integration as a useful basis for economic 
development strategies.*** The second and arguably the secondary reason, was 
because the EC wanted to find a multilateral partner to help in the development and 
negotiation of a comprehensive EC strategy towards Latin America. The EC gave 
support to sub-regional economic integration bodies which included the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI), the Andean Pact, the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
integration, cooperation and development treaty between Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay. It also entered into discussions at different periods of time with the Latin 
American Economic System, the countries of the Cartagena Agreement, the 
Contadora Group, the Contadora Support group, the Group of 8 (Rio Group), the 
Latin American Parliament and the two diplomatic cooperation structures, the 
Group of Latin American ambassadors (GRULA) and the Group of Central American
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ambassadors (GRUCA). The EC’s efforts to establish a multilateral negotiating 
partner will be reviewed in a later discussion of political factors in the EC/ Latin 
America relationship.
The initial Commission report of 1974 which recommended that aid should be 
allocated to the non-associated countries gave priority to schemes which would
11 o
encourage regional cooperation and integration. ° Since 1974 the EC supported 
the efforts to promote Central American regional integration (see Chapters 4 and
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5) and CARICOM - this last organisation being composed essentially of Lome
members and outside the purview of this study. The EC gave economic support to
11 Latin American regional institutions between 1976 and 1985, under the technical
and financial assistance programme (the largest category of development aid).
Between 1976 and 198 support channelled through regional institutions totalled 35%
of funding for ’normal1 development projects.**^ This financial support was
disproportionately directed to Central American regional institutions. Between 1976
and 1985 Latin America a t regional level received 8.93 million ECUs, South
American regional institutions received 34.625 million ECUs and Central American
115regional institutions received 51.29 million ECUs. Latin American regional 
institutions to benefit included the Latin American Free Trade Association (the 
predecessor organisation of ALADI) and the Institute for Latin American 
Integration.**®
The Andean Pact benefitted as the only South American regional organisation
to receive assistance from the EC. (Regional cooperation finance combined with
individual Andean Pact country support totalled 350 million ECUs between 1976 and 
1t71986). EC supported Andean Pact programmes concentrated on two areas; food 
strategy and industrial development. The Community supported a regional 
telecommunications development project and a regional fisheries project. The 
Community implemented trade benefits regarding rules of cumulative origin for the 
Andean Pact (and the CACM) and donated financial and technical assistance for 
projects designed to encourage harmonisation of industrial standards and quality 
control.**®
The economic results of efforts to encourage regional integration were
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disappointing. The conclusion expressed in a 1990 Commission document was that
fthe regional integration so much talked of in the last 30 years  has never
progressed beyond an extremely limited degree of institutional cooperation. There
is as yet very little  economic integration.1**** However by 1990 the EC remained
convinced that regional economic integration projects in Latin America (and Asia)
should remain a high priority for Community support. Four areas were targeted for
future support. The first was regional support for the environment. The second was
the development of intra-regional trade. The third was support for regional
120institutions and the fourth was support for regional communications projects.
(iv) Investment and debt
The European Community had no direct responsibility for the promotion or 
supervision of direct or indirect investment in Latin America or elsewhere. That 
responsibility belongs to member state governments, business, commercial banks and 
multilateral financial institutions like the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank), the European Investment Bank (E1B), the IMF and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Only EC member states were represented 
on the boards of the international financial institutions; neither did the EC have 
observer status or participate in meetings as at say the UN or the G7.
Latin America was not unimportant as an area of investment for the EC/12 
as a whole. EC member state direct and indirect investment and aid provided 
substantial sources of capital for Latin America, particularly in South, as opposed 
to Central America. The 1986 Commission Communication to the Council noted that
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the EC/12 owned 20% of foreign direct investment (fdi) in Latin America (compared 
to just 50% held by the US). The Document also pointed out that in 1984 and 1985, 
the EC/12 was the source of the largest new fdi in South America. EC/12 fdi 
amounted to some $1,200 million compared to $250 from Japan and a net 
disinvestment from the US of $170 million.
The debt issue however proved to be of more concern to the EC than issues
122relating to direct investment. Latin America was a significant recipient of
loans from European banks. At December 1986 Latin America owed eight European
countries a total of $11,459 billion; of these only Switzerland, which was owed
$1,198 billion was a non-EC member state. By comparison the US was owed $12,079
billion and Japan $4,300 billion. Of the EC member states three - Britain, Germany
and France - were owed $4,110 billion, $2,160 billion and $1,863 billion 
11'Krespectively. And the debt issue, at least from the perspective of the EC/12 
was essentially a south American issue. Over half of European loans were in Brazil 
and Mexico, with Argentina and Venezuela accounting in volume terms for most of 
the re s t .* ^
Given Latin America's difficulties and in the case of some countries their 
inability, to repay both interest and principal - marked most dramatically by the 
Mexican crisis of 1982 - all creditor countries, including the Europeans, were forced 
to participate in some form of rescheduling, if only out of self-interest. One 
European banker stated that
'Outright repudiation of all or even most of the debt by even one or two of 
the largest debtors could leave several of the largest banks in the US and some in
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Europe in a dangerously weak situation. This could also provoke a liquidity crisis if
depositors were to lose confidence. Either of these eventualities could cause serious
disruption to the financial system which, if the monetary authorities did not
12*5intervene, could produce a depression on the scale of the 1930s.
The EC did not present a particularly cohesive response to the serious
problems raised for both Europe and Latin America in respect of investment issues -
particularly in relationship to debt. The EC was limited by its lack of competencies
but also because in the case of Latin American debt its response was institutionally
fragmented. The Commission engaged in unsuccessful attempts at debt diplomacy
(see below). The Parliament passed a series of declarations calling for an EC debt
strategy. The Councils issued some cautious statements and the Monetary
Committee which 'adopted a much more orthodox stance on the problem than the
EC Commission or the European Parliament' produced its own initiative.
In 1984 Chairman of the Commission Gaston Thorn failed in his attem pt to
persuade the Council of Ministers to extend the remit of European Investment Bank
lending to Latin America. In the same year the Commissioner for External Relations
Karl Haferkamp argued that the responsibility for policy and action vis-a-vis debt
lay not with the Community but with the individual member states. The new
Commission led by Jacques Delors at least initially backed the more activist policy
led by the Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson. In 1985 Cheysson met
with representatives of the leading Latin American debtor countries organised in the 
127'Cartagena Group' in an attempt to forge a common position on the 
debt.128
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'The Commission and the Group of Cartagena agreed that democratic regimes 
and regional cooperation had to be strengthened: that a global approach to solving 
international economic problems was necessary; that financial and trade problems 
were interconnected and; that the role of the World Bank would be 
strengthened.' * ^
However Commission activism was deterred by the reiteration by the Finance 
Ministers of their superordinate role in respect of debt. The Council supported the 
1986 Monetary Committee proposals which essentially maintained a cautious 'case 
by case' approach although the proposals did accept that the industrialised nations 
should adopt a common approach. The major departure from previous policy was the 
proposal to give special assistance to the poorest countries internationally; a 
proposal which would include Africa but exclude most of Latin America. By 1986 the 
Commission was only able to report disappointing results in its quest to find a 
Community role in respect of the debt.
'It [the Community] has not yet, however, found the way to bring its
considerable economic weight fully to bear in the coordination of macro-economic
policies, particularly monetary policies, between the industrialized countries. It is
only very indirectly that it helps to step up the flow of public funds to the indebted
countries of Latin America which are suffering from a net transfer of resources to 
1 *10other countries.'
By 1989 the Commission appeared to have abandoned any attem pt to carve
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out a Community role on debt. It noted the support of ’the governments of the
Community Member States* for the various initiatives on debt relief and the support
of the Finance Council for the 1989 'Brady Plan' proposed by the US Treasury
Secretary. It commented on the European Council's concern that the debt repayment
burden on middle income developing countries, a categorisation which includes most
of the Latin American debtor states, would cause a threat to the democratic
development of those countries. But the Community accepted that its own
role was peripheral; and more or less confined to industrial cooperation and the
132exchange of scientific and technological expertise.
The Parliament expressed its concern about the negative aspects for
democracy should the debt problem spiral out of control but had even less success
than the Commission in exerting influence. An interesting aspect of Parliamentary
resolutions however was the demonstrable consensus across the political spectrum
133that a comprehensive settlement ought to be achieved.
Political and institutional issues
Political issues, such as the lack of democracy, abuse of human rights, and 
abrogation of the law, which characterised the rule of the military dictatorships in 
South America, prior to the 'return to democracy' in 1984 and which included some 
of the largest economies, did not provide the primary obstacles to efforts made by 
the Community to deepen EC economic and political relations with Latin
1 *\AAmerica. Political issues such as human rights, the rule of law and liberal 
democracy were articulated as concerns of the Community but the EC's political
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concern with Latin America as a whole was only minimally directed a t South 
America. The two exceptions in terms of EC activity were in respect of Chile since 
the military coup in 1973 and for a brief period in 1982 the Falklands/Malvinas war 
and its immediate aftermath. The three major institutions of the EC (the Council, 
the Commission and the Parliament) in the main took a more or less indifferent 
attitude to South America - in comparison both to their interest in Central America 
and with other regions of the world - with the partial exception of the European 
Parliament which after direct elections in 1979 became an active participant in 
Community diplomacy towards the region.
This section is mainly concerned with political issues but it also consider the 
attempts at institutionalisation of relationships between the two regions. This is 
because the institutionalisation process had political implications in that the effect 
of any institutionalisation of economic relations was a t least partly to tie  Latin 
America into an international political economic sub-system (EC-Latin America) 
where the EC was not only the leading and dominant partner economically, but by 
inference at least, the dominant political force.
(i) The Council of Ministers
The Council displayed only sporadic interest in Latin America until the 1980s. 
Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Rome the EC member states had issued a 
’memorandum of intention' addressed to Latin America which had promised to 
establish and maintain close relations with the region. However it was not 
until December 1970 that the Council issued a Declaration, its first on Latin
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America, which was essentially concerned with trade m atters, and which formalised 
cooperation procedures including the establishment of an EEC/Latin America Joint 
Committee.*'*® Although it is difficult to quantify the Council’s political activity 
in respect to Latin America prior to 1985 when the first systematic records began 
to be kept of EPC, one commentator, Esperanza Dur&n noted that up until the early 
1980s the EC's ’mild interest., focused mainly on political change in the region, not 
least because of the Cuban revolution. ' 1 She also commented that EC policy 
demonstrated some independence - both in relation to the member states and its 
principal ally, the United States.
'the EC as a collectivity has adopted less ambiguous positions on such issues
as Central America, Chile, the Andean Pact and SELA than its often vacillating
member countries, with the possible exception of Germany. It is also interesting to
note that its approach to Latin America as a whole has tended to tilt more openly
against US policy than has been possible for its individual members, which are
1 *18anxious not to damage their bilateral relations with the US.
Dur&n pointed to the ’remarkable degree of cohesion' achieved by the EC on
1 *1Qtwo issues; the Falklands and Central America. The latter issue is the subject 
of detailed consideration in the next two chapters but the former deserves some 
mention even though that 'remarkable cohesion' only lasted for a few weeks in 1982 
(2 April -24 May). As Geoffrey Edwards noted, one of the most interesting aspects 
of the joint action by the Ten member states acting within the Council of Ministers, 
was the fact that Community and Member State competencies were conflated as the
158
EC/10 ’as a collectivity’ sought to find ways to support Britain against Argentina. 
As Edwards pointed out, 'in a series of meetings and decisions which crossed and 
recrossed the boundaries between EPC and EC matters, many residual sensitivities 
as to the institutional proprieties were swept aside - for the time being at 
l e a s t . E d w a r d s  concluded by noting that 'Latin America as a whole has always 
tended to be a lacuna in the Community's external policy' and even if 'the 
Community felt obliged to do something, it did not have to play a central 
role'.*^* But he also warned against the dangers of underestimating the 
ramifications of EC activity on the Falklands, which at least gave some indications 
of the possibility of a cohesive and common EC foreign policy for the future.
The EC's political activity in respect of the Falklands proved to be a 
momentary excrescence of political concern with events pertaining to Latin America 
and did not reoccur in the 1980s in respect to either South America as a whole and 
with the exception of Chile, in respect to any individual South American country.
A European Policy Institute survey of all public documents relating to EPC 
between January 1985 and June 1989 showed that in terms of EPC active political 
contacts (as expressed through representation, demarches, conference attendance), 
the Council had 7 such contacts with Chile, 4 with Panama, and 1 each with 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. This compared to 2 each for 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua, 1 each for Guatemala and Honduras, 63 for 
the Central American states as a whole, and 47 for the Contadora Group
1 AOcountries. The priority given to Central America and miniscule interest of the 
Council in South America is emphasised by the fact that these references were not 
mutually exclusive. References to the Contadora states were entirely due to their
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involvement with the Central American peace process of the 1980s. The active 
contacts recorded with aU the South American states except Chile referred to 
political contacts made by the Council with these states in terms of their connection 
with the conflict in Central America.
The same survey also recorded all references within EPC documentation to 
both particular countries and to regions. These references were also heavily skewed 
towards Central America. Between January 1985 and June 1989 Latin America was 
referred to 55 times in EPC public documentation; South America 5 times, the 
Falklands/Malvinas 3 times and Central America 140 times. References to individual 
countries in the same period confirmed this pattern. In South America the numbers 
of references in descending order were Chile (70), Cuba (23), Argentina and Peru (14 
each), Brazil (11), Panama (10), Paraguay (9), Colombia (7), Mexico (6), Bolivia (4), 
Ecuador, Surinam and Venezuela (3 each). This compared to EPC references to 
individual countries in Central America as follows; Nicaragua (53), El Salvador (24), 
Guatemala (21), Costa Rica (11) and Honduras (10).^^
The record of Council political involvement in South America in the latter
half of the eighties was particularly poor when contrasted to the claims made in
relation to the accession of Spain and Portugal to the E C .*^  The Act of
Accession contained an annexed Joint Declaration on relations with the countries of
Latin America which although only specifying support for the expansion of economic
relations between the two regions, did hint a t possible closer political 
145relations. By January 1989 the EC was still referring to the Ibero-Latin 
America affinity and hoping that the appointment of the Spanish Conservative, Mr. 
Matutes as Commissioner responsible for the region would serve to act as a spur to
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improved relations. However economic relations between the two sub­
continents continued to decline and there was little evidence, by 1990 at least, of 
a growth in interest by the EC in South America. The increased political activity 
which did occur was almost entirely in respect of Central America.
In June 1987 the Council adopted a revised strategy towards Latin America 
and promised to intensify political relations with the region. However apart 
from the sporadic demarches made to the Pinochet government in Chile about its 
human rights record the only other demonstrable sign of an increased interest of the 
Council in the region in the late 1980s was the political dialogue which was 
established with the Rio Group of South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) as a by-product of the 
EC’s activities in Central America (see Chapter 5). The EC and the Rio Group met 
a t ministerial level in September 1987, March and September 1988, and April 1989. 
This almost informal series of meetings was institutionalised at a meeting held in 
Rome in December 1990. The Council and Commission of the EC agreed to meet 
annually with the expanded Rio group of eleven countries (the former eight minus 
Panama plus Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay) to discuss political and economic 
issues of mutual interest.*4® But as an official publication of the EC points out, 
’It is a dialogue, not negotiations, and it cannot directly produce concrete 
results.’14®
(ii) The European Parliament
The pre-1979 non-elected European Assembly displayed some interest in Latin
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America. In 1971 for instance it called for ’rapid and effective action by the
150Communities’ to work for closer cooperation with Latin America. Post 1979
the elected Parliament, the least powerful of the major European institutions,
demonstrated the greatest involvement in respect of EC/Latin American political
relations. This involvement was more or less restricted to the arena of ’declaratory
diplomacy’ and took place in six different ways. The first was through a series of
reports, questions and resolutions presented at the Parliamentary, Committee and
’Intergroup* s e s s i o n s . T h e  second was via the Joint European Parliament/Latin
152American Parliaments which were instituted in 1974. The third was via the
1 5*?'Interparliamentary Delegation for Latin America’. The fourth was via the
1 r A
various visits by individual European Parliamentarians to the region. The fifth
was via the activity of the political groups and political parties which engaged in
'party to party' diplomacy in Latin America. The sixth was the active
encouragement (and finance) which the European Parliament gave for political visits
to Europe by Latin American politicians and officials.
A survey of EP questions and resolutions showed that between 1963 and 1988
a total of 629 written questions were asked about Latin America. There were 369
on South America, 260 on Central America and 191 on the Caribbean. Although 164
of the questions on South America related to economic issues and 66 concerned
development aid, 85 referred directly to political issues and 84 to human rights.
Over the same period 213 EP resolutions were concerned with Latin America; of
these 128 dealt with South America. Fewer resolutions on economic issues (including
development aid) were proposed than on political issues (including human rights) -
155the former totalled 98 and the latter 140. Major political themes included
162
support for democratisation; the reiteration of the deep rooted links between
economic development and social and political stability; the condemnation of human
rights violations; the support of regional and sub-regional cooperation; support for
non-intervention; support for social justice and agrarian reform; calls for an end to
sta te  repression and all forms of terrorism including state terrorism; support for the
1*56work of the international party federations and their contribution to the 
stabilisation of democracy as well as support for other transnational organisations; 
and the promotion of an active role for the EC in partnership with Latin America 
and the USA.*^
A judgement as to whether the European Parliament was influential or not, 
or to what degree, in terms of its impact on the course of political events in South 
America in the 1980s is difficult - not least because of the difficulty of separating 
out the impact of the EP from the impact of both the other EC institutions and the 
political activity at the level of the member states. One way of assessing the 
influence is to examine the substantial interventions of the EP in terms of the 
reports which were considered by the various committees and the plenary sessions. 
In the 1980s major reports to the EP came from Mr. van Aerssen (1983, 1985,1987), 
Mrs. Lenz (1985, 1989) and Mr. Mcgowan (1985).
The major areas of political concern of EP reports, debates and resolutions 
were in respect of democratisation processes in South America. The EP also 
regularly expressed support for named individuals whose human and civil rights had 
been abused by various governments. To the extent that the EP was able to act as 
a platform for international public opinion such declaratory democracy was a 
contributory factor in terms of mobilising support for political objectives like fthe
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return to democracy'. It would be ridiculous to argue that the EP's declaratory 
diplomacy brought about the democratic changes which occurred in South America 
in the 1980s but it would be equally facile to dismiss the EP's contribution as 
worthless. The problem is that repeated EP rhetorical interventions in the debate 
about Latin American development gave rise to expectations by Latin Americans 
who expected political declarations to be backed up by economic support. By and 
large this economic support did not materialise to any great extent.
(iii) The Commission
The Commission encouraged closer relations between the two regions in three 
ways. These were the establishment of permanent representation in Latin America, 
its own activist diplomacy, particularly by Commissioner Claude Cheysson during his 
second term of office (DG8, January 1985-December 1988) and the consolidation and 
support of region to region forums for dialogue.
The EC was permanently represented in Latin America from 1965 when the
Higher Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community established a 'liaison
1 ^8office' in Santiago de Chile. This office became the Latin American 
Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in 1967 although it was 
downgraded to the status of sub-office in 1978 and the main Delegation transferred 
to Caracas, Venezuela. By 1989 there were additional permanent Commission 
Delegations (offices) in Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay and Costa Rica and plans to set up 
a further two in Peru and Ecuador. The Delegations had the status of diplomatic 
missions and also acted as information centres for the EC. By 1989 the Caracas and
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Santiago offices also operated as EC Documentation Centres for Latin
1 CQ
America. These offices took a pro-active stance as far as spreading
information about Europe was concerned. As well as participating in straightforward
trade related activities such as attendance at the region's trade fairs, they
distributed radio programmes about Europe to Latin American radio stations,
organised seminars and visits to Brussels by Latin American politicians, civil
servants, journalists and students and helped support 31 reference centres on the EC
160in Latin American universities.
The first formal agreements linking the EC with a part of Latin America
were the cooperation agreements with Argentina (which came into force in 1963) and
Brazil (which came into operation in 1965) on the peaceful use of nuclear 
161energy. The Commission's interest in the region declined over the next decade
and only revived in the early 1970s with the signing of three nonpreferential trade
agreements with individual Latin American countries; Argentina (1971), Uruguay
(1973), Brazil (1973) - and a nonpreferential agreement on economic and commercial
cooperation with Mexico (1975).*®^
In August 1971 Commissioner Borschette visited Chile, Argentina and 
163Uruguay. He was followed in September/October by the Commissioner 
responsible for external relations, Ralf Dahrendorf. Commissioner Dahrendorf met 
three Heads of State of military dictatorships (Brazil, Argentina and Peru) and one 
elected president, Salvador Allende of Chile. Talks did not include any references 
to democracy or human rights but focused on Europea and Latin American dismay 
in respect of US President Nixon's unilateral decision, taken the previous August,
1RAto opt out of the Bretton Woods system. In 1975 the new Commissioner
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responsible for external relations, Sir Christopher Soames visited Guatemala,
i c e
Venezuela, Peru and Brazil. In 1979 Commissioner Guido Bruner visited
Venezuela and Ecuador to discuss the possibilities of cooperation in the energy 
166sector.
Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp, also Commissioner for external relations visited the
region in 1979 in order to participate in the Joint EEC/Brazil Committee (Brasilia,
October 1979) and the Joint EEC/Mexico Committee (November 1979) - both
167Committees having been set up under the agreements signed previously. This 
resurgence in interest in Latin America waned again until the Falklands/Malvinas 
war put the region back on the EC's political, as well as economic agenda. 
Commissioner Narjes, in a reply to a debate of the European Parliament in October 
1983 argued that
'This is a particularly good time to consider longer-term relations and their 
development, especially between the Community and the Latin American sub­
continent, now that the special political problems of Latin America, and the South 
Atlantic crisis of last year, have led to a greater political awareness and mutual 
understanding of the content, scale and prospects of Latin American-European 
relations.'^®
Narjes argued that 'a new phase' in relations could be beginning which could
16Q'strengthen the existing links and open up new possibilities.'
The zenith of Commission activism however came when ex-French Foreign 
Minister Claude Cheysson started his second term as Commissioner responsible for
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Development in January 1985. Cheysson had a long standing interest in Latin
America. After attending the 1981 Cancun Summit as French foreign minister,
Cheysson had also visited Central America. In that year he had also signed, on behalf
of France, the controversial Franco-Mexican Declaration on £1 Salvador (see
Chapter 6). As French Foreign Minister, he had also attended the 1984 San Jos6
Summit, which brought together all the EC and Central American foreign ministers,
the foreign ministers of Spain and Portugal (then EC candidates), the European
Commission and the Central American Common Market (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Cheysson’s activism however had its most tangible results (see Chapters 4 and
5) in respect of the Central American region with the establishment and
consolidation of the San Jos6 process. Cheysson attempted a dialogue with the
Cartagena Group over the debt issue but, as has been mentioned, this was blocked
by the ECfs Monetary committee. Cheysson however continued to encourage the
Latin American nations to cooperate to negotiate both on debt and on issues like
trade. He saw advantages to a common front of Latin America and the EC against
the United States. In 1987 he spoke with approval of a 1985 document put to the EC
170by the Contadora Group entitled ’the End of the Monroe Doctrine’. In 1985
Cheysson commented on the ’incomprehension - some would go so far as to say
arrogance’ of the US in its relations with Latin America.
Cheysson never abandoned his commitment to attempting to find some way
that the Community could have some input into the resolution of what he saw as a
key problems for Latin America. These were the debt crisis, the related question of
how to achieve economic growth and the threats to the new-found democracies if
172these economic problems were not resolved. Cheysson personally presided over
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the sixth EEC/Mexico Joint Committee and the second EEC/Uruguay Joint 
Committee - both held in Brussels in November 1985. One outcome of Cheyssonfs 
interest in the region was the memorandum of agreement signed in October 1988 by 
Cheysson and Enrique Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank 
which was designed to encourage private European investment in Latin America. 
Another concrete result of Cheysson's activity was the financial instrument set up 
also in 1988 designed to promote EC/Latin American (and Asian) joint ventures in 
the private business sector. Officially known as the EC International Investment 
Partners this instrument was sometimes referred to as the ’Cheysson 
facility*.
By 1989, despite the much heralded arrival of the Spanish Commissioner 
Matutes who it was hoped (by optimists in Latin America and the EC) would work 
to strengthen links between the two regions the Commission seemed to be reverting 
to a policy of 'benign neglect' towards the region. A December 1989 Commission 
review of relations argued that it was primarily 'up to the Latin American countries 
themselves to make the adjustments' which would help achieve the objectives of 
economic development and the consolidation of democracy. These policies 
perhaps reflected Mr. Matutes affinities to his political party (Conservative) rather 
than his nation.
The institutionalised dialogue between the Commission and Latin America was 
fragmentary. The EEC dialogue with GRULA was established in 1970. Having 
achieved little  in the 1970s the dialogue was suspended in 1979 due to the admission 
of Cuba into GRULA at a time when Cuba was not recognised by the Community. 
(Cuba became a member of SELA in 1979 thus allowing it of right representation in
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GRULA.) The dialogue did not restart until May 1981, to be again suspended in 1982, 
this time by Latin America after the Falklands/Malvinas crisis. The 
GRULA/Commission dialogue restarted, at least informally, in February 1985. ° 
By the late 1980s however what political dialogue that did occur tended to take 
place through the more or less annual meetings of the San Jos6 process which 
brought together not only the Central American and Contadora foreign ministers, 
as has already been noted, but in addition towards the end of the 1980s the foreign 
ministers of the Contadora Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay). 
From 1987 this ministerial dialogue - with the Commission playing a secondary role - 
was institutionalised in the EC/Rio Group dialogue.
The Commission itself was active in the Joint Committees and sub­
committees which were set up under the terms of the agreements signed both with 
individual Latin American nations and the agreements signed with the two sub­
regional groupings - the Andean Pact and the Central American nations. The
Commission represented the EC on the Joint Committees which were an integral
17fipart of the 3 framework agreements with Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. In all 
these relationships, with the noticeable exception of the EC/Central America 
Agreement the Commission kept to, more or less, its Treaty of Rome based sphere 
of competence. There was little sign therefore of any potential materialisation of 
an institutionally integrated Community policy, towards Latin America or more 
specifically towards South America, except in the case of the Falklands/Malvinas 
crisis.
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(iv) EC political relations with Latin America
Arguably, political issues only ever became crucial factors in EC relations 
with Latin America when they appeared to threaten the fundamental values and 
interests on which those relations were based. One important event was the 
Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 - the impact of which was obviously greater on EC/ 
Central American relations - but which also had an impact on EC/ South American 
relations particularly in respect to the close relationship which developed between 
the EC and the Contadora countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela). 
Another was the Falklands/Malvinas war in which every Latin American sta te  except 
Chile opposed Britain and supported Argentina and every EC member state, a t least 
for a short period, supported Britain, as, after some wavering had the United States. 
The danger in the first seemed to be a radical threat to the shared values which 
formed the philosophical base of the EC's policy towards Latin America in that 
revolutionary upheaval might spread to other Latin American countries. The danger 
in the second was the possibility that Latin American nations might close off 
markets and sources of raw materials, and turn elsewhere for trading and maybe 
political support, perhaps to Japan or less likely, but not impossibly, to the Soviet 
Union. The EC's major response even in terms of this South American issue however 
was to push forward with its Central American initiative (see Chapter 4).
The 1987 Community strategy as articulated in the Council's declaration on 
Latin America stressed that the EC and Latin America shared 'common values and 
interests' and 'a common aspiration towards a conception of society based on respect 
for human rights and leading to a similar view of the political as well as the
170
177economic world order.* ' *
By 1990, the region's revolutionary movements (except in Peru) were more 
or less (at least temporarily) defeated, the military dictatorships, once so useful but 
increasingly an embarrassment to the Western political order, virtually redundant 
and therefore there were no viable political challenges to the political order 
espoused by EC philosophy and political practice. The absence of such challenges 
might indicate that Latin America may remain a low priority for the EC.
EC relations with Latin America: overview
The history of EC involvement in Latin America cannot be divided very easily 
into different phases given that the EC's activity and interest in Latin America 
remained low throughout the post-war period. However broadly speaking three stages 
in EC involvement can be discerned. The first was from 1957 to 1979; the second 
from 1979 to 1982; and the third from 1982 to 1990.
The first phase could be characterised as a period of 'EC apathy'. Economic 
links were maintained but despite the efforts of the Latin Americans, were not 
prioritised for improvement by the EC. Political relations were almost non-existent.
The next few years, between 1979 and 1982, marked a transitional phase in 
EC relations with Latin America and there were some indications that the European 
Community was prepared to adopt a pro-active policy towards Latin America. This 
was the period of increasing 'EC awareness* in respect of Latin America.
1982 was a key year in terms of another change in the EC's approach to Latin 
America. This was the year of the Mexican debt crisis when both European banks as
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well as US banks were made to face up to the negative implications for the world’s 
banking and financial systems of the Latin American debt crisis. It was the year of 
the Malvinas/ Falklands war - in the aftermath of which the EC was forced to 
recognise the potential damage to EC-Latin American economic and political 
relations. All these factors contributed to a consolidation of a distinct EC policy to 
Latin America. The idea seemed to be to protect markets and to provide a more 
coordinated EC approach towards the region. This was the period of ’EC activism’.
Yet the above summary still leaves too many puzzles unsolved. Why did the EC 
become more active around 1979? What precipitated the continuing interest of the 
EC in the region after 1982 - despite the fact that by the end of 1982 the Falklands 
factor had proved to be only a temporary problem in EC-Latin American relations. 
Neither did the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 prove to have longlasting affects in 
terms of changed banking, government or multilateral institutional policy towards 
Latin America.
Given the EC’s political and economic focus in terms of Latin America in the 
1980s was disproportionately focused on the sub-region of Central America it is 
perhaps within this region that the answers to the puzzle may be found.
The most salient political and economic factor in Central America from the 
late 1970s onwards was that of the national revolutionary movements. An 
explanation of the renewed interest in Latin America in 1979 should perhaps 
therefore take into account the impact on domestic Latin American politics and 
international relations of the successful revolutions of 1979. The Sandinistas had 
achieved state power in 1979 but they were not the only significant revolutionary 
movement in the region. It was not a coincidence that the end of EC apathy towards
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Latin America occurred with the rise and success of revolutionary movements in 
Nicaragua and Grenada (the latter a Lom& member but geographically and post-1979 
politically close to Latin American revolutionary movements) and the appearance 
as key political actors of the Salvadorean and Guatemalan liberation organisations. 
The reason that the EC was not an important factor in Latin American politics after 
the Cuban revolution of 1959 (although as we have seen it had shown some interest 
in this revolution) was that in 1959 it was not capable of performing a role as an 
international actor and at that period it had been a subordinate partner to the US 
in the Western Alliance. By 1979 the EC was institutionally more or less developed 
and it had growing different interests and foreign policy objectives to those of the 
United States.
The EC was as concerned as the United States to suppress revolutions and 
the next chapter will consider the EC's policies towards the revolutionary changes 
which were taking place in Central America in the 1980s. By 1982 after the failure 
of the Salvadorean revolutionary movement's 'final offensive' it became very clear 
that the United States was not going to allow 'another Nicaragua' in El Salvador 
even at the cost of horrific violence. It has already been noted that 1982-1990 saw 
a rise in EC activism in Latin America - particularly with regard to the Contadora 
nations - and this interest was focused around the Central American conflicts. Given 
the renewed US interest in its 'back-yard' why should the EC have become active 
in this area? What was the issue which encouraged the EC to pursue an activist role 
in the 1980s?
Without prejudging the evidence which will be presented in the following 
chapters there appear to be two salient issues. The first was the EC's wish, shared
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with the US, to prevent the spread of revolution and to make a European 
contribution to the process. The second was its increasing concern about United 
States belligerence which could internationalise the Central American conflicts. 
Thus EC foreign policy both reinforced US goals and at the same time challenged US 
hegemony in the region.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to deal with three questions. Has the EC acted 
as a cohesive international actor in its relations with Latin America? Did EC foreign 
policy practice contribute to the development of an institutionally cohesive EC 
foreign policy? And what relationship did the EC's Latin American policy have to 
the EC's decision to become actively involved in Central America in the 1980s?
In answer to the first question it has been shown that the institutions of the 
EC has more or less shared a broad philosophical approach to the region. Latin 
America and in particular South America has had a low salience for the EC and 
apart from the Falklands/ Malvinas crisis the institutions of the Community operated 
in a sometimes ad hoc and uncoordinated manner. In terms of the contribution to the 
general development of a cohesive EC foreign policy and practice, relations with 
Latin America had their major institutional impact again as a result of the 
Falklands/Malvinas experience when the institutions worked closely together, albeit 
for a short period, to produce an integrated policy and agreed action.
In terms of a response to the last question it has also been shown that factors 
relating to EC relations with the region as a whole (Latin America) and the larger
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sub-region (South America) cannot account for the rise in EC interest in the smaller 
sub-region (Central America) in the 1980s. Instead it appears that what increased 
EC interest there was in Latin America in the 1980s can be accounted for by factors 
relating to EC-Central American relations. It is to therefore to these relations that 
we turn our attention to in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 European Community policy towards Central America
The European Community's interest in Central America has relatively recent 
origins. The first significant EC contact with the five republics was in 1975 when Sir 
Christopher Soames, then vice-president of the Commission with responsibility for 
external relations, visited the headquarters of the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) in Guatemala City. The Commissioner met the ministers for the 
economy of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, as well 
as the Secretary General of the CACM.* Relations with Central America however 
remained nascent until the end of the 1970s; whereafter they developed into an 
important foreign policy priority for the Community throughout the 1980s.
This chapter examines the development of EC interest in Central America 
and presents an exposition of the various policy objectives of both the Community 
as a whole and its constituent parts. It traces the growth of EC activity towards 
Central America from the inception of EC/Central American relations in 1975 
through to the consolidation of a coherent policy framework in 1984.
Definitions
The previous chapter pointed out that the EC's conception of Latin America 
as a geographically constituted entity has been in a state  of flux since the 1950s. 
Similarly, although the shifts in the EC's thinking about what constituted Central 
America were never as marked as the changes in EC perception of what constituted 
Latin America, the EC's conception of the former entity changed according to the
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evolution of historical and political circumstances. In 1981, when Central America 
began to increasingly impinge itself on the Community’s agenda, at least three 
different geographic interpretations of what constituted Central America could be 
found within EC official documentation.
The term Central America could refer to the five Central American republics
who considered themselves as a relatively homogeneous entity with a discernible
Central American identity, that is Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras
and Nicaragua. Apart from being historically a closely knit community (although
riven by conflict) these five nations had also formed a Central American Common
Market (CACM) in 1960. In Latin America these five republics are considered as the
constituent elements of Central America and this understanding soon began to
permeate the EC's conception of what constituted Central America. By 1986 EC
oofficial documentation was referring to these five states as Central America.
Prior to 1986, a second EC understanding of what constituted Central 
America included the five republics plus Panama. Panama probably has the closest 
links of all neighbouring states with the five republics. Panama joined the Central 
American Common Market in 1980 and remained closely associated with the five 
republics via its support role in the process of negotiations which sought to bring 
peace to the region in the 1980s. By 1986 the EC was following Latin American 
practice and made some differentiation between Central America (the five 
republics) and what it termed the Central American isthmus (the five republics plus
o
Panama).
In 1981 the EC's idea of Central America could also refer to the above 
mentioned six nations plus the Dominican Republic and Haiti.^ As at 1981 the
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Dominican Republic and Haiti were the only two independent Caribbean states, apart 
from Cuba, which were not associated with the Community via the Lome 
Conventions. They appeared to be considered as Central American for the EC's 
administrative convenience. Policy towards all 'non-associated' nations in the 
Caribbean and Central American region could thus be developed on a 'regional' basis. 
The terminology had again been refined by 1986 so that these two states were 
referred to collectively as Hispaniola and no longer considered as part of Central 
America. By 1989 both the Dominican Republic and Haiti had been admitted as 
members into the Lome Convention and so as far as the EC was concerned were now 
members of another, far broader regional grouping, that of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) group.
The EC's vision of the Central American region never included Belize which 
is physically part of the Central American isthmus. This is because immediately 
after independence in 1981 Belize joined the Lom§ Convention group and was 
therefore considered by EC policy makers as part of the ACP region.
Cuba, as has been pointed out in the previous chapter, was never considered 
by the EC to be part of Latin America, let alone Central America and/or the 
Caribbean, until 1988, when it was politically recognised by the Community.
For the purposes of this study the term Central America will be used as a 
description of the five republics; Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Any other usage will be made clear in the text.
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Pre-Historv
European involvement with Central America began in 1502 when the 
Genovese adventurer, Christopher Columbus, landed on Guanaja, one of the Bay 
Islands in the Gulf of Honduras. Columbus sailed down the Caribbean coast of 
Central America to Panama where he was attacked by native inhabitants and driven 
from the isthmus. Initial Spanish colonial policy used the isthmus as a source of slave 
labour for the mines in Hispaniola (today the Dominican Republic and Haiti). 
Colonisation began in earnest in the mid 1520s. The Spanish retained a dominant 
influence in Western Central America up until the 1820s when independence brought 
into being the ’United Provinces of Central America’. The ’United Provinces* was 
a federal union which lasted from 1823 to 1838 before it split into the five republics
c
which form contemporary Central America.
The Spanish bequeathed the language and religion (Catholicism) of colonial 
Spain as well as a transformed demography. The estimated population of Central 
America in 1500 was around seven million. By 1778 the population had plummeted 
to around 800,000 after the native inhabitants were decimated by colonial brutality 
and disease. The dominant racial group of contemporary Central America is 
mestizo or of mixed race while in Costa Rica, where the native communities were 
almost completely wiped out, the dominant racial group is European. The Native 
Indian communities are minority communities in contemporary Central America - 
even in Guatemala where substantial numbers do survive.
Other European influence impinged on Central America's eastern coast by 
way of the sixteenth century French corsairs and Dutch and English buccaneers.
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These ’pirates1 made their living mainly from the plunder of Spanish shipping. 
Britain’s Sir Francis Drake is probably the best known along with Henry Morgan, 
later Governor of Jamaica. Of the non-Spanish European influence, the English was 
the most durable and significant. In 1633 the English sent an official expedition to 
the eastern coast of Central America, which they called Mosquitia, and in which 
they established a quasi-colony. The geographical area which thus came under the 
British sphere of influence covered the south east of contemporary Honduras and all 
of contemporary Nicaragua's Atlantic coast region. Mosquitia was never an 
important place of settlement for the English but it did serve to provide a 
convenient platform from which the English could challenge Spanish dominance of 
the isthmus. Although many of the English settlers or 'Shoremen' as they were 
called, left Mosquitia to settle in Belize in 1787 (four years after the English had 
agreed to evacuate Mosquitia in Article Six of the Treaty of Paris) some stayed. 
British commercial interests became interested in the possibilities for a potentially 
lucrative trans isthmus canal in the 1830s and Britain reestablished a British 
protectorate over Mosquitia in 1840, only formally relinquishing control in 1860. The 
British however maintained a presence on the Atlantic Coast until 1905 when they 
left their base in Greytown, now known as San Juan del Norte, a port town at the
Q
mouth of the San Juan River in southern Nicaragua.
The English supported the import of protestantism to the region via German 
Moravian missionaries who arrived in the nineteenth century. They also supported 
the import of Black (sometimes slave) labour from the Caribbean islands. English 
colonialism therefore had a substantial impact in respect of today's eastern coast. 
The majority religion is Protestantism of one form or another. The majority language
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on parts of the Atlantic Coast is English. There are important communities of Black, 
English speaking peoples on the Eastern coast of Central America from Honduras in 
the north through to Costa Rica in the south.
On a fairly trivial level the impact of English colonialism can be seen in
terms of the predominance of familiar surnames like Hodgson, Campbell, Gordon and
Wilson. On a more important level the English consolidated and encouraged a
hostility towards all things 'Spanish' - particularly in the area of intensive
settlem ent on the part of the coast which today forms part of Nicaragua. This was
to have important consequences after the Nicaraguan revolution when the ethnic
divide between east (non-spanish) and west (Spanish), which was exacerbated anyway
by initial governmental policy mistakes, was manipulated by domestic and external
counterrevolutionary elements in an effort to discredit the revolutionary 
ogovernment.
After independence up until the end of the nineteenth century the British also 
were involved in the internal affairs of the Spanish speaking Central American 
federation and later remained a powerful political force within the independent 
republics until the end of the century. Indeed, Frederick Chatfield, the British 
Consul to Central America designed the financial reforms which were to split the 
federation and forced the federation's President Morazan to adopt them. Chatfield 
was particularly active in Nicaragua. In 1842 and 1844 he enforced a British naval 
blockade against Nicaragua and as a result of the 1844 blockade one British national 
was awarded control of the Nicaraguan tobacco monopoly for two years and another, 
who had suffered some damage to property in an anti-British demonstration, was 
granted credits on Nicaraguan import duties.*® The last British military
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interventions in Central America were in 1894 and 1895, the former in Bluefields
and the last a naval blockade of the west coast Nicaraguan port of Corinto.**
The impact of British interference which included support for the
Conservatives, one of the two major political forces in Central America, was a
nationalist response led by the Liberals. The Liberals looked to the United States to
enforce the 1823 Monroe Doctrine which had pledged to prevent European powers
interfering politically in the American hemisphere (see Chapter 1). Thus the United
States was at least initially invited into Central America by progressive and
12modernising forces to help rid the isthmus of British influence.
However as British power waned internationally towards the end of the
nineteenth century, a new European power began to make its influence felt in
Central America. German businessmen became established in coffee production and
became influential in Central American trade. From 1913 through until the start of
the Second World War Central America's trade with Germany was second only to
their trade with the United States. Arguably, it was only in the relatively recent
past, that is since 1945, that the United States was able to assume a more or less
(at least up until the 1980s) undisputed economic dominance in terms of trade and
13investment relations with Central America. Economically in the immediate post
war period Central America became dependent on 'virtually one source of foreign
investment', the United S ta te s .^
Politically, the European states had no real locus within Central America
from when the British withdrew in the early twentieth century. As one distinguished
historian has stated, after World War 1, 'European power was hardly in sight' in the
1*5Central American isthmus. US dominance in the region was backed up by
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military force. In the twentieth century the United States invaded, occupied and sent 
troops to different parts of Central America and the Caribbean a t least 21 
times. Walter LaFeber, a US historian has pointed out that
fIn this respect, US foreign policy has sharply distinguished Central America
and the Caribbean nations from the countries in South America. In the latter region,
US political threats have been rarer. Direct, overt military intervention has been
virtually nonexistent. Central American nations, however, have received special 
17attention.1
In the early post war period Central America was subordinated to a United 
States foreign policy which from 1947 prioritised the fight against what it saw as 
international Soviet and Communist expansionism. This was to be a universal crusade 
which would include the eradication of Communist influence domestically and also 
within the US' immediate sphere of influence, that is in Latin and Central 
America. 'Communism' was broadly defined as including all political movements 
which expressed radical, independent or reforming programmes. In Central America 
the United States put Kennan's policy into action in 1954 when they financed and 
supported a military invasion of Guatemala which toppled the elected, reformist
I Q
president Jacabo Arbenz Guzman. The west Europeans supported the US action
with Britain and France opposing a Guatemalan request for discussion of the invasion
20to take place at the UN General Assembly.
In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s Central America was considered 
by the European powers as very much part of the US 'back-yard'. Any historical
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European political and economic presence had been almost obliterated. And if Latin 
America was low on the agenda for the newly created institutions of the EC (see 
Chapter 3), Central America was even lower.
EC interest in Central America through the first two decades of that 
organisation's existence was minimal. Although the trade-oriented Europeans did not 
adopt the trade embargo against Cuba only France demonstrated much political 
independence of US policy in that period. Only France agreed to sell arms to 
Castro's Cuba and only France voted against the United States in the UN Security 
Council after the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.^*
An important point is that West European responses to Central America even 
in these early days tended to be defined in terms of US policy towards the region. 
West Europeans responses also tended to be elicited in terms of political as opposed 
to economic issues. Central America was and is of little, if any economic interest 
for West Europe. When the EC did become intensively involved in Central America 
in the 1980s these two themes were evident in EC policy. EC intervention was 
primarily for political reasons and it was a response to US policy in the region.
Prior to 1975 however there was no EC interest or activity in the five 
republics of Central America.
The beginnings of a policy: 1975-1981
In the six years 1975-1981 the various institutions of the Community 
responded to the growing economic and political problems of Central America on a 
rather ad hoc and uncoordinated manner. One of those institutions, the Council,
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displayed no interest in the region a t all. It was only after being urged to do so by 
the Commission in particular, but also the Parliament, that the Council finally began 
to consider the region as part of its foreign policy responsibilities (in 1982).
(i) The Council
The Council did not demonstrate any interest in Central America in this 
period. However 1975-1981 saw the beginnings of policy and activity towards Central 
America by both the Commission and the Parliament.
(ii) The Commission
In 1975 Sir Christopher Soames became the first member of the Commission
to pay an official visit to Central America. Between 1975 and 1981 two more
Commissioners visited the region; Mr. Wilhelm Haferkamp who was responsible for
external relations and Mr. Claude Cheysson who was responsible for Development.
The EC's priority right from the beginning was to strengthen links with the regional
integration institutions particularly the Central American Common Market (CACM)
as well as to develop bilateral links.
Some impetus was given to the establishment of closer EC/Central American
relations in 1978 when the Central American Ministers of the Economy proposed that
the CACM should consider the possibilities of a cooperation agreement with the EC,
22on the lines of that operating between the EC and ASEAN. The Commission 
responded by agreeing, in April 1979, to formally meet with the Secretariat for the
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Economic Integration of Central America (SIECA) and of the individual Central
oo
American countries and Panama. As a result by November 1981, the Group of 
Central American Ambassadors in Brussels, (GRUCA) which included the Panamanian 
representative, met with the Commission representatives twice, in 1979 and 1980. 
The EC also worked with SIECA within the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations.^ 
Between 1975 and 1981 the EC was the object of visits from Central 
American politicians anxious to secure economic assistance and political support in 
respect of the often bloody political strife in the region. President Rodrigo Carazo 
from Costa Rica, Dr. Sergio Ramirez from the Nicaraguan government, the 
president of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and various 
ministers from Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica visited Brussels in this period.
As has been indicated in the previous chapter, the EC's main direct 
competencies towards Latin America were in the areas of trade and aid. Its indirect 
competence (that is non-Treaty based) lay in the field of regional integration. The 
economic area in which it had least influence, at least in Latin America, was in 
respect of investment and debt.
In trade terms Central America was of little importance to the European 
Community. In 1970 EEC/12 imports from Central America were worth just $257 
million. This amounted to 5.2% of its imports from Latin America. By 1980 EEC/12 
imports had increased in cash terms to $1317 million but the share in relation to the
o r
total of Latin American imports increased only marginally to 5.8%. These 
figures should also be seen in the context of a declining Latin American share in EC 
imports from 11% in 1958 to 5% in 1978.^* (see Chapter 3 for detail). In 1980 the 
major Central American exports to the EC were coffee and bananas. The EC
201
received 16.7% of its imported coffee from Central America and Panama and 39.3%
27of its banana imports. Central America's exports to the EC were therefore 
neither strategically important for the EC or of such a nature as to make the EC 
dependent on Central America as a source of supply for a particular commodity.
Conversely in 1970 the Central American countries received a mere $197 
million worth of EC exports, just 5.0% of total EEC/12 exports to Latin America. 
By 1980 although the volume in cash term of EEC exports to Central America had 
increased to $598 million this total only amounted to a 3.1% share in total EEC/12
OQ
exports to Latin America. In 1979 Central America only accounted for 0.5% of
the total trade of the EC/1 0 .^
By contrast the EC was an important trading partner for Central America.
In 1979 the countries of the Central American isthmus (the five Central American
republics plus Panama) sent 24.0% of their exports to the EC/9. This compared with
the 34.9% of exports which were destined for the US market. In 1979 bananas
and coffee amounted to 40.5% of Central American exports and the EC imported
just under half of Central America's banana exports and just under a third of coffee 
31exports.
The Community did not 'possess contractual trade relations on a bilateral
32basis as such' with the nations of Central America. However some bilateral
trading agreements were signed in this period between individual Central American
countries and the EC. On I January 1978 an agreement on textiles came into force
with Guatemala within the context of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (see Chapter 3).
Export quota agreements for handicrafts which included silk and cotton fabric woven
33on handlooms were opened with Honduras in 1977 and El Salvador in 1978.
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Initial EC support to Central America came in the form of efforts to promote
trade expansion as well as in the form of humanitarian aid which included emergency
food and disaster aid. Support for regional integration and financial and technical
assistance comprised the other major components of the EC's Central American
34cooperation programme.
Trade support included the promotion of the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) scheme which since 1971 could be utilised by Central America. 
The GSP was also used to support regional integration in that a system utilising 
cumulative rules of origin was introduced for the five member countries of the 
CACM. In 1978 the Commission organised an information meeting in Guatemala to 
try to ensure that the rather complicated GSP scheme could be better utilised by
oe
CACM business. Export promotion schemes were also offered and in 1979 the 
programme for the Central America isthmus included a conference on marketing 
techniques to be held in Tegucigalpa and a food marketing seminar a t Panama 
City.36
EC aid was made available for regional integration which was perceived as 
a way of promoting 'stability' in the region. SIECA was given technical support in 
the areas of 'customs nomenclature, customs laboratories, and customs value (in 
particular, the training of staff)'.
Central America also became eligible for financial and technical aid which 
from 1976 could be granted to non-associated countries (see Chapter 3). Financial 
and technical aid was targeted by the EC to the poorest countries and the poorest 
groups within those countries. The rural poor were a particular priority as were 
regional projects. Disaster relief and reconstruction could also be financed from the
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financial and technical aid budget. Only Bolivia benefitted out of all of Latin 
America from this new EC instrument in 1976 but by 1977 the figures in respect of 
financial and technical assistance to Latin America were already beginning to 
display a pattern in respect to Central America which would remain fairly consistent 
for the next decade and a half. By 1977 40% of the 9 million ECUs set aside for 
financial and technical assistance for Latin America was allocated to Central 
America (this particular budget included Panama, Dominican Republic and Haiti). 
In 1978 the equivalent percentage was 33.8% but by 1979 the figures showed an 
upward trend with Central America receiving 58% of the total allocated to Latin 
America. In 1980 Central America received an even higher 67.4% of the Latin 
America total. The sums involved were small. The EC's total budget for all the non­
associated countries was 110 million European Units of Account (EUA) in 1979 - 20%
OQ
of this was allocated for Latin America. In 1979 Central America received 13.4 
million ECUs compared to 9.70 million ECUs allocated to the rest of Latin America. 
The 1980 figures were 20.1 million ECUs for Central America and 9.70 million ECUs
O Q
for the remaining countries of the sub-continent. Nevertheless even given the 
low volumes of aid the relative weighting of financial and technical assistance was 
an indication of the priority given by the EC to the troubled sub-region within the 
context of its Latin America policy.
In 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 the Bank for Central American Integration 
(BCIE) benefitted from this budget in terms of technical assistance. Three other 
regional organisations benefitted in the period 1977-1980. These were the Institute 
of Nutrition of Central America (INCAP), the Pan American Health Organisation 
(PAHO) Central America and the Tropical Agriculture Research and Training Centre
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(CATIE). Again the sums involved were not large with CABEI receiving the largest 
amount of support at 3.23 million ECUs over the four year period.^®
The three individual countries which benefitted most from EC financial and 
technical assistance in the period 1977-1980 were Haiti (10.6 million ECUs), 
Honduras (13.4 million ECUs) and Nicaragua (5.3 million ECUs).*** Of the Central 
American republics Honduras received support for water supplies and sanitation and 
Nicaragua received support for economic and social rehabilitation.
Nicaragua was in need of reconstruction funding given that it had just come 
through a two year civil war which had left some 50,000 dead and its economic 
infrastructure devastated (see chapter 1). The EC chose to prioritise support for the
new revolutionary government to the extent that it agreed to provide by way of a
Af)supplementary budget some $9 million in 1979 for Nicaraguan reconstruction.
This sum amounted to just under half the EC’s previously agreed 1979 total for Latin
America as a whole.
Although economic aid was needed in Nicaragua for its own sake the
Community allocated aid because of ’both economic and political considerations’.
In 1979/80 Honduras received by far the largest amount of the Central American
countries at 11 million ECUs - with Nicaragua receiving the second largest sum at
5.3 million ECUs. Together Nicaragua and Honduras received half of the total EC
aid - some 33.5 ECUs - which was destined for Central America (including Panama,
Haiti and the Dominican Republic) in 1979/80.^ In addition, in 1980, 50% of all
direct food aid for Central America went to Nicaragua and Honduras. One Honduran
development project which EC food aid counterpart funding paid for was that of silo
44construction for gram storage.
205
Nicaragua was not the only country to receive disaster relief in respect of the 
after affects of revolution. In 1981, the people (not the government) of El Salvador 
also received support, via non-governmental organisations, in the aftermath of the 
1980 so-called ’final offensive* by the Salvadorean liberation movement (FMLN).^ 
The importance that the EC gave to Central America in terms of its policy priorities 
within Latin America is clear from the fact that in 1980 over half (51.4%) of the 
EC’s total 1980 budget for Latin America went to the sub-region. Over half of the 
Central America budget went to Nicaragua and Honduras. In other words by 1980 
around twenty-five per cent of the EC's total budget for Latin America went to two
ARcountries which could boast only 1.91% of the total population of Latin America.
In Central America EC aid was obviously targeted to reach the poorest 
countries. (In 1980 Haiti's GNP per capita was $270; Honduras $560 per capita; El 
Salvador $660 per capita; Nicaragua $740; Guatemala $1080; Dominican Republic 
$1160; and Panama $1730.)^ Yet arguably as early as 1979 the EC was also 
demonstrating the beginnings of its future policy towards the region which would 
attem pt to target what aid it did allocate to Central America to areas of 'political 
instability', this phrase often being little more than a euphemism for describing 
those areas where revolutions had or might occur. However initial EC attitudes were 
not hostile to either the incipient revolution in El Salvador or the actual revolution 
in Nicaragua. The FSLN's first major social project, the literacy campaign, was 
largely funded through counterpart funding from the controlled sale of EC food aid
i n
in Nicaragua. The governments of El Salvador in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were not supported by the EC nor were the military governments of Guatemala. EC 
aid which reached those two countries prior to 1980 was either humanitarian food
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aid or aid to non governmental organisations apart from the tiny amount of aid went
49to both countries for export promotion. Between March 1981 and March 1982 
some 7.5 million ECUs was distributed to the Salvadorean people via non­
governmental organisations like the Red Cross and the UN High Commission for
Refugees. Salvadorean refugees based in Nicaragua and Honduras received some 2.5
50million ECUs in the same period via the same channels.
The linking of aid to the poorest countries often with the most inequitable 
distribution of land as a means of assisting in the achievement of political stability 
was clearly spelt out by Commissioner Narjes when he responded to the debate in 
the European Parliament in November 1982 on the Commission's recommendations 
for Special Action in favour of the Economic and Social Development of Central 
America. He stated that 'economic and social factors are at the root of the political 
instability in this region and this was also the point of departure of the Commission's 
recommendations.' ® *
The underdevelopment which characterises Central America along with its 
distance from Europe and history of political violence made the region unattractive 
to EC investors. In 1980 private EEC investment in CACM countries amounted to 
just $3.78 million compared to $4.23 in Panama alone (and compared to private EEC 
investment of $720 million in all developing countries).**^ By far the largest source 
of foreign investment in Central America was the United States. In 1977 US direct 
investment in the five Central American republics amounted to $677 million 
(compared to $2442 million in Panama) and by 1980 it had increased to $1009 million 
(compared to $4223 million in Panama).**'* It was not part of the Commission's 
early priorities to try to encourage EC based investment in the reg ion .A lthough
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some Community representatives spoke occasionally of potential opportunities for 
EC investors should the region become economically developed and stable this never
ee
appeared as a primary reason for EC involvement in the region.
By 1981 the germs of a Commission policy could be seen even within the
rather ad hoc arrangements which had developed between 1975 and 1981. In 1979 the
official EC policy document on Latin America treated policy towards Central
America as a subsidiary issue and as an entirely economic question. By 1981 the
EC had found Central America important enough to issue an entire document
spelling out the EC's relationship with the region. EC priorities were to encourage
trade and regional integration. Development aid was to be allocated in such a way
as to back up these priorities. The Community was also gradually evolving a policy
57to the region based on political as well as humanitarian considerations. The 
Community argued, in line with its overall philosophy (see Chapter 2) that 'while 
fully respecting the sovereignty of all the countries in the area, the Community's 
regional aid and development cooperation will continue to take account of political
CQ
and human rights factors in the region.'
The Commission's concern over political developments in respect of 'the 
unstable situation in Central America* resulted in the forwarding to the Council on 
4 December 1981 of a communication recommending increased Community aid to
RQ
Central America.
(iii) The Parliament
The first directly elected European Parliamentarians took their seats in
208
Strasbourg in 1979. However prior to 1979 the Parliament had expressed concern
about developments in Central America particularly In relationship to human rights
fiOabuses by the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. During the first year of the 
Nicaraguan revolution (also the first year of the directly elected Parliament) the 
Parliament’s attitude was of cautious support for the new government. In a 
resolution passed in April 1980 Parliament welcomed the ’restoration of democratic 
freedoms’ and highlighted the economic difficulties which the country faced. The 
resolution called for fast and effective aid programmes for Nicaragua. The European 
Parliament also signalled its entry into the realm of high politics in respect of 
Central America when it stated that the EP ’hopes that the Member States of the 
Community will continue their policy of strict neutrality towards Nicaragua and will 
invite their partners to take the same attitude and to encourage its observance by
Cl
Nicaragua’s neighbours as well.
The Parliament also took an activist stance in respect to El Salvador and 
Guatemala. In April 1980 the Parliament condemned the murder of Salvadorean 
Archbishop Anibal Romero. In September 1981 the Parliament expressed its concern, 
by way of a resolution jointly sponsored by both Socialist and Christian Democratic 
groups (the two largest political groups) about the violent state-organised repression 
in El Salvador.®^ In February 1980 and in September 1981 the Parliament
CO
condemned human rights violations in Guatemala. The 1981 resolutions were the 
result of a joint Socialist/ Christian Democrat parliamentary delegation which had 
visited the region in June 1981.®*
El Salvador however was the early focus of EP attentions and in October 1981 
the Political Affairs Committee instructed Christian Democrat Mrs. Marlene Lenz
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to sta rt to prepare a report on El Salvador.
The EP had already signalled its intention to focus on Central America as a 
discrete entity when in 1980 the External Relations Committee of the Parliament 
’came to the conclusion that Central America was a separate problem [from that of 
Latin America]*. As early as 1980 therefore the EP began to formulate a 
specific policy to Central America; one which included support for democracy, 
human rights, economic aid and non-intervention in the region. And even before both 
the election and ascendancy of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency the EP was 
expressing anxiety about possible US intervention in that the EC’s member states 
were being invited to warn their 'partners', including implicitly the most important 
of those partners, the United States, to refrain from intervention in revolutionary 
Nicaragua.
Towards Convergence: 1982
In 1982 all the institutions of the Community expressed their concern about 
the conflict in Central America. There were initially divergent views on what should 
be the appropriate approach but by the close of 1982 a discernible Community 
approach appeared to be emerging. Increased Community aid, agreed in 1982, came 
about because of a Commission initiative, although it was agreed within the 
framework of political cooperation - an arena in which theoretically the Commission 
did not have powers of initiative (see Chapter 2).
(i) The Council
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The first ever statement by the Council on Central America appeared on 29
March 1982. The European Council expressed its concern at fthe continued growth
of tension in the region1. It expressed support for peace initiatives and noted that
the regional conflicts stemmed from social and economic inequalities. The Council
instructed the foreign ministers to draw up proposals, based on Commission
guidelines, for the implementation of increased and coordinated aid to the 
67region.
The Council did not agree the Commission’s proposals, made in June 1982,
because it was divided as to whether Nicaragua should be included. Germany under
the new Christian Democratic government and the British Conservative government
were against including Nicaragua in any regional package. This was of course the
approach taken by the Reagan administration which did not permit Nicaragua to
benefit from its Caribbean Basin initiative. As the Commission pointed out although
Nicaragua fulfilled the conditions which had already been agreed by the Council -
a new criterion seemed to be about to be introduced by ’some Member States' - that
of whether or not Nicaragua could implement land reform ’democratically’. Neither
the Commission nor the Parliament concentrated their challenge on the member
states’ assertions, at least publicly, although there is plenty of evidence that the
Sandinista agrarian reform was probably the most substantial in that nation's history
68- probably the most substantial in Central American history. Instead the Council 
was challenged on procedural grounds and on the basis that a programme of aid 
which incorporated the Sandinista government would help maintain Nicaragua within 
a Western sphere of influence and could encourage the Sandinistas to ’democratise’. 
In late October a compromise decision was reached when the terms of the
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aid package were slightly amended. A Commission official explained that
'the Foreign Ministers in Council on October 27th were more "nuancS" on the 
Nicaragua question. The Commission (W. Haferkamp) insisted that, in order to 
preserve the regional approach of the special action envisaged, Nicaragua should not 
be excluded. France has very strongly defended the same view and Germany 
advanced the idea to start the action for Honduras, the Domenican (sic) Republic 
and Costa Rica, without however excluding Nicaragua. The UK finally agreed to try 
a compromise.. This would be to find a solution which would permit Nicaragua to 
benefit de facto of the envisaged aid, but under a different and more general 
geographic presentation.'®^
By mid November the Council had agreed that an extra sum of 58 million
ECUs should be made available to all non-associated countries (Latin America, Asia
TOand parts of Africa). The Council finally agreed a regional package in November
71but the sum allocated to Central America was only 30 million ECU.
Although the member states had disagreed over tactics the Council had
continued, throughout 1982, to express its concern at the escalating violence in the
region. The Council's August statement declared a welcome for 'any initiative that
could put an end to the violence' and called for 'respect for human rights and the
72restoration of peace in the region'.
(ii) The Commission
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The Commission’s major efforts throughout 1982 were involved in trying to
persuade the Council to adopt a position towards Central America which would allow
Nicaragua to benefit from the supplementary development aid it proposed for the
region. The European Council statement issued in March had agreed that the crisis
in Central America required a response from the international community which
would include an increase in aid. Increased aid was seen as important because the
causes of the conflict in Central America were deemed as mainly due to 'serious
73economic problems and social inequalities'. It was stressed by the Commission
that that the proposal to increase aid to Central America was primarily in response
to political and strategic imperatives. It argued that 'increased Community aid to
Central America., is justified by the assessment made by the Member States and the
Commission, in the political cooperation framework, of the current situation in the
7 A.region and its possible repercussions at regional and world level.
Where the Council disagreed with the Commission was on the allocation of 
a supplementary aid package. The member states agreed that supplementary aid 
should be forthcoming but disagreed as to whether Nicaragua should be permitted 
to benefit or not.
The Commission insisted that Nicaragua should benefit from any aid package.
Indeed when the European Parliament debated and finally agreed a resolution calling
on the Community to cut off aid to Nicaragua on the grounds of alleged lack of civil
liberties and abuses of human rights the Commission categorically refused to do 
7*5so. Commissioner Pisani stated that 'the Commission will not suspend aid' and 
further went on to argue that the Community should actively favour Nicaragua. 'I 
would point out to the House that the situation is difficult and that Nicaragua, after
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7fiall it has been through, needs our support.1
The Commission's intention was that the Community initiative in favour of 
'Special Action' for Central America should be 'substantial enough to produce 
tangible results, not only from the political point of view, but also in terms of 
economic efficiency '.^  The Commission was anxious to convey a political and 
visible message to Central America that it was prepared to assist the region.
'Given the US and Canadian plans for large-scale financial assistance as from
this year, and of course the oil agreements with Venezuela and Mexico, the
proportion of aid from the Community will be reduced, however, if it remains at the
present level, and will thus fail to convey the desired degree of European solidarity
78in the international Central American rescue operation.'
The Commission proposed to the Council that 65 million ECUs worth of
supplementary financial and technical assistance be allocated to Central America
(the six countries of the isthmus, Haiti and the Dominican Republic) in 1982. The
plan was to commit the resources in 1982 and make most of the payments in the
first part of 1983. Because the Commission identified structural economic and social
inequality within the agricultural sectors in Central America as a prime cause of
social and political unrest the additional funds were to be allocated in support of
79agrarian reform programmes.
All the Central American countries (as outlined above) were to be eligible for 
Community aid but the granting of financial and technical assistance for specific 
programmes was to be made 'on the principles and criteria governing the
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Community’s development cooperation policy and the likelihood of effective 
80implementation.* Commission officials visited the region and judged that four
countries met the criteria - one of which was Nicaragua. The other three were Costa
Rica, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. It was the Commission’s insistence that
Nicaragua should be a beneficiary country of the special aid plan and the Council’s
reluctance to agree that held up a decision on the initiative until November 1982.
The Commission argued that it would rather withdraw the whole programme than
agree to eliminate Nicaragua from eligibility. There were two reasons for
Commission intransigence. The first was that the Commission argued that their
criteria for allocation of aid had not been challenged and it was proposed to allocate
aid according to those criteria. They also argued that it would be politically
'dangerous' to exclude Nicaragua from the EC's aid initiative. Such an act 'would
undoubtedly be unjust to Nicaragua, but very tactless vis-a-vis the countries of
81Central And Latin America'.
The Council refused to agree to the Commission's attem pt to include the 65
million ECU in the supplementary and amending budget for 1982 and so the
Commission was forced to reprocess the request as a resource transfer in October 
821982. The Council eventually supported the Commission's request but sharply cut 
the sums involved so that in the end less than half the sum that the Commission had 
originally recommended was agreed.
However total Community aid to Central America in 1982 showed a sharp 
increase in relationship to previous years. In 1982 Central America received 110 
million ECUs (including the supplementary allocation). This compared to a 1981 aid 
allocation of just under 40 million ECUs and a 1980 total of just over 45 million
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ECUs. The 1982 aid totals also compared favourably in terms of share of total Latin 
American aid (South and Central America). The rest of Latin America received just 
28.65 million ECUs.83
(iii) The Parliament
The Parliament adopted two major reports on Central America late in 1982. 
The first was the Report drawn u p  on behalf of the Committee on External 
Economic Relations on economic relations between the European Community and 
Central America.^  commonly called the 1982 Wieczorek-Zeul Report after the 
author and year of the publication. It was agreed in October 1982. The second had 
a more long-winded title. It was called the Report drawn u p  on behalf of the 
Committee on Development and Cooperation on the communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities to the Council concerning special action 
in favour of the economic and social development of Central America (COM(82)257 
final) and the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
Council (Doc. 1-559/82 - COM (82) 481 final) for a decision completing the general 
guidelines for 1982 concerning financial and technical aid to non-associated
Qt
developing countries.00 This report became known as the Michel Report after its 
author who unfortunately died before the report was finally agreed in November 
1982.
The reports and the resolutions which accompanied them provided a 
framework for European Parliament policy towards the region for the rest of the 
1980s. They also marked the start of a consensus across party lines on Central
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American policy. That consensus did not mean that the various parties were 
unanimous in their views about all issues and there were moments and periods of 
dissension on the application of the policy throughout the 1980s. The disagreements 
were illustrated early on in 1982 in respect of the differing approaches taken by the 
two biggest political groups to El Salvador and Nicaragua.
In March 1982 the European Parliament passed a resolution (by 84 votes to 
59) which stated among other things that 'the forthcoming ballot in El Salvador, to
oc
be held on 28 March 1982, cannot be regarded as free elections'. The resolution
was sponsored by the Socialist group and was opposed by the Christian Democrats;
the latter were accused by the Socialist group of giving at least implicit support to
one of the main candidates in the Salvadorean election, Napoleon Duarte, who
87campaigned on a Christian Democrat ticket. The Parliament was also divided
with respect to its position vis a vis the United States. The resolution considered
that a solution to the conflict in El Salvador could only come about 'political
dialogue between the government and opposition' but also that 'the policy pursued
88by the United States will not bring about such a solution'. However, the Socialist 
sponsor of the resolution, Mrs. Van den Heuvel, was careful to stress that criticism 
of US government policy did not imply wholesale criticism of the US.
'It is perhaps a good thing that I should have the opportunity to state  once 
again quite clearly and categorically that the Socialist Group has no interest 
whatsoever in bringing the American people into disrepute. All we are doing is 
passing objective judgment on the policy pursued by the Reagan administration, and 
we feel we have a right to subject that policy to critical appraisal precisely because
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we respect the American people and their tradition of democracy... We hope that 
the resolution., will play a part in a development which is in keeping with the
OQ
democratic tradition of the American people.
The second major issue of contention between the two biggest political groups 
was in respect of the revolutionary government in Nicaragua. In June 1982 the 
Christian Democrat sponsored resolution referred to above was passed (albeit based 
on a narrow majority in a poor turnout), which among other things, called for aid for 
Nicaragua to be stopped 'until respect for human and civil rights and democratic 
freedoms is guaranteed in that country'.^®
The resolution was clearly anti-Nicaragua but at the same time the Christian 
Democrats were anxious to dispel any suggestions that they were offering support 
for the United States policy of military intervention in Nicaragua. The June 
resolution unequivocally stated that 'no foreign military intervention (in Nicaragua 
and Central America] in any form whatsoever is permissible.'*** In important ways 
the Christian Democrat position converged with that of the Socialist Group. The 
Christian Democrats proposed an anti-revolutionary position but did not support the 
use of the military instrument by the United States in terms of the 'containment' 
of the Nicaraguan revolution. The Socialist Group wanted an end to the violence and 
repression in El Salvador and while not considering the Reagan administration's 
policy to be a useful way of dealing with the political conflicts neither did it support 
an anti-US policy per se. Both major political groups were starting to express an 
uneasiness with US policy in terms of the instruments utilised and the tactics chosen 
to deal with the political conflict in Central America.
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By contrast the two major reports on Central America were supported by both 
Christian Democrats and Socialists. Socialist MEP Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul introduced 
the first of these and Christian Democrat Victor Michel the second.
Wieczorek-Zeul's report, although emanating from the Committee for
External Relations, dealt mainly with the development aspects of relations between
the European Community and Central America (including in this report Panama,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba). Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul pointed out that this
was because 'we cannot offer so much in the way of trade policy benefits and, in any
case, the fact is that the trade element is less important in relations between two
.92so very different regions. The resolution accompanying the report called for 
increased long term aid for Central American development programmes based on an 
approach which would encourage progress towards self-sufficiency in food production 
'and more effective rural development'. The resolution recommended that the 65 
million ECU recommended by the Commission be agreed by the Council and called 
for the establishment of an 'economic cooperation agreement as a further visible 
sign of the EEC's commitment to Central America'. The resolution also proposed 
that the EC give support to specific projects which would help to encourage the 
process of regional integration for instance the development of a joint 
communications infrastructural network between Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
Honduras.^
The objectives of the report were a little more ambitious than the carefully 
worded resolution might suggest. Wieczorek-Zeul delineated these as fourfold. 
'Firstly, we want to give Latin America a political signal following the conflict over 
the M alvinas'.^ The first objective therefore had nothing to do with Central
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America - the ostensible subject of the report. The Parliament was here seeking to 
build bridges in the wake of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict when the EC had lined 
up behind Britain and Latin America (apart from Chile) behind Argentina (see 
Chapter 3). The second objective was
’to give the countries of Central America another, a European option. We 
have no intention of presenting them with a social model to be followed - as the 
USA has been doing for decades past and is still doing today.. As far as we 
Europeans are concerned, stability means stable and socially just conditions, a form
95
of stability which will not be achieved by arms.
Here Wieczorek-Zeul was seeking to do two things. The first was to 
differentiate the Community from the United States in terms of its approach to the 
Central American conflict. The United States had persistently viewed the regional 
conflict as flowing primarily from Soviet and Cuban Communist interference in the 
region and therefore as a conflict with international ramifications (see Chapter 1). 
The Parliament on the other hand considered the Central American conflict as a 
regional problem born primarily from local conditions which included poverty and a 
highly inequitable distribution of wealth. In short the US viewed Central America 
via an East-west prism; the European Parliament from a North-South perspective. 
The second implicit intention of this objective was to indicate to the Central 
Americans that the alternative to the US need not be the Soviet Union. The 
Europeans could offer a less traumatic path to capitalist development than that 
practised by the US military and Department of State. If the first objective was
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meant to be a 'political signal* to Latin America the second included another 'signal1 
- this time to the United States as much as to Central America.
The third objective was 'to give a clear signal to the Council of Ministers., 
that we want to see the Commission's programme of regional aid implemented fully
QC
and as quickly as possible. Here the intention was not simply to support the 
Commission's bid for supplementary aid for the region. Wieczorek-Zeul intended that 
the Parliament support the principle of regional and non-exclusive aid to the region. 
In particular the Parliament was being asked to make it clear that Nicaragua should 
be included among the list of beneficiary countries.
The fourth objective was to persuade the Community to adopt 'a long-term 
orientation' to Central America within the framework of an economic cooperation 
agreement. The proposal was that the Community adopt a regional agreement 
backed up by bilateral agreements. The idea was to provide support 'to those stable 
democratic counties which already exist in the region' a t the same time as 
encouraging regional integration. Wieczorek-Zeul also recommended that EC/ 
Central American cooperation should be strengthened by the pursuit of a tri-partite 
partnership which should include 'larger neighbouring countries like Mexico and 
Venezuela'.^
The parliamentary debate reflected these concerns. Members of all political 
persuasions were anxious to support the report as a way of mending relations with 
Latin America. Sir Fred Catherwood, a British Conservative representative, whose 
government had recently been at war in Latin America argued on behalf of the 
European Democratic Group (the official political group of which the British 
Conservatives were part) that the Central American countries 'really need help to
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get things moving again; they are right down on the bottom, and they need to be 
helped up again'. He added that the work on the External Relations Committee's 
reports on South and Central America
'was, of course, overtaken by an attack on a part of the Community territory 
in the South Atlantic, and we, particularly in this group, hope that this report comes 
at a time when a signal of friendship from the Community will get a friendly 
response from Latin America. For our group, this is a particularly important reason
QQ
for supporting this report.'
Sir Fred Catherwood's intervention also included an ambiguous reference to 
the United States. He argued that if Central America had always been the 
'backyard' of the US it had 'not always [been] a happy one' and hoped that the 
Parliament's proposals would therefore have 'a positive and helpful effect on... other 
countries, including the United S t a t e s ' . U S  policy towards the region was a 
major issue in the debate even though the US was not specifically mentioned in the 
resolution under discussion. Mr. Seeler of the Socialist Group noted that the USA had 
historically supported anti-democratic regimes like the Somozas and the 
Batistas. Mr. van Aerssen representing the Christian Democrats rejected Mr. 
Seeler's overt criticisms of the US but did go on to liken the Latin American's 
predicament vis-a-vis the US to that of Europe. They 'are probably somewhat 
sceptical - as we Europeans would be too - about sheltering too obviously under the 
umbrella of a major power which may be tempted in certain cases to dictate to 
those countries what kind of attitude they should adopt.'*®* Mr. van Aerssen
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agreed with the Socialist group however in respect of the intention to provide a 
’European option*. The Latin American countries 'are looking for a new partner, and 
that partner is the European community.' Like Sir Fred Catherwood and the 
Communist spokesperson in the debate Mr. Pajetta, he argued that the EC should 
work towards a new policy for the region in partnership with the United States, not 
separately from them. Mr. Inner speaking for the Liberal and Democratic Group 
summarised what had coalesced into the European Parliament's views in respect to 
US policy in Central America.
'Our friendly links with the USA notwithstanding, we should have no qualms 
about which of the measures taken by the USA over recent years do not meet with 
our approval and in what respects we believe that, as a fair and altruistic partner, 
the USA should be working on a different policy. In this respect, the European 
Community has a special role to play - one which no one else can assume and for 
which we must accept full responsibility.'*^
At the same time as indicating that it did not seek to support US policy of 
propping up brutal dictatorships the major political groups despite their claims to 
neutrality and objectivity warned that EC support was not politically unconditional. 
Mr. van Aerssen for the Christian Democrats opined that
'We have only two criteria to set, which are that the countries in question 
must be seen to be making progress towards a pluralistic structure in which every 
citizen is allowed to say what he thinks and has the chance, via the democratic
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process, to put his ideas into practice; and the countries must be prepared to create 
a climate of security.'*®**
i
It was a Socialist Group member who made clear against which countries this 
injunction was directed. Mrs. Van den Heuvel pointed out that because of the human 
rights abuses and lack of democratic legitimacy of their governments the 
Commission was not supporting direct aid to El Salvador and Guatemala . On the 
other hand Mrs. Van den Heuvel considered that ’all of the democracies in that 
region fall far short of the standards we apply in our own countries'. In particular, 
while being sympathetic to the government of Nicaragua, Mrs. Van den Heuvel 
argued that 'we are bound to regard the steps taken so far [by the Nicaraguan 
government] towards democracy as hesitant in the extreme.'*®^
Support for the third and fourth of Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul's objectives again 
came from all sides of the House. The predominant view was that Nicaragua should 
be included in a regional aid package and that the Community should move towards 
an economic cooperation agreement with Central America. In expressing his support 
for the Commission and the Wieczorek-Zeul report one British Conservative member 
was moved to declare that if the Council did not support the extra 65 million ECUs, 
destined for Nicaragua among others, this could be explained in only one way. 'The 
only reason for refusing that package can be the political motive of following 
President Reagan.'*®^
The November Michel report offered a continuation and consolidation of the 
approach agreed by Parliament in October. The Commission should be supported and 
Community instruments should be utilised 'to help defuse an increasingly polarised
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situation in Central America1. The rapporteur, Christian Democrat Victor Michel
also supported the regional and non-exclusionary strategy already agreed. Mr. Michel
pointed out in the report that Nicaragua had not received any US aid since March
1981 and in May 1982 had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union such that
1 Ofiit would receive technical assistance and credits in the following five years.
The implicit message was that the Community could have a role to play in
preventing Nicaragua from adopting pro-Soviet hardline Communist policies. The
resolution stated, inter alia, that the Council should agree the Commission’s package
'as any additional delay would threaten its effectiveness and psychological impact
in Central America and would call into question the Community's credibility in this
part of the world'.*®^
The resolution also commended the Commission for two innovations which
were to form an integral part of Community policy towards Central America. One
of the opening recitals of the Michel resolution stated that the Parliament, in the
framing of its policy, had taken into account 'the desire expressed by the
Commission to seek a political dialogue with the governments of countries receiving
Community aid covering more than just negotiations on projects to be 
108financed.' The resolution also welcomed the Commission's intention to
coordinate the various Community financial instruments which were being utilised 
109in the region.
Other notable EP activity in 1982 included visits to the region by the 
President of the European Parliament, the Dutch Socialist Pieter Dankert, in August 
and German Christian Democrat, Mrs. Marlene Lenz in October/November.**** 
Throughout 1982 Mrs. Lenz continued to draw up her report which she had been
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requested by the Political Affairs committee to prepare.***
Consolidation: 1983-1984
In 1982 the European Council had taken 'a decision to intervene1 in Central 
112America. However there were still some differences of approach between the 
institutions, between the member states and between the major political groups. In 
1983 and 1984 those differences became somewhat attenuated so as to allow for the 
emergence of a coherent 'European Community1 policy towards Central America. 
The consolidation of a European Community approach to Central America was noted 
by Mr. Pieter Dankert, the President of the European Parliament, when he addressed 
the Nicaraguan Council of State in Managua in January 1984. In a discussion which 
commented on the Community view in respect to Central America he argued that 
'the broad similarity of views of the Community institutions now - a rare 
phenomenon - makes me believe that we can contribute positively to the challenges
1 1 o
which confront Central America.
(i) The Council
During this period the Council played a much more visible and active role 
than before. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign minister, began 1983 
as the President-in-Office of the Community and devoted one of his first 
pronouncements to the conflict in Central America. He commented that
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'The Ten [member states] view developments in Central America with 
concern. The political tensions in this region carry with them the risk of grave 
escalation with unforeseeable consequences. The countries of the European 
Community accordingly welcome initiatives from states of the region, which may 
lead to a reduction of tension.'***
These remarks were made just two days after four neighbouring nations of 
Central America - Colombia, Mexico, Mexico and Venezuela - had met on the 
Panamian island of Contadora to discuss ways of resolving the conflict by pacific 
means and through a mutually agreed peace treaty. What may have precipitated the 
Council to state  its concern at this time was not simply its desire to welcome the 
regional initiative which was itself the product of a string of previous peace 
initiatives by Venezuela, Mexico and Nicaragua the previous year (see Chapter 1). 
A November 8 1982 Newsweek cover story, 'America's Secret War - Target 
Nicaragua' had revealed that the United States was providing military and financial 
support for the contras fighting the Nicaraguan government. What was also made 
official and what was worrying to the west Europeans that the US was for the first 
time officially supporting a group of mercenaries whose aim was to overthrow an 
internationally recognised government. The fear was that the crisis would escalate 
from that of a bloody but regional affair into a conflict with international 
ramifications with the potential to become a global East-West crisis involving both 
superpowers.
The European Council affirmed its anxiety in respect of the spiralling 
international crisis in a statement issued in June 1983 - the Stuttgart Declaration.
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’The Heads of State and Government confirmed their close interest in 
developments in Central America. They are deeply concerned at the economic and 
social conditions in many parts of the region, at the tensions which these create and 
at the widespread misery and bloodshed.
They are convinced that the problems of Central America cannot be solved 
by military means, but only by a political solution springing from the region itself 
and respecting the principles of non-interference and inviobility of frontiers. They, 
therefore, fully support the current initiative of the Contadora group. They 
underlined the need for the establishment of democratic conditions and for the strict 
observance of human rights throughout the region.’
Alois Mertes, a West German Christian Democrat and former Minister of 
State in the FRG’s Foreign Office, termed the Stuttgart declaration ’the first
||C
binding expression' of European Community policy towards Central America. 
The statem ent spelt out the objectives of European Community policy towards 
Central America and the diplomatic language only partly obscured important policy 
themes of which there were at least six.
The first was a distancing of the EC from the US in terms of the analysis of 
the causes of the conflict and in terms of the policies chosen to deal with that 
conflict. The EC insisted on a political analysis which emphasised the political and 
economic roots of the crisis. The US stressed the cause of the conflict as springing 
from external subversion transmitted by what they termed the Managua-Havana-
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Moscow axis. The EC also rejected the military option which was preferred by the
US and supported a negotiated settlement.
The second theme was the implicit affirmation by the EC that Nicaraguans
had the right to choose or reject their own government in the EC's insistence on a
basic principle of non-interference. This clearly marked the EC position as different
from that of the US which had maintained its rights to intervene in the name of
117'self-defence' and later in the guise of 'defending democracy'. '
Thirdly, the references to the principles of non-interference and inviolability 
of frontiers was a reminder of the basis of EC foreign policy philosophy which 
founded itself on these basic principles of international law (see Chapter 2). This was 
more a reflection of the European historical experience and condition than any 
implicit criticism of the US. Post war disagreements in Europe over the question of 
borders were not resolved until the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 (to break 
out again violently in the early 1990s). However the fact that this formed such an 
important part of the EC's approach shows the degree of sensitivity of the EC to 
these issues and arguably a not altogether cynical appreciation by the EC of the 
value of international law as a means of solving disputes.
The fourth clear theme which emerged from this statement was the EC's 
support of a regional as distinct from a great power solution to the conflict. This 
was different from the US approach which saw the solution to the region's problems 
within a global East/West framework.
The fifth underlying theme concerned a basic strategic agreement with the 
United States. By stressing the EC's support for 'the establishment of democratic 
conditions and for the strict observance of human rights' the Council was introducing
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a policy theme which the United States could support. The US had long claimed that 
in Nicaragua there was both an absence of democracy and abuse of human rights. 
The Council may have had in mind the death squads in El Salvador or the genocidal 
sta te  apparatus in Guatemala but it as likely that it was here issuing an implicit 
warning to the Sandinista government that it ought to 'moderate1 its revolutionary 
fervour in order to secure EC support.
A sixth message which could be read from the Stuttgart declaration was the 
demonstration of an EC consensus vis-a-vis the Central American conflict. The EC 
manifested an ability to devise a specific EC policy which emphasised regional and 
political solutions, stressed the socio-economic factors as causes, and opposed the 
use of military instruments and interventions. This EC consensus was broad enough 
to capture the support of all the political currents in the Community bar the 
Fascists. All parties could support the establishment of democracy and respect for 
human rights despite the fact that each party might have different views as to which 
should be the regional actor whose behaviour needed to be reformed.
The Stuttgart Declaration therefore articulated a by now common approach 
by the institutions, major political parties and the member states. The genesis of the 
statem ent was in the analysis articulated in the 1982 Wieczorek-Zeul/Michel reports 
and the Commission's recommendation for a special initiative on Central America. 
However the policy had developed to the extent that the Council's approach was 
much more concerned with articulating a position in contradistinction to that of the 
US. The six underlying themes that could be found in the statement formed the basis 
of a consolidated EC policy to the region for the rest of the decade. This rather 
uneasy consensus gave strength to the policy in that it provided unity in respect to
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the United States and the region. It was however an inherently contradictory 
consensus given that policy objectives seemed to include at one and the same time 
containment (or moderation) of revolution and support for non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the region - including in the internal affairs of revolutionary 
Nicaragua.
The Council became an active partner with the Contadora Group in the search 
for peace and did not limit its support for the peace process to that of passive 
'declaratory diplomacy1. From 1983 it engaged in an interventionary diplomacy 
towards the region - and attempted to back up its activism with the economic 
instruments available to it. In late September 1983 the Presidential troika (see 
Chapter 2) comprising the Foreign Ministers of Greece, West Germany and France 
(respectively the presidency, former presidency and succeeding presidency of the 
Council), m et the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora countries en marge of the 
United Nations to discuss the recently promulgated 'Document of Objectives' (the 
Contadora peace plan).**® In November 1983 the Council considered ways of 
consolidating relationships between the Community and Central America including 
the possibility of an economic cooperation agreement.
The major part of the Council's activity in 1984 was taken up with the 
preparation for the September meeting of the foreign ministers of the EC/10 and the 
candidate member states, Spain and Portugal with the foreign ministers of the 
Central American and Contadora countries, together with a representative from the 
Commission and the Central American Common Market. In June 1984 President 
Monge of Costa Rica, while on a tour of eleven European countries, had proposed 
that the European Community member states participate in this meeting, to take
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place in San Jos6, Costa Rica. The Costa Rican initiative was backed by the other 
Central American states, although with some initial misgivings by Nicaragua. 
The Salvadorean President, Napoleon Duarte, while visiting Brussels in July 1984, 
expressed his commitment to the September meeting as a positive development and 
emphasised 'the importance of the European presence in Central America'.*^®
The Costa Rican foreign minister's formal le tter of invitation to the 
Commission stated that Costa Rica perceived the meeting as 'a bringing together 
of both regions, which will be of an eminently political character, which will lay the 
basis for future cooperation.'*^* The President of the Council, Claude Cheysson, 
took the invitation to a June Council meeting and in hs reply to President Monge, 
Cheysson noted that
'All my colleagues have demonstrated interest in the idea of a meeting, to 
which they give particular importance and which will permit the organisation of 
political and economic dialogue between the European Community and Central 
America, and will bring closer, in all spheres, relations between the two groups of 
s ta te s . '* ^
The formal acceptance of President Monge's invitation came from the July
Council meeting after West German Foreign Minister Genscher had shown public and
12^enthusiastic support for the idea. Genscher had proposed that EC/Central 
American relations be set on a formal footing - on the model of the EC/ASEAN 
agreements - and had also taken up President Monge's idea of inviting the two EC 
candidate members, Spain and Portugal, to the September meeting. *^*
232
The San Jos6 meeting was unprecedented in three important and related
ways. Firstly it was the first time that the Council had met outside Community
territory. This fact itself underlined the priority of Central America for Community
foreign policy. Secondly, the United States was not invited to San Jos6 even though
this was a part of the world which the northern 'colossus* saw as its exclusive
'backyard'. Given that the Community was advocating a different line than that of
its Alliance partner, the West Europeans seemed to be prepared to risk US ire on
this issue. Thirdly, the meeting brought together some of Western Europe and
Central America's senior statesmen including Guilio Andreotti (Italy), Sir Geoffrey
Howe (Britain), Leo Tindemans (Belgium), Hans-Dietrich Genscher (West Germany)
Claude Cheysson (France), Edgard Pisani (European Commission), Edgardo Paz
12*5Bamica (Honduras) and Miguel D'Escoto (Nicaragua), in Central America.
It was the US however which inadvertently both helped draw international
attention to the conference of foreign ministers and bring about a successful
conclusion to the proceedings. George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, sent a
letter to each of the EC foreign ministers urging them not to allow 'increased
12fieconomic aid or any political support for the Sandinistas'. At the time, Claude
Cheysson was moved to remark that 'What business does Reagan have in any of this?
As far as I know, he is neither a member of the EEC nor of the Contadora group nor
127of the Central American nations'. Christian Democrat, Leo Tindemans, who 
was not sympathetic to the Sandinista government, responded by declaring that 'We 
are not there [Central America] to give lessons or morals to the Central American
I OQ
countries, but to help them'. All the member states, including pro-US Britain, 
rejected Shultz's attempts to direct the formulation of Community policy. Claude
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Cheysson later commented that ’once more, it was the Americans who created
unanimity in the Community. Having received a perfectly insulting letter from
George Shultz, all the foreign ministers felt themselves obliged to go to San Jose in
• 129Costa Rica and to conclude something.' *
The San Jos6 conference produced a 'Joint Communique' which included
political and economic commitments on behalf of the EC. Politically, the
Communique committed the participants to regular future meetings at 'ministerial
or senior-official' level in order to support 'an end to the violence and promote
social justice, economic development and respect for human rights and democratic 
130liberties'. The Communique stressed the importance that all participants gave 
to continued negotiations between the Central American countries themselves to try 
to find a solution to the crisis. In an implicit rejection of US policy (the US was 
never openly mentioned In the Communique) the participants declared that they 
were 'united in the view that the problems of that region [Central America] cannot 
be solved by armed force, but only by political solutions springing from the region 
itself. In this conviction they affirmed their support for the pacification measures 
which are being developed in the Contadora process.’*'**
Economically, the Community recognised that the international economic 
situation and the problem of debt servicing was particularly difficult for the Central 
American states because of the declining prices for Central America’s main exports. 
The Community pledged to ’do everything possible., towards the development of the 
region’ but avoided committing itself a specific amount of finance. * ^  The 
Community stressed that it would give priority to support for regional and social 
projects. The EC also agreed to enter into immediate discussions with the Central
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Americans in order to negotiate a framework economic cooperation agreement
between the two regions. The EC's support for such an agreement was not simply (if
a t all) because of the possible economic benefits. In line with a Community
philosophy which genuinely saw regional integration through a neo-functionalist
prism (see Chapter 2) the idea was also to encourage such integration which might
1 nlead to 'spill-over' effects in terms of political cooperation. The Communique 
contained a paragraph which stated that 'an effective manner of contributing to the 
reduction of political tension in Central America would be to support the action 
intended to preserve the degree of economic interdependence existing between the 
countries of the region.'
The Community had also not forgotten its own political objectives in terms 
of providing a visible 'signal' to Latin America that Europe wanted to play a 
constructive role in the region's politics.
'Both sides considered that the conclusion of an agreement of this type would 
confirm the political will of both regions to extend and develop their relations and 
that it would also help to reinforce relations between the Community and latin 
America as a whole.
President Monge considered the San Jos6 meeting of 'worldwide historical 
importance'. Even if the Council did not subscribe to such hyperbole the 
Community remained convinced of the value of the exercise. The European Council 
meeting in Dublin issued a statement to this effect at the December summit. The 
statem ent also reiterated the Community's support for the Contadora peace
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1 37initiative. One of the European participants to the San Josfe conference
(although not a Community member state) demonstrated that support in a practical
manner in October when Spain hosted the Contadora group in Madrid which met to
138finalise the proposed Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America.
(ii) The Commission
The Commission's role through 1983 and 1984 was essentially that of a
support function to the diplomacy of the Council although the Commission continued
to give a high priority to the region. In April 1983 Commissioner Pisani informed the
Parliament that he considered the situation in Central America 'one of the major
139problems facing the world today'.
The Commission investigated the possibilities of an economic cooperation 
framework agreement after the idea had been floated by West German foreign 
minister Genscher at the beginning of 1984 and which was later supported by the 
Central American ambassadors to Brussels in May. The Commission argued in a 
proposal issued in February, that such a cooperation agreement would be meaningless 
without substantially increased financial aid to back it u p .* ^  They argued that 
aid to the region should be doubled - from 40 million ECU annually to 80 million. 
They also argued that aid should maintain a regional character. This latter argument 
meant that the Commission was in effect reiterating its view that Nicaragua should 
not be excluded from Community support.
The Commission did not see its role however as being confined to providing 
merely economic support for a Community foreign policy implemented by the
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Council. Commissioner Giolitti's contribution to the parliamentary debate on Central 
America in April 1984 emphasised the political aspects of Commission policy. He 
reiterated that in the Commission’s view the causes of the conflict were socio­
economic but expressed concern that the regional conflict had escalated into an 
East/West issue. Mr. Giolotti reiterated Commission support for the Contadora 
proposals and for the ’democratisation* taking place in the region. Perhaps the 
clearest indication of the Commission's intention to play a political role was Mr. 
Giolotti’s reminder to ’the Community authorities' (ie. the Council) of 'their 
political responsibility' in that he hoped that they would 'adopt a really substantial
1 AOprogramme of cooperation with Central America.'
In February 1984 the newly appointed head of the Commission's Central 
American delegation (the Commission's representation abroad), Mr. Luigi Boselli, 
announced that the Community would continue to support the Contadora group's 
peace initiative and the search for a negotiated settlement to the Central American 
conflict. Mr. Boselli actively promoted the Community in Central America. In July 
1984 an exhibition on European integration was held in Guatemala City and Mr. RaOl 
Sierra Franco, the representative of the Central American integration institition - 
the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) - publicly 
thanked Mr. Boselli for his work in Central America. Mr. Boselli also played 
an active part in the preparations for the San Jos6 meeting. Mr. Boselli acted as 
liaison between Brussels and the Costa Rican officials one of whom was Maria 
Sabriela Echeverria, the official responsible for Europe and at least initially for 
organising the San Jos6 conference. He commented in a telex to Brussels that 'she 
seems a little  lost and counts on my h e l p ' . M r .  Boselli also worked closely with
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the Italian Ambassador to Costa Rica, Mr. Nicosia, accompanying him to some of 
the preparatory meetings in San Jose.
The San Jos6 Communique did not include a figure for increased EC financial 
assistance to Central America but Mr. Pisani, who signed the final statement on 
behalf of the Commission, announced that aid would be increased to 60 million ECUs 
in 1985. Mr. Pisani said that the Community could help Central America increase 
its trade to the EC. The Commissioner supported the consolidation and 
reinvigoration of the Central American Common Market which he argued would 
provide the conditions for real industrial development.*4® He also signed an 
agreement with the Costa Rican foreign minister on the establishment of a 
Community sub-office in San Jos6 - with responsibility for Central America.*4® 
Mr. Pisani confirmed the political logic behind the Community’s attempts to support 
Central American economic and regional integration.
’For there can be no doubt that it is only if this Central American solidarity 
asserts and organizes itself that the danger of external intervention feared by all 
can really be removed. It is by progressively building up a system of mutual security 
and support that Central America will be able to render impossible, and above all 
pointless, any external intervention.’*4^
Commissioner Pisani was also careful to stress, diplomatically, that regional 
integration should include all the Central American countries. The Commissioner 
argued that ’the strategic interest of the area does not in itself justify preventing 
it from being itself or contesting the right of each of its members to enjoy, while
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respecting the others, its own vision of its destiny and its own national
options.1^ ®  This was in effect, a message for those Council members who had
previously tried to exclude Nicaragua from EC aid and for those Central American
countries who might be susceptible to US pressure.
The Commission remained active in respect to Central America throughout
the remainder of 1984. In December Commission officials met with their Central
American counterparts in Guatemala City to negotiate the basis for the economic
cooperation framework agreement. Both sides expected to complete negotiations in 
14Qthe following year.
While these high-profile political negotiations were taking place the actual
level of Community aid fell - in comparison to its high point in 1982. In 1983 Central
1 *50America received a total of 41 million ECUs of Community aid. This included
19.36 million ECUs of food aid and 14.16 million ECUs of financial and technical 
1
assistance. In 1984 Community aid to Central America (the five republics plus
the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Mexico) increased a little, to a total of 52.38
million ECUS (the Mexican share was just 0.88 million ECUs). This figure included
26 million ECUs of financial and technical assistance, 21.30 million ECUs of food
aid, 2.81 million ECUs of aid via non-governmental organisations, 1.04 million ECUs
for export promotion, 0.80 million ECUs of emergency aid, 0.33 million ECUs of aid
152to displaced persons and 0.10 million ECUs for training.
(iii) The Parliament
In 1983 the Political Affairs Committee decided to extend the remit of Mrs.
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Lenz's El Salvador report to include the whole of Central America. As a result and 
according to normal parliamentary procedure most of the resolutions which were put 
forward in 1983 and early 1984 were referred to the Political Affairs Committee for 
consideration by Mrs. Lenz in her report. By 1984 the parliamentary focus had 
clearly shifted from a concern with El Salvador and Nicaragua to an emphasis on 
Nicaragua. It is true that Parliament passed two resolutions on El Salvador in 1983 
compared to one on Nicaragua and one on Grenada but because of the Lenz report 
most resolutions on Central America were referred to the committee. Between 
January 1983 and April 1984 a total of seven resolutions on Nicaragua were proposed 
in Parliament and referred to the Political Affairs Committee, one on Guatemala 
and three on Central America in general. One further resolution was passed 
in Parliament on Nicaragua in early 1984 - on the elections scheduled for November 
1984.154
In January 1984 Nicaragua and Costa Rica were visited by a delegation from 
the European Parliament which included President Dankert and the Rapporteur, Mrs. 
Lenz. President Dankert’s address to the Nicaraguan Council of State in Managua 
became the subject of an attempted censure by the Christian Democratic group on 
the delegation’s return to Brussels. The Christian Democrats, including the 
Rapporteur for Central America, condemned Mr. Dankert for not having paid 
sufficient attention to alleged human rights abuses in Nicaragua, for having 
suggested that the US displayed a similar attitude to Latin America as that of the 
Soviet Union to Eastern Europe and for having suggested that the European 
Community adopted fan intermediate position between the United States and the 
Soviet Union*.
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In fact Pieter Dankert was closer to presenting the by now more or less 
coherent and consistent Community policy to Central America than his political 
opponents admitted or perhaps realised. Dankert was certainly warmer in tone 
towards Nicaragua and more overtly critical of United States policy towards Latin 
America than the Christian Democratic group might have liked but the speech was 
also careful not to issue either a blanket condemnation of the United States or a 
generalised message of support for the revolutionary government. The President 
acknowledged Western Europe’s dependence on the United States for security in his 
speech and also expressed concerns about 'certain aspects of life in Nicaragua'. 
Dankert also called attention, as the Commission had frequently done, to the 
international ramifications of the Central America conflict. He reiterated the 
Council's call for respect for the principles of territorial integrity and self- 
determination, remarking that an adherence to these principles would of itself 'limit 
superpower involvement'.
Christian Democrat Mrs. Lenz eventually did present her report in April and 
again in May. Adoption of the report would have meant that Parliament would have 
moved away from the Community consensus on the region. The report contained 
within it very strong criticisms of Nicaragua and recommended that the government 
in El Salvador should be given more Community support. The report was sympathetic 
to the United States to the point where it declared that the 1983 US intervention 
in Grenada 'seemed acceptable., because Cuba had almost occupied the island'. Mrs 
Lenz also criticised the Commission for a 'one-sided' approach to Central 
America. The Lenz report was criticised by parliamentarians for its bias 
towards El Salvador, for its lack of attention to the socio-economic roots of the
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conflict and for its implicit ascription of the causes of the conflict to the global 
East-West conflict. Mrs. Lenz's report was not agreed by the Parliament as 
the other political groups in both April and May organised themselves so as to leave 
the Strasbourg Assembly without a quorum when the vote was called. The Lenz 
report was not re-presented to the Parliament - partly because the Parliament was 
dissolved that Summer for elections. In effect the Parliament affirmed the policy 
which Pieter Dankert had outlined in Managua in January. The Community would 
continue to offer its 'European option1 which would oppose the military oriented 
policy proposed by the United States and would also encourage a move away from 
'Communism1 towards 'democracy' by revolutionary Nicaragua. At the same time 
the other non-revolutionary states in the region would be encouraged to curb human 
rights abuses.
The new Parliament however still maintained an interest in Central America. 
The 'enlarged Bureau' (the management group of the Parliament in which all the 
political groups are represented) sent a message of support to the September San
I C Q
Jos6 conference and in November the Committee on External Economic
Relations delegated to Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul - the architect of Parliamentary policy
on Central America - the task of drawing up yet another report on relations with 
1 fiflCentral America. November also saw a visit to Nicaragua by an official 
parliamentary delegation in order to observe the elections. Christian Democrat Mr. 
Pol Marck, the rapporteur, issued a report which rather grudgingly stated that 'the 
government made an effort to ensure the success of the elections from the formal 
point of view'. In the same vein he added that 'Nicaragua is not a totalitarian state 
today'. At the same time the report acknowledged that US government policy 'does
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not leave the parties involved a sufficient margin for manoeuvre1. He argued that 
if the US was to firmly sta te  its support for self-determination this ’would deprive 
the extremist elements in the Sandinista leadership of the alibi of the threat of 
aggression and might give the more moderate Sandinista elements a chance to open 
a constructive dialogue with the opposition parties.’*®* Thus the
’role of the European Community at inter-regional level in Central America 
is of prime importance. The statement made at S. JosS de Costa Rica by the Foreign 
Ministers of the European Community, Spain, Portugal and the countries of Central 
America constitutes the basis for a strengthening of inter-regional 
cooperation.* °
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Chapter 5 Implementation and Change: 1985-1990
The previous chapter traced the development of EC policy through to its 
consolidation and institutionalisation in 1984. This chapter charts the implementation 
of EC policy towards Central America through to the waning of EC interest in late 
1989 and early 1990. This chapter therefore considers the implementation of EC 
policy and the changes in policy through the latter half of the 1980s via the process 
of implementation.
The chapter also contains a preliminary assessment as to whether (or not) and 
to what extent EC policy towards Central America achieved its own stated 
objectives. Some preliminary consideration is also given to the relationship of the 
changing practice of EC policy to the institutional evolution of EC foreign policy. 
Both these latter points are discussed more extensively in the conclusion to the 
thesis. The conclusion of this thesis will offer an overall evaluation of the 
significance of the EC's intervention in Central America in the 1980s.
The Council
The Council’s main activities through the rest of the 1980s involved the 
normal declaratory diplomacy of European Political Cooperation (EPC) statements 
and also a continued activist policy mainly, though not entirely through conference 
diplomacy by way of what became known as the San Tos6 process. The priority given 
by the Council to Central America was stressed by Mr. Andreotti, the President-in- 
Office of the Council, in January 1985, when he stated that the Council intended to
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develop and consolidate the policy that had been agreed in September 1984 at San 
Jos6.*
The Foreign Ministers meeting in the context of EPC put out numerous 
statements on Central America during the second half of the 1980s. Most reiterated 
the Community’s support for the Contadora peace initiative. For example in the first 
half of 1986, under the aegis of the Dutch presidency, the now 12 Council members
9
issued five statements supporting the Contadora group and the peace process. 
From 1987 EPC statement also iterated support for the peace initiative of President 
Arias of Costa Rica which was adopted by all five Central American states in 
August of that year. The Council continued to stress its commitment to a negotiated 
peace settlement and to ’strengthening democracy'. The United States was not 
mentioned by name but repeated appeals were made to 'all countries with links to 
and interests in the region' to play a constructive role.^ Although the majority of 
EPC statements were concerned with the general prospects for peace and democracy 
in Central America a t least two concerned themselves with human rights abuses; one 
referred to Honduras (February 1988) and the other to El Salvador (November 1989).
The Council also continued to play an active diplomatic role in its attempts 
to help defuse what was referred to by all participants and observers as the 'crisis' 
in Central America. For instance in April 1986 the Dutch President-in-Office Mr. 
Van den Broek, attended a meeting of the Contadora group outside Community
e
territory, in Panama, as an observer. Minister Van den Broek let it be known that 
the EC countries might be interested in participating in a proposed border 
commission to monitor the frontier between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Also in 
April, the President-in-Office visited US Secretary of State George Shultz 'to help
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improve the probability that the agreement reached in Panama would be signed and 
to exert positive pressure/®
The major and most visible part of Council diplomacy however took place 
around the ’San Jose’ conferences which were held annually (with the exception of 
1986) along the lines of the 1984 meeting such as to establish an institutionalisation 
of the political and economic dialogue between the two regions. San Jos6 II took 
place in Luxembourg in November 1985, San Jos6 III in Guatemala City in February 
1987, San Jos§ IV in Hamburg in February/March 1988, San Jos6 V in San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras in February 1989 and San Jos6 VI in Dublin in April 1990.^
The Contadora Group nations remained part of the tripartite arrangement 
which had been established at San Jos6 and in 1988 were joined informally at the 
Hamburg meeting (San Jos6 IV) by the Contadora support group (the 'Lima1 group 
comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) which had been created in August 
1985 to aid the peace process. In December 1986 these two groups started to work 
together formally within the ’Rio' group (Group of 8). The San Jos6 meetings 
continued to be attended and supported by all of the member states including Britain 
- the closest member state to the United States. United States pressure however did 
contribute to a downgrading of diplomatic representation by some of the member 
states (including Britain) at the conferences from 1987 onwards and also was 
instrumental in the vetoing of the attendance of the Lima group a t the February 
1987 conference.®
Nevertheless US pressure could not prevent the gradual institutionalisation 
of inter-regional political and economic cooperation between the Community, 
Central America and Latin America which came about because of the joint concern
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in respect to political developments in Central America and which took place in the
latter part of the 1980s. For instance in September 1987 the EC and the Rio Group
began a process of political dialogue in New York en marge of the UN General 
q
Assembly. In 1988 one session of the two day San Jos6 conference was devoted to 
a meeting of the European Community with the Contadora Group and the Support 
group without the participation of the Central American states. Panama was also 
excluded from this session in order to show disapproval of the military government 
of General Noriega and the perceived threats to democracy in Panama - although 
it had been permitted to attend the Central American sessions. This session was 
unminuted although it did include a wide ranging set of discussions of concern to 
Latin America (the Group of 8 represented over 90 percent of the population of 
Latin America) and the European Community.*® This wider process of political 
dialogue continued and itself became institutionalised in 1990 (see chapter 3).
At Luxembourg in 1985 the participants to the San Jos6 process made a 
decision to upgrade the annual meetings to ministerial level and agreed the 
institutionalisation of the political dialogue between the European Community 
member states, the Commission, the Central American states and the Contadora 
nations.** The Luxembourg Summit also saw the initialing of a cooperation 
agreement between the Community and the members of the Central American 
Common Market (the five republics) and Panama. This economic cooperation 
framework agreement was ratified in 1986 and came into force on 1 March 1987. 
The practice of issuing two separate communiques on political and economic issues 
began at the 1985 meeting. A more important innovation was the continued presence 
of the Commission as a full participant in the political dialogue as was demonstrated
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by the inclusion of the Commission as a signatory to both the political and the 
economic communiques from 1985 onwards. (In 1984 the Commission had been a 
signatory to a joint political and economic communique.)
(i) The political dialogue
The 1985 political declaration contained a series of reiterations of general
principles agreed by all three regional participants represented by the Community,
the Central American nations and the Contadora group. These included a rejection
of external interference (again the United States was never mentioned by name),
support for international law and the principles of self-determination and non-
13intervention, support for democracy and social justice. If the Communiques 
suggested any overt strategy to deal with the conflict in the region it was in their 
support for the Contadora peace process and a regionally based, negotiated solution 
to the conflict. An underlying strategy was simply to ensure that the Central 
American states kept talking to each other and negotiating with each other. This 
la tter objective was contrary to United States strategy which had been to exclude 
Nicaragua from regional discussions and to attem pt to isolate Nicaragua 
diplomatically and internationally (see Chapter 1).
The 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 political communiques repeated the general 
principles outlined in previous declarations but in addition articulated a discernible 
shift in emphasis and focus in at least three important ways. The first shift in 
emphasis came with the increasing weight given to ’democracy, political pluralism’ 
and ’true ideological pluralism' as necessary pre-requisites for peace in the region.
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This was allied to the second shift from reliance on a solution to the conflict 
brokered by the Contadora nations to a solution directly emanating from the region 
in the form of the Esquipulas Peace plan agreed by all the Central American 
Presidents in August 1987. The third shift in focus was away from the more general 
statements of 1984 and 1985 towards explicit comment on specific developments in 
the region.
The first two shifts in emphasis were related. In the process of seeking
Community support for his initiative, President Arias had made clear that the
fundamental difference between his proposal and that of the Contadora Group was
the latter prioritised security issues while his plan stressed the necessity for
’democracy1 in the region.*^ The reference to the establishment of ’democracy’
in the region came to be perceived by all actors involved (including Nicaragua) as
a reference to the desirability of political reform in Nicaragua. One independent
source commented in 1986 that the Contadora proposal for the establishment of
’genuinely pluralist democracies’ was ’widely taken to refer to the political
15organisation of Nicaragua’. In 1986 President Arias explicitly stated that the in
his view Nicaragua did not possess ’a democratic regime as we conceive i t.’*® At
the third San Jos& meeting in 1987 Costa Rica. El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
lobbied to have Community aid redirected away from Nicaragua ’in favour of the
democracies'. In its report from the 1987 meeting, the independent London-based
Latin America Weekly Report wrote that ’several diplomats have told us that the
many allusions to democracy in public statements in Guatemala City are to be
taken, inter alia, as a coded reference to the redistribution of European aid away 
17from Nicaragua.'
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From the mid and late 1980s Community references to the establishment of 
democracy in the region could also be increasingly interpreted as applying mainly 
to the process of political reform in Nicaragua. This was illustrated in the 
negotiations on the 1987 Communique where at the Community’s request, a 
paragraph was inserted into the Communique which referred to the Central 
American Parliament being elected by ’common rules’. According to Community 
sources this 'precision refers to the desirability of elections in Nicaragua under the 
same rules as in neighbouring countries'. In 1989 another authoritative source 
informed its readership that the San Jos6 V conference would be utilised politically 
by the Council to 'confirm and further define their support for the implementation 
of the Esquipulas agreements and the peace and democratisation process in general 
(notably the announcement of elections in Nicaragua).'*® By contrast Community 
parlance increasingly referred to El Salvador and Guatemala, in which there were 
the most extreme human rights abuses in the 1980s, as the 'young democracies'.^® 
The change of focus in the peace plans promoted by President Arias therefore 
coincided with a shift of emphasis by the Community. The Esquipulas Accords 
however did not support the settlement of the conflict by military force - the 
preferred US option. In fact although the Accords were designed partly to exert 
pressure on Nicaragua to undertake political reform and in this sense had the support 
of the US government, in another real sense the Esquipulas Accords very quickly 
developed as a mechanism of exerting pressure on the US to change its approach to 
the region. President Arias told President Reagan that 'I recognise that it is not 
possible for the Sandinistas to become democratic as long as there is a war in their 
territory. It is not possible for them to become pluralistic when they have to fight
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21a war with the contras. Arias1 sentiments again coincided with those of the 
Community which since the early 1980s had expressed its disagreements with US 
policy which had at its centre the arming and financing of the contra mercenaries.
The Political Communiques of 1988, 1989 and 1990 expressed support and 
encouragement in respect of specific developments in the evolution of an integrated, 
negotiated and regional solution to the conflict in Central America. These included 
the Esquipulas plan, the cooperation plan launched by the Group of 8, dialogue with 
armed opposition movements, the Central American Presidents' Summit meetings, 
the formation of verification committees, the proposal for a Central American 
Parliament, the economic reactivation plan and the EC's decision to provide 
economic support for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. In 1989 the 
Communique expressed support for 'an effective cease-fire' and appealed 'to all 
Salvadorean sectors to participate in the forthcoming elections'. The Communique 
also offered specific support to the plan for demobilisation of the contras which had 
been drawn up by the Central American presidents. A new subject was introduced 
into the 1989 statement (and mentioned again in 1990) in that the Central American 
nations' intention to cooperate in the fight against drugs was commended by the 
conference participants. The 1990 statement welcomed the setting up of the Central 
American Environment and Development Committee.
The 1990 Political Communique was somewhat different from the others in 
that although it contained many of the general sentiments that had been expressed 
in previous statements its perspective was that of a review of policy objectives 
achieved.
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'The participants., welcomed the positive evolution of the regional peace
process in Central America. They agreed that there has been progress compared to
the serious prospects which characterised the area at the end of the 70ies and the
beginning of the 80ies. This period was characterised by lack of democracy in some
countries of the region, external intervention, border incidents, a high level of
22violence, a massive flux of refugees and other negative factors.1
The Communique also expressed support for continued dialogue between the 
government of El Salvador and the opposition, the FMLN, with a view to 
reincorporating the Salvadorean guerrilla fighters 'into the peaceful life of the 
country, in a climate of safety and respect for their human rights and fundamental 
freedom s.'^  The 1990 declaration contained the clearest admonition to the US yet 
- although still did not mention that country by name. The ministers made a 'firm ' 
request to all countries 'with links to and interests in the region' to help in the 
peace process in particular by transferring funds agreed for the contras to a fund 
which could be used to assist in their reintegration into Nicaraguan society.
The references in the Communique to 'progress' having been made in terms 
of the positive evolution' of the peace process could be seen as puzzling if 
consideration is given to the fact that civil war continued in El Salvador and human 
rights abuses remained a violent fact of Guatemalan life. The Salvadorean civil war 
continued until a UN brokered deal brought a peace deal in 1991. The violence in 
Guatemala continued to such levels that in 1991, a three person delegation led by 
Henry Saby, the moderate Socialist Chairman of the European Parliament 
Committee on Development and Cooperation, reported on its return from that
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country that ’Guatemala today is not a state under the rule of law, but the victim 
of covert state  terrorism in which the Army wields total and unconditional power, 
the civilian authorities are trapped in a power vacuum, and there is no credible, 
independent judiciary.’^
The perspective of the Communique can best be understood however by 
reference to the elections which took place in Central America prior to the Dublin 
meeting. The statement mentioned the importance of the elections in Honduras, El 
Salvador and Costa Rica but stressed that the Nicaraguan elections were fa historic 
event* which should serve to ’promote the reinforcement and consolidation of 
democratic institutionality and of the rule of law in Nicaragua.' The February 1990 
Nicaraguan elections had of course, resulted in the defeat of the Sandinistas and the 
victory of the pro-Western candidate, Violeta Chamorro. If the Sandinistas defeat 
could be equated to the installation of pluralist democracy in Nicaragua then the 
progress could be seen to have been made.
(ii) The economic dialogue
The economic cooperation ’dialogue’ took place with the participation of the 
Contadora countries. Panama was a signatory to the 1985 cooperation agreement but 
Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia contributed to the discussions as potential and 
actual aid donors to Central America. At the 1990 Dublin summit these latter three 
countries provided an ’inventory' and ’assessment’ of their own contribution to 
Central American development. The 1990 economic communique contained a 
paragraph committing the Community to coordinate its cooperation efforts vis-vis
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Central America with Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico.
A separate Economic Communique was issued from all the San Jose meetings
from 1985. It was made clear in the economic communiques that the purpose of
Community economic cooperation with Central America was to contribute to
political stability. In 1985 for instance the participants 'emphasized their
determination to help stabilize the Central American region, more particularly by
implementing measures to improve that region's socio-economic conditions, the
•25backwardness of which was the basic cause of social instability.'
The 1988 Hamburg economic communique committed the Community to 
supporting 'specific and supplementary actions' to back up the Esquipulas peace plan 
and offered cautious approval of the 'Immediate Plan of Action' which had been 
drawn up by the five Central American states in order to start the process of 
economic reactivation. In 1989 the Community signalled its intention to participate 
in the United Nations backed 'Special Economic Co-operation Plan for Central 
America' (PEC) in coordination with other states and international organisations. In 
the 1990 economic declaration reaffirmed Community participation in UN 
coordinated economic reactivation for the region.
The economic communiques marked developments in economic cooperation 
between the two regions and also demonstrated the lack of progress in some areas. 
From 1985 through to and including 1990 the declarations continued to express 
concern a t the problems facing Central America because of the five republics' debt 
and the unstable and declining prices of commodities, their major export and source 
of hard currency. The Community response was both general and specific. At the 
level of generalities the Community reiterated the positive role of the GATT in
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terms of the potential expansion of world trade and commended the structural 
adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank. The Communiques called 
on the Central American nations to engage in export diversification and to take 
more advantage of the Community’s GSP. The message was that the Community's 
own development model - of a regional, economically integrated institution based 
on a philosophy of international free trade - was appropriate for Central America. 
The Community
'provided support for the Central American countries' commitment to the 
progressive liberalization of regional trade, considered an important factor for the 
restructuring, reactivation and strengthening of economic integration in the region, 
the restoring of the convertibility of the Central American countries' currencies and
op
the fuller integration of the region into international trade.
In terms of specifics the Community offered assistance in terms of financial 
support for regional economic institutions for instance in the development of a 
regional payments institution. It also offered support for small and medium sized 
businesses. The aim was to help provide conditions which would encourage domestic 
and foreign private investment. The Community complemented its support for the 
reactivation of business with a declared intention to assist with emergency and food 
aid and also to finance the voluntary repatriation of refugees. The 1990 Communique 
noted that Community support for refugees and displaced persons was taking place 
within a coordinated international framework institutionalised in the May 1989 
International Conference on Refugees in Central America.
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The economic communiques however betrayed signs of tension between the
two economically disparate regions. In 1989, the Central Americans seemed to
express their disappointment with the EC when, after acknowledging increased
Community financial and technical assistance, also noted that ’the overall needs of
the isthmus were so great that they required even greater efforts by the
27international community over and above the contributions it currently received.
In 1990 the Community insisted that the Single Market would lead to the expansion
of world trade and 'would stimulate the world economy' which would have a
favourable affect on trade with Central America. The Central Americans on the
other hand expressed their 'concern' a t the possible affects on the region of the
Single Market particularly in respect of the possible deleterious affects on Central
America's banana exports to the EC.
By 1990 the Community was still emphasising the connection between
economic factors and political stability but seemed to be less convinced of the
necessity for increased Community intervention. The Central American countries
were strongly encouraged to participate in 'economic adjustment' plans 'approved
by the international community'. Both the Community and Central American nations
stated that 'i t  was essential to create a climate of confidence which would a ttract
European investment to the region'. However (and this was agreed by both the
Community and Central American ministers) the Communique also stated that it was
'the countries of the region [which] had the primary responsibility for creating a
28favourable environment to a ttract foreign investment.'
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The Commission
The Commission continued to see its role as that of providing both political 
and economic support for the Central American peace process. More importantly it 
openly viewed the political and economic instruments it had available to it as to be 
utilised for political goals. In other words the Commission conceived itself as a 
political actor in terms of the Central American policy. This view was not simply 
the view of Claude Cheysson, the activist Commissioner responsible for development 
issues, but was regularly enunciated in various Commission statements. In October 
1985 for example Commissioner De Clerq announced that
'The Commission reiterates its hope that through negotiation Central America 
can reach a settlem ent ensuring peace and stability within the framework of 
democratic pluralism and respect for human rights. The Commission also reiterates 
its intention to contribute to the efforts made by the Community to achieve these 
ends by supporting the peace process launched in 1982 with the initiative of the 
Contadora group and by strengthening collaboration both in the political field and 
in the field of economic cooperation.'^
That same year Commissioner Clinton Davis had publicly announced the 
Commission’s ’grave concern’ in respect of the US trade embargo of Nicaragua. He 
told the European Parliament that
’In the Commission's view, such measures will make it even more difficult to
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restore badly-needed stability to the whole Central American region. It [the 
embargo] is to be particularly regretted since they could seriously jeopardize the
o n
steps towards peace being taken in the context of the Contadora process. 1
(i) The political role
But it was Commissioner Cheysson who led the Commission's initiatives vis-a- 
vis Central America. In June 1985 Commissioner Cheysson announced the 
Commission's support for the Community efforts 'to halt violence and instability and 
promote justice, economic development and respect for both human rights and 
democratic liberties in this part of the world [Central America].''** The 
Commissioner responsible for development did not however see the Commission's 
role as simply that of support for a Council policy. For instance in January 1986 in 
Guatemala Commissioner Cheysson 'made a number of declarations' in support of
Q O
the Caraballeda Declaration (see Chapter 1).
The Commission's Central America policy developed such as to encompass 
three related strategic objectives which were articulated within a speech by 
Commissioner in the European Parliament debate of May 1986. The first objective 
was to assist in the economic development of the region in order to help ameliorate 
the conditions which were considered by the Community to be the major cause of 
the regional conflict. The second was to ensure that regional cooperation between 
all five Central American nations took place by encouraging the five governments 
to work together. The third was to discourage US military intervention and an
•JO
escalation of the crisis into a full blown East-West confrontation.
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Community economic cooperation was to be used to encourage moderation 
on the part of all the Central American nations. Cheysson argued that the 
Community supported
'social justice, respect for human rights, democratic freedom and national 
reconciliation., with a framework of pluralist, participatory systems. In this way we, 
through our relations with them, are helping to encourage and maybe even push
n  i
them to go in for this type of development.'
Commission political support for the peace process was designed to 
demonstrate to the United States that the Community could not support US policy 
towards the region. Cheysson particularly commended the Contadora Group's 
expressions of independence. In May 1986 for instance Cheysson told the Parliament 
that the Contadora Group 'were showing that each of these countries [of Central 
America and the Contadora group] feels entitled to pose its problems and to pose 
those that bind it to its neighbours, over and above any East-West 
considerations.
The overtly political nature of Commission policy was apparent in one 
Commission communication from the Caracas office to Brussels in July 1986. This 
six page note focussed entirely on the stalled Contadora peace process and the 
prospects for the establishment of a Central American Parliam ent.^  This latter 
idea had been promoted by the Guatemalan President Cerezo since 1986 was 
enthusiastically supported by the Commission along with the other major Community
Q 7
institutions. In a letter written in November 1987 to the Guatemalan President
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OQ
Cheysson described the idea as a ’fine political initiative'.
By 1987 however, the Commission, like the Council, was displaying a change 
in emphasis. In 1985 Commissioner Clinton Davis had suffered sustained barracking 
from the right in the European Parliament, partly because of his presentation of the
OQ
Commission’s position which was of steadfast support for Nicaragua. By contrast 
in 1987 Cheysson was warning of the possible 'slide into totalitarianism' by unnamed 
countries in Central America. Astute listeners would have realised that the 
reference to totalitarianism was a reference to Nicaragua which throughout the 
1980s was accused by the United States of having such a form of government. Even 
without the use of semiotic interpretation it was not difficult to identify which 
country Cheysson was referring to as in the same statement he argued that US 
military pressure on 'these countries' was not the way to prevent 
totalitarianism.4® Cheysson was perhaps uncharacteristically coy. The United 
States was exerting military pressure on only one of the Central American Countries 
- Nicaragua.4* Cheysson's view of Nicaragua slipping towards totalitarianism 
should be contrasted with his view of Guatemala as having 'returned to democracy' 
by 1987.42
Cheysson remained convinced that it was the Community's encouragement 
which had helped to ease conflictual relations between the Central American states 
and that it was the Community's insistence on a regional, non-exclusive approach 
which had helped lay the basis for the Esquipulas peace process.4® One internal 
Commission communication commenting on the 1987 San Jos6 meeting noted that
'Coming a t a time of renewed and increased tensions in the region the holding
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of the meeting was in itself of particular significance in that Europe was seen as 
instrumental in bringing together around the same table - for the first time in eight 
months (since 6 June 1986 when the Contadora and support group countries presented 
the third draft of the Peace Act) the Foreign Ministers of the five Central America 
Countries.'^*
The Commission’s official view was that ’since 1984 the European Community 
has played the role of a catalyst in Central American affairs by giving the region's 
five countries., the chance to renew dialogue.' The Commission also stressed the 
difference between its approach and that of the USA in that 'the EEC Commission 
was quick to underscore the fact that its approach brings all sides together, contrary 
to those of "certain other countries" that "divide in order to c o n q u e r" .T h e re  
is also no doubt that Cheysson conceived of the Community's Central American 
intervention as a model for future Community politics elsewhere in the world. In a 
statem ent prior to the 1988 San Jos6 meeting Cheysson argued his by now well- 
known view that it was the Community which 'had since 1984 largely contributed to 
the dialogue between the five countries of Central America'. He added that 'this 
policy of the Community which consists in making countries talk to each other 
within the framework of regional groups could be an important factor for stability 
in the international scene in the years to com e.'^
The high-profile political role of the Commission did however diminish with 
the advent of Commissioner Matutes in 1989. Commissioner Matutes continued to 
participate in the San Jos6 process but limited the Commission to a supportive
A7economic role. Central America continued to decrease in political importance
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for the Commission such that by 1992 a keynote speech by Commissioner Matutes
i n
on the subject of Latin America contained barely a reference to the sub-region. 
The reason for the de-emphasis of political issues was partly because of the 
different priority accorded to the region by the two Commissioners. More 
importantly the change of Commissioner coincided with a change in international 
conditions including a change of US President, making it appear possible that the 
Central America crisis could be resolved without US military intervention (see thesis 
conclusion).
(ii) The economic role
It was the Commission's responsibility to implement the economic provisions 
of the framework agreement which was agreed in 1985. The Commission regularly 
m et with officials from the Central American nations and integration institutions 
in the annual Joint Committees which were set up specifically to implement the 
provisions of the agreement, during visits to Central America by Commission 
representatives and in conferences with the Group of Central American Ambassadors 
(GRUCA) based in Brussels. The economic issues were centred on the direct areas 
of Community competence that is aid and trade.
The Community had been of the opinion in 1985 that aid should be doubled to 
the Central American countries. In cash terms this would have meant an 
increase from 40 million ECU to 80 million ECU per year.'*® However the 
Council’s negotiating brief to the Commission of July 1985 had not permitted the 
Commission to make such a commitment within the 1985 framework agreem ent.^
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Instead an additional protocol attached to the agreement committed the Community
CO
to 'substantially' increasing aid to the region although no sum was specified. 
Although the Commission 'regretted' that the Council had not made a formal 
commitment to doubling of aid Cheysson's response was to work for the doubling of 
aid through the use of contingency reserves within the Community's budget. In May 
1986 Cheysson announced to the Parliament that
'Bearing in mind the creation of a 5% reserve in Chapter 930 [the budget line 
for financial and technical cooperation], we believe that we can commit ourselves, 
before this House, to an actual doubling of aid, in spite of the fact that there has 
been no formal agreement, in the coming years.
Community aid to Central America did rise to 77 million ECU in 1985 but fell 
back to just over 40 million ECU in 1986.*^ In 1987 total aid reached 82 million 
ECUs.**** In 1988 and 1989 total EC aid amounted to around 100 million ECUs each
re
year. The Community's commitment to a continuing economic support to 
Central America at the end of the 1980s was demonstrated in November 1989 when 
the Commission agreed initial finance of 43.5 million ECUs for a scheme designed 
to rescusitate intra-regional trade - the total cost of which was 150 million 
ECU.57
Community aid was allocated according to six different priorities. The 
Commission identified these as
'(i) integrated rural development;
276
(ii) support for small and medium-sized enterprises;
(iii) support for cooperatives
(iv) health (reduction of infant mortality rate, etc.)
(v) human resources (qualifications, training of teachers and 
instructors, reform of administrative machinery, etc.);
(vi) generally speaking, any means of encouraging the regional 
integration of tiny national markets (countries of 2 to 8 
million inhabitants) for which integration and economic 
development are even more closely linked than elsewhere.'**®
Community aid projects reflected these varied priorities but by 1988 the 
emphasis had shifted away from social projects in favour of a policy geared towards 
'infrastructures, boosting trade and developing markets' - although the commitment
c q
to regional schemes remained.
The bulk of Community aid came in the form of financial and technical 
cooperation and food aid. Community financial and technical aid was sometimes 
matched by co-finance from the member states. The Italian government for instance 
co-financed the project aimed to support the reactivation of small and medium sized 
business and to reinforce the central role of the Bank for Central American 
Integration (BCIE). The Community contribution to this scheme was 20 million 
ECUs. The Italian government also co-financed with the Community a UNICEF 
administered scheme designed to support the health of infants and mothers 
throughout Central America. This cost the Community about 10 million ECUs.®* 
The Community co-funded one regional project with France which was designed to
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help the region move towards self-sufficiency in food production. The Community 
also of course was the sole funder for a number of regional projects. One such 
regional project which was agreed in 1987 at a cost of some 2.9 million ECUs was
oo
the programme designed to eradicate rabies in the region.
The Commission was anxious to stress that the Community as both 
Community and member states (the EC/12) was a substantial donor of aid to Central 
America whose record compared favourably with the United States. In January 1987, 
in response to criticism from the European Parliament that Community aid was 
negligible compared to US aid, Claude Cheysson insisted that 'Community aid and 
aid from its Member States is equivalent to 90% of American aid.'®**
It seems unlikely however that the amount of aid donated by the EC/12 ever 
amounted to 90 per cent of US aid either in any particular year or in terms of total 
aid between 1976-1990. In total the US spent over $7 billion in Central America in 
official aid between 1980 and 1989. Some three-quarters of this was classified as 
economic aid. At a generous estimate the EC and member states total aid in the 
same period would not have risen above $1 billion dollars. Although it is difficult to 
make any meaningful comparisons mainly because the exact figures are difficult to 
establish it is likely that these official figures for US aid underestimate the amount 
of US aid which flowed to Central America via private and semi-legal operations 
designed to support pro-US re g im e s .T h e se  official aid figures also did not 
include the substantial assistance from private sources which was donated for 
Nicaraguan development programmes.
However even if the Community somewhat overestimated the proportion of 
Community aid as compared to US aid the valid point was that a fair assessment of
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the Community contribution to development in Central America, a t least as
compared to the US, could only be made if the combined economic input of both
member states and the Community were taken into account.
Another criticism from some quarters, as has already been noted, is that
Nicaragua received a disproportionate share of Community aid. In fact over the
period 1976-1988 (the period for which figures are available) Nicaragua did receive
the highest amount of bilateral Community aid out of the five republics. Nicaragua
received a total of just under 172 million ECUs; Honduras 100 million ECUs;
Guatemala 51 million ECUs; El Salvador just under 42 million ECUs; and Costa Rica
34.5 million ECUs.65
If these figures are broken down by category however it becomes apparent
that Community aid was directed via its criteria of allocation to the poorest at least
as much as via political criteria. Honduras received the highest amount of financial
and technical aid at 58 million ECUs for the period compared to Nicaragua which
66received the second highest amount at 38.5 million ECUs. Nicaragua's total was
boosted by the very high levels of food aid it received from the Community in
response to both its poverty and to a series of natural disasters which it experienced
during the 1980s (drought, flooding, hurricanes). In the period 1976-1988 Nicaragua
was the fourth largest recipient of Community food aid to Asia and Latin America.
It received food aid valued at just under 70 million ECUs. Only India, Bangladesh and
67Sri Lanka received more. Nicaragua also received 52.4 million ECUs for work 
carried out by non-governmental organisations (ngos). This was the largest amount 
received for work with ngos in the region. It was also a larger sum than the 
combined amount for food aid and ngo projects received by every other Central
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American republic. The next largest recipient of food aid and aid for ngos, Honduras,
CO
received a total of 35.6 million ECUs for these activities over the same period.
Nevertheless the fact that Nicaragua received any aid at all from the European 
Community was significant. The Community's major ally had not only stopped all aid 
to Nicaragua since 1981, exercised its veto against Nicaragua in multilateral lending 
institutions since 1985, thus imposing a de facto financial embargo, and had imposed 
a trade embargo since 1985, but had actively lobbied in the Community to try to 
persuade the Community and its member states to exclude Nicaragua from 
Community aid programmes.
In trade terms Central America was 'of no importance at all' to the European 
Community, according to a senior commission official responsible for Central
CQ
American policy. This judgement was not an exaggeration. EC trade with the
rest of the world grew from one and a half billion dollars in 1980 to just under three
TObillion dollars in 1990. Its trade with Central America (the five republics)
71between 1981 and 1987 averaged around 1500 million ECUs per year. 1
The Central Americans made some proposals to improve trade with the
Community via the framework agreement but the Community did not support any
far reaching changes in trade relations. The Central Americans asked to be linked
to the EC via a preferential trading agreement in the same way that the ACP states
72were linked via the Lom6  Convention. The Community rejected this request and
although promising to consider how the GSP scheme could be extended to benefit
73Central America, by 1991 had not agreed any concessions for Central America. 
Requests made by the Central Americans were for a support mechanism for 
commodity prices (STABEX - see Chapter 3), access to European Investment Bank
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loans, a mechanism to assist with foreign debt and hard currency resources to 
support a regional payments scheme. Apart from the last, all these requests were 
denied .^
In economic terms, although the Community was undoubtedly successful in 
terms of an increase in Community aid to the region it could perhaps be criticised 
for not increasing aid enough, particularly given its political interest in the region. 
In trade terms the Community’s involvement in Central America was also 
disappointing - a t least for the Central Americans - given that no major 
improvements in trade volumes took place and no major structural changes, which 
might have helped in enhancing the prospects of increased trade and economic 
development, were agreed.
The Parliament
The Parliament's role in the second half of the 1980s changed from that of 
initiator - a role which it had taken on with some success in the first half of the 
decade - to that of support for and monitoring of the other institutions of the 
Community. Cross-party support from the major political groups continued for the 
broad thrust of Community policy although there were disagreements as to which 
of the Central American countries should be considered as least 'worthy' of 
Community support. For the Christian Democrats and the parties of the Right it was 
Nicaragua, and for the Socialists and the parties of the Left it was, generally 
speaking El Salvador and Guatemala. However, none of the political groups with the 
possible exception of the Fascists supported US military intervention or the 1985 US
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economic embargo on Nicaragua. For that m atter none of the groups supported 
Soviet involvement in the region although when this issue was discussed it tended to 
be only the far right that perceived Soviet influence in the region as a serious 
problem.
As with the Council and the Commission however a change of emphasis took
place in parliamentary statements with a move towards a more overt pressure on the
Sandinista government to ’democratize . The concern with Nicaraguan
'democratization1 as a feature of Parliamentary policy objectives was demonstrated
in a resolution of the European Parliament agreed in October 1989 which resolved
to allocate European Parliament (not Commission) monies for 'aid to support the
process of democratization, particularly in Central America, starting with the
76Nicaraguan elections'.
The first two parliamentary reports on Central America were both the work
of Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul and in many ways reiterated the views of the Parliament as
77had been articulated in her own previous reports. Both reports, in 1985 and 1986, 
were supported by the major political groups and their adoption by Parliament served 
to reinforce the broad consensus which had developed on Central American policy 
in the mid-eighties. Both reports were on the subject of the framework agreement 
with Central America although both Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul and her parliamentary 
colleagues placed the debate around these reports in a fairly wide context. Mrs. 
Wieczorek-Zeul made clear that she considered the aims of the framework 
agreement should be far wider than simply economic development which she seemed 
to argue was of subsidiary importance compared to the political goals of the 
Community. She argued that
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'the aim of the agreement is the use of economic and political cooperation 
and development aid to reduce confrontation in the region, assist the development 
of peaceful solutions to the region's problems and to curtail external military and 
economic interference - i.e. by the United States. A further goal is the use of the 
European Community's limited resources to alleviate the economic and political 
dependency of the region.'^®
The Parliament expressed two main areas of difference with the Council in
respect of the cooperation agreement. The first was in terms of the amount of aid.
The parliament would have preferred that the Council commit the Community to a
specific figure; that is to the doubling of aid rather than to the vaguely worded
79'substantial' increase which was on offer to Central America.
The second area of disagreement related to the Parliament's concern to 
extend its own powers in respect of both this agreement and others. The Commission 
had recommended that the political dialogue agreed at San Jos6  in 1984 should be 
institutionalised within the context of the Community's economic framework 
agreement. This would have allowed the Parliament some formal oversight powers 
in respect of the political aspects of the agreement with Central America. Instead 
the Council agreed to formalise the political dialogue a t ministerial level outside the 
framework agreement thus denying the Parliament an institutional input into the 
political aspects of the cooperation agreement. The Parliament could only suggest 
that there be regular meetings of the EP and the proposed Central American 
Parliament 'to ensure that there is parliamentary supervision of the implementation
o n
of all parts of the agreements.
283
The third parliamentary report on Central America in this period was
initiated by the Belgian Socialist Ernest Glinne as the rapporteur for the Political
Affairs Committee. The report contained a somewhat idiosyncratic review of the
prevailing political situation and while not recommending any major change in policy
was important for its efforts to move the Community into more active support for
81Costa Rica, 'the only real democracy* in the region.
The resolutions passed by Parliament in respect to Central American issues
from 1985 through to 1989 were focussed on support for the peace process or on
Nicaragua specifically. Parliament also expressed concern in the period at human
rights abuses in Guatemala and at various events in El Salvador and less frequently
Honduras. However parliamentary debates reflected the focus on Nicaragua within
the context of a regional conflict which had as an essential component the direct
82involvement of one of the superpowers, the United States.
The tenor of the debates was to continue to support a 'European option' which
included support for non-exclusionary regional economic and political efforts, a
condemnation of all outside interference in the internal affairs of the countries of
the region, and support for human rights and pluralist democracy. In practical terms
this meant that Costa Rica was supported by all parties as an 'exemplary'
democracy while it was also agreed by all parties that every other country was
lacking in terms of their application of democratic norms, policies and 
8*1structures. A parliamentary delegation led by Socialist Alf Lomas reported after 
a visit to Central America in November 1987 that 'for various reasons only a sort 
of limited or imperfect democracy applied in the region'.®^
Where the major parties tended to disagree was in terms of the attitude to
284
Nicaragua and to a lesser extent the attitude to the United States. Even on these 
issues however the parties were more or less agreed on certain fundamentals. Both 
Socialists and Christian Democrats (the two major parties) and most of the other 
parties (except the Fascists) took a position from the mid-1980s that Nicaragua was 
not a democratic state and had moved away from the ’original goals’ of the
or
Sandinista revolution. Both sides also agreed that the United States should not 
militarily intervene in Central America. Where they disagreed was in terms of the 
causes of the alleged lack of democracy in Nicaragua. The Socialists and the parties 
of the Left tended to express the view that the Sandinistas had been forced into 
restricting democratic rights because of the US funded war against their territory
QC
and people. The Christian Democrats and the parties of the right tended to take
the view that the Sandinistas were inherently Communist and ’totalitarian’ and were
87using the war as an excuse to display their true colours.
In respect of the United States the disagreement tended to be as to whether
the United States was fundamentally misconceived in terms of its foreign policies
88or whether it had just got it wrong on this occasion. The parties of the right
argued that United States foreign policy, although inappropriate, was an
89understandable reaction to Sandinista provocation. Another response from the 
right was simply to remain silent on the issue of US intervention in the region in 
debate. Probably the most extreme example of this approach was in the 1986 debate 
over two resolutions on Nicaragua. One was a Socialist sponsored resolution which 
set out to note the International Court of Justice decision which had condemned the 
United States for illegally intervening in Nicaragua. The other was a Christian 
Democratic sponsored resolution which put forward a condemnation of the Sandinista
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government for placing restrictions on the media. During the joint debate on both
resolutions the Christian Democrats did not comment once on the judgement of the
International Court. Mrs. Lenz, the spokesperson for the Christian Democrats on
90Central America simply ignored the Socialist resolution. Both resolutions were 
91passed.
There were some parliamentary representatives which did take issue with this 
approach although they by no means represented the majority. Mr. Staes of the 
Rainbow Group (comprising Greens and various non-Socialist parties of the Left) 
perhaps summed up the character of parliamentary debates in his criticism.
fIt is namely totally beside the point to cavil about whether some action
taken in a particular country is democratically acceptable while in a neighbouring
country tens of thousands are tortured and murdered every year without anybody
•92paying any particular attention.1
Apart from the reports, resolutions and debates, the Parliament also played 
a role in the Community’s policy towards Central America in its ability to engage 
in parliamentary visits to the region (which were numerous on both an official and 
non-official basis) and in its ability to offer a platform to visiting Heads of State to 
expound their policies and to try to persuade the Community that these were the 
right policies. In the latter half of the 1980s the first visiting Head of State to 
address the plenary session a t Strasbourg, in May 1985, who was concerned with the 
conflict, was President Reagan. He was given a rough welcome by the Socialists and 
MEPs of the Left, many of whom put up banners protesting the US' Nicaragua policy
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before walking out of the chamber.
Two years later, in May 1987, President Arias of Costa Rica visited the 
Parliament in Brussels, as part of his European tour to encourage support for his 
peace plan. President Arias also sought to persuade the President of the European 
Parliament, Lord Plumb, that it would be unwise to permit President Ortega of 
Nicaragua, for whom an invitation had been mooted in the Parliament, to address 
the plenary at Strasbourg unless he (President Arias) was also asked along to give fa 
balanced assessment of developments in the region'. He argued that an address by 
President Ortega 'could compromise' the upcoming discussion between the Central 
American Presidents on the plan for peace. Lord Plumb is not recorded as having 
responded favourably to this suggestion. 'In response, Lord Plumb took careful note, 
and explained the procedure under which the Enlarged Bureau invited visiting Heads 
of S ta te .P r e s id e n t  Ortega in fact addressed the plenary in 1988.
President Arias was honoured by the European Parliament when Lord Plumb 
presented the Costa Rican president with the Parliament's Gold Medal in recognition 
of his role in the peace process. The presentation took place at the ninth Inter-
r
Parliamentary conference of the European Parliament and Latin American 
parliamentarians, held in San Jos6 in February 1989.
Throughout the period the European Parliament also maintained a keen 
interest in the San Jos6 process, even though it had been excluded by the Council 
from any formal involvement. In 1988 the Parliament sent a delegation to San Jos6 
IV, held in Hamburg. The delegation leader, Fernando Suarez Gonzalez, reported 
back to the President of the EP that parliamentary attendance
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'was., very important from the institutional point of view. The presence of 
the European Parliament at the opening of such an important diplomatic negotiation 
has shown to the public the increasing importance of the role played by the European 
Parliament in the policy-making of our Community.
Meeting objectives
The major objectives of the European Community's policy towards Central 
America can be adduced from the Wieczorek-Zeul and Michel reports of 1982, the 
Council's Strasbourg Declaration of 1983, and the Wieczorek-Zeul reports of 1985 
and 1986.
The genesis of Community objectives were clearly delineated by Mrs. 
Wieczorek-Zeul in the debates on her 1982 report. In 1982 Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul 
stated that the objectives of her report were to give Latin America a 'political 
signal' that Western Europe wished to build bridges after the Malvinas conflict; to 
offer the countries of Central America a 'European option' in respect of a 
development model; and to persuade the Community to adopt a long term orientation 
to Central America in cooperation with 'larger neighbouring countries like Mexico 
and Venezuela'. Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul and the Parliament also intended to persuade 
the Council to support the principle of non-exclusionary, regional aid to Central 
America. By 1983 the Council had adopted these objectives as its own, as had the 
Commission.
In 1985 Mrs. Wieczorek-Zeul set out a further set of objectives which were 
adopted by the Parliament and which were representative of Community objectives
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for the latter half of the decade. These objectives included the use of political and 
economic aid to reduce conflict in Central America; the intention to help find 
peaceful solutions to the conflict; and to prevent United States intervention in the 
region.
The Community had some successes. It succeeded in building bridges with 
Latin America as a whole - so much so that as a direct result of the San Jos6 
process it entered into what at the end of the decade became an institutionalised 
'dialogue1 with Latin America via the Rome agreement with the Group of 8. The 
Community offered valuable diplomatic support to the Central American nations in 
their quest for the 'diversification of dependence' vis a vis the United States and to 
a lesser extent the Soviet Union. The Community did adopt a long term orientation 
towards Central America in conjunction with the larger Latin American neighbours 
via the Contadora process. The Community also adopted the principle of support for 
non-exclusionary, regional economic and political programmes which arguably made 
a significant contribution to the bringing together of the five Central American 
governments. The Community, arguably, contributed to the international diplomatic 
pressure on the United States not to launch a full scale invasion of Nicaragua.
However the balance sheet also shows that Central America did not 
experience economic growth in this period and at the end of the decade was seeing 
some diminution in human rights abuses but nevertheless all countries of the region 
still experienced violence and conflict.
Whether the Community met its objectives as a result of its own policies is 
somewhat of a m atter for speculation but some attention is paid to this issue in the 
conclusion of this thesis.
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Institutional aspects
Two institutional points should be noted at this juncture. The first is that to 
all intents and purposes the Commission and the Parliament, not the Council, were 
the initiators of the Central American policy. The second point is that the 
Parliament achieved a significant de facto input into the making and implementing 
of the policy through its continued and cross-partv supported efforts to push the 
Council into action in this area. These institutional issues and their ramifications are 
also further discussed in the conclusion of this thesis.
Explaining the policy
This chapter has reviewed the development and intensification of US 
intervention in Central America in the 1980s. The previous chapter had argued that 
the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war and the Mexican debt crisis of the same year had 
aroused some EC interest in Latin America but that these issues did not of 
themselves cause the EC to instigate extensive cooperation with Latin or Central 
America. The EC's activity in Central America in the 1980s did not therefore have 
its roots in a more generalised Latin America policy. Indeed this chapter has sought 
to demonstrate, among other things, that the opposite occurred. As a consequence 
of the Central America policy, the EC strengthened its relations with Latin America 
as a whole. Given that the EC's policy towards Central America was not a 
consequence of a more generalised interest in Latin America it is necessary to
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search for other factors which can help explain the policy.
It is particularly necessary to try to understand and explain how and why a 
Community consensus emerged on this issue across party and member state. In order 
to examine how and why that convergence took place the next chapter will delve 
into another 'level-of-analysis' and consider the interests and policies towards 
Central America of four important and diverse member states; Britain, France, 
Germany and Spain. In reviewing the approach of these states to the Central 
American crisis the next chapter will present an analysis of how their policies 
converged to permit a more or less united European Council approach to Central 
America emerge in the mid and late 1980s.
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Chapter 6 Member State Policy towards Central America
The policy of the institutions and member states of the European Community 
towards Central America coalesced in the mid-1980s around a number of issues 
which included a particular attitude to the Nicaraguan revolution and a sometimes 
ambivalent but nonetheless critical view of US policy in the region (see Chapter 5).
In this chapter an evaluation of four of the most important and politically 
diverse member states policies towards the region is presented. One objective is to 
try to decipher what interests those member states had in common which 
contributed to a convergence of attitude to the region in the Council of the 
Communities and which resulted in unanimous and continuous support for the San 
Jos6 process (see Chapter 5).
It is the individual states which are represented in the Council and their 
national policies which are negotiated before consensus (or not) can emerge. Because 
of the importance of bilateral national polices, a critique is offered of the Central 
American policies of the states and governments of Britain, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France and Spain. These four states have not been identified as a focus 
for further analysis because they are the most powerful states in the Community or 
because they demonstrated a greater level of involvement with Central America 
than other member states. If the former was the case Italy would be included, at 
least on economic grounds, and Spain excluded. If the latter criteria were adopted 
the Netherlands would have to be included given its consistently high levels of 
bilateral aid to Central America in the 1980s. ^  These four states are key because 
of their weight within the Community and because of their political diversity. What
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were the factors that Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Socialists had in 
common vis-a-vis a Central American policy? Where did they agree and where did 
they differ? These states are taken as both representative of significant political 
currents in the Community and possessing the political weight, with the possible 
exception of Spain, to exert decision-making power in international politics both in 
and out of the Community mechanisms.
Foreign policy making, even in democracies, is not noted for its susceptibility 
to domestic pressures. However the Central American crisis of the 1980s evoked a 
god deal of public interest internationally. Because of this, the chapter also 
considers the sub-national and transnational actors which influenced and/or exerted 
pressure on the four governments and their impact on government policies.
The chapter focusses on the time period from 1979 to 1985. The dates are 
chosen because it was around 1979 that the European Community began to intensify 
its involvement in Central America and by 1985 the Community had achieved a 
consensus on policy towards Central America. Spain of course did not enter the 
Community until 1986 and therefore had little direct impact on the Councils 
growing unanimity of view (in EC terminology communaut6 de vue). However the 
Spanish Socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez appears to have had an indirect 
influence on West European policy formation and formulations in respect of Central 
America, particularly via its leader’s role within the Socialist International. This is 
one reason for offering an evaluation of the Spanish contribution. The second equally 
important reason is that the impact of Spain on the Community’s Central (and Latin)
o
American policy is often exaggerated.
The chapter considers the four states’ interests and policies in the region but
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particularly focuses on the two issues with which the European Community was most 
concerned; the Nicaraguan revolution and EC/US relations. Because this chapter is 
dealing with member state  policies it also considers both these issues in the context 
that particular state 's relationship with both the Nicaraguan revolution and US 
administrations. The argument is not that interests determine policies but that 
interests provide, to paraphrase Kenneth Waltz, a 'shoving and shaping' mechanism, 
as far as sta te  policies are concerned. National interests of course, can sometimes 
be contradictory. This can most clearly be seen in British political interest vis a vis 
the Falklands which was of maintaining suzerainty and Great Power status - which 
was at variance with the economic interest of protecting and expanding markets in 
Latin America, including Argentina.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first is to help explain the 
convergence in Council policy in the 1980s. It considers what divergences and 
commonalities there were between the member states in terms of their bilateral 
policies towards Central America.
The second aim of the chapter is try to counter any methodological bias 
towards overestimating the role of the European Community in the region by 
changing the level of analysis of the central problem addressed in this thesis, that
o
is 'why did the EC intervene in Central America in the 1980s?'. This latter point 
is important because although the Central American policy was an important 
Community initiative in the 1980s it does not necessarily follow that Central 
America was an equally important issue for the member states. If the region was not 
a priority issue for member states as well as the Community this would of course 
not only tend towards the weakening of Community policy but also a loss of
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Community credibility with its Central American partners. The chapter therefore 
also considers the relative priority of Central America as a foreign policy issue for 
each of the member states discussed.
Although the chapter is concerned with foreign policy towards one region of 
the world it does attempt to review the foreign policies of four major states in the 
international system. The presentation therefore is somewhat schematic and the 
conclusions tentative and suggestive rather than definitive.^ Nevertheless the 
evidence presented is sufficient to offer useful comparative analysis in respect of 
the issues raised.
Britain and Central America
Britain's major direct interest in Central America was Belize - a British 
colony until independence was achieved in 1981. No vestigial interest in the five 
republics remained outstanding from the its nineteenth century colonial role in 
Central America (see Chapter 4).
Britain's indirect interests in Central America related to that region's 
position as a sub-system within two larger regional entities. Britain had an indirect 
interest in Central America because of Britain's locus as an ex-colonial power in 
Central America and the Caribbean. Britain also had an indirect interest in Central 
America as part of a Latin American entity with which British governments were 
concerned to encourage trade and safeguard investments but with which relations 
became strained because of the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. Straddling both of 
these regions - both conceptually and physically - was the British interest in
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maintaining the security of the Panama canal.
British policy only reluctantly and almost clandestinely responded to the crisis 
of the 1980s - fearing to alienate the United States yet unwilling to support the 
extremes of the Reagan administration’s policies towards the region. Britain’s 
participation in the European Community’s intervention in Central America achieved 
among other things, a position for Britain whereby 'cover' could be offered for 
adopting a policy which was different from that of the United States in tactics if 
not in fundamentals. The policy towards the Nicaraguan revolution differed with 
the US - although not as much as that of France and Spain - in two ways. The first 
was in terms of the assessment of the utility of the military instrument as an 
appropriate foreign policy means. The second was in terms of the evaluation of the 
purported ’threat to the West' from Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan expansionism.
(i) General regional interests and policies
Britain had been in dispute with Guatemala over Belize since the 1820s when 
Guatemala achieved independence. An agreement was signed in 1859 between Britain 
and Guatemala which allowed for British sovereignty on the proviso that the British 
would build a road from Guatemala City through Belize to the Caribbean Coast. The 
road was never built and Guatemala has subsequently claimed Belize as its own. This 
unresolved dispute contributed to the decision - supported by Belizean governments 
after independence - to maintain a small British garrison in Belize.
Although the British government and after 1981 the Belizean government 
were careful not to become involved in the Central American conflict one important
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byproduct of the Belize/Britain/Guatemala dispute was the British relationship with 
Guatemala. Relations were a t best antagonistic and from 1981 formally non-existent 
after Guatemala severed diplomatic links with Britain. (These were not fully 
restored until December 1986). One of the consequences of British consideration of 
Guatemala as a 'potential enemy' was that it was unlikely to be able to support the 
US strategy for the region which partly involved mobilising four of the five Central 
American republics (including Guatemala) in an alliance against Sandinista 
Nicaragua. In fact in 1983 Britain protested to the United States when it sent a
Q
shipment of helicopter parts to Guatemala.
In 1966 Guyana had achieved independence thus obviating the need for Britain 
to remain involved with the Venezuela/Guyana border dispute and reducing the 
likelihood of British military and/or political participation in a conflict zone
Q
proximate to the Central American republics. Britain's major interest in the 
Central America and the Caribbean region however was as a major ex-colonial power 
with residual links to the region because of the remaining dependencies like the 
Caymans and Montserrat and because of ties such as Caribbean immigration (to 
Britain) and trade, investment and aid relationships.^ In spite of these ties post­
war British governments more or less accepted that it was the United States and not 
Britain which was the predominant power in the Caribbean region. The British role 
would be to provide political support to prevent any of the Caribbean countries 
following the Soviet or Cuban model of development. A 1981 Foreign Office 
memorandum stated that
'The main British defence and security interests are in Europe in line with the
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increasing concentration over the years of our efforts in the NATO area.. Geography 
dictates that the United States should have become closely interested in the 
Caribbean, and there is a broad Western interest in the region. In practical terms 
this means that free institutions and developing economies should be encouraged and 
supported and that the area should remain, as far as possible, free from Soviet and 
Cuban intervention. The Caribbean is not an indispensable source of strategic raw 
materials for Britain.’**
Although Britain, unlike the United States maintained diplomatic relations 
with Castro’s Cuba, in many respects Caribbean policy in the early 1980s was shaped 
by the Reagan administration's Cold war concerns. This non-independent foreign 
policy placed Britain in a difficult position in October 1983 when the United States 
invaded Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, without agreement from 
the British government and in spite of the 'considerable doubts' expressed by Mrs. 
Thatcher to President Reagan about the advisability of such a course of action.
There remains doubt as to whether the British government was consulted at any
level before the actual invasion. One source indicates that Mrs Thatcher was
12telephoned by President Reagan the night before the invasion. If Mrs. Thatcher 
was consulted she did not pass the message on to the minister responsible for 
Grenada, Ray Whitney. At a meeting in the Foreign Office on 25 October 1983 with 
a group of Labour MPs and one Labour Councillor to discuss a possible US invasion 
of Grenada and Nicaragua the junior minister responsible for the region Mr. Ray 
Whitney did not know until half way through the meeting, after being called aside 
by civil servants, that Grenada had just been invaded. Combined with the fact that
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Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Minister, had announced only the day before in the
House of Commons that he had 'no reason to think that American military
intervention is likely' it would seem to indicate that the Thatcher government had
13no advance warning of US invasion plans.
The British government did not engage in direct public criticism of the US 
although Mrs. Thatcher, President Reagan's closest ally, demonstrated her 
disapproval on 31 October 1983 when she remarked that freedom 'does not mean 
that you are entitled to go into every country., which is under communist 
oppression'. Neither did the Royal Navy, which had a frigate stationed off Grenada, 
join in the invasion.^
One year before the Grenada invasion the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee had issued a report which had recommended that Britain upgrade its 
diplomatic and political involvement with Central America and the Caribbean. The 
report had also recommended that Britain work closely within the EC and side by 
side with Mexico, Venezuela and Canada to try to achieve some amelioration of the 
socio-economic conditions which in the opinion of the Committee were the root
1 c
cause of conflict in the region. Although the report s recommendations were 
more or less ignored by the British government at the time of publication there are 
some indications that the report's conclusions combined with the embarrassment 
over the Grenada affair forced some limited differentiation in British policy from 
that of the US towards the region. A 1984 government statement argued that 'an 
increased American involvement in the Caribbean., need not inhibit Britain 
maintaining a distinctive policy towards the area'.
The Reagan administration resented the British lack of enthusiasm for the
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Grenada invasion. US policy-makers considered that British support should have been
forthcoming if only as a quid pro q u o  for US support in the Falklands/Malvinas
dispute the previous year.
Because of the 1982 Falklands war, Britain had managed to alienate every
Latin American country, with the exception of Chile. Britain had also found itself
reliant on the United States for diplomatic support and a t least initially uncertain
whether that support might be forthcoming. The United States on the other hand,
had been reluctant to enter the diplomatic fray, given that it wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Latin America, particularly because of the high priority given
to the US' Central American policy. The US was also concerned that Latin American
hostility to what was widely perceived as British colonial interference in the South
Atlantic might result in more pro-Soviet Latin American stances - particularly if the
17US joined Britain in a 'Western alliance' against Latin America. Thus US policy­
makers judged that given the support given by the US to Britain in difficult 
circumstances in 1982 - a reciprocal support was due to the US over Grenada in 
1983.18
One indirect result of the Falklands war and Nicaraguan diplomacy was that
the Argentinean military advisers to the US financed contras were withdrawn from
Central America and the US was propelled into a much more direct involvement in
IQthe anti-Sandinista war.
A potential concern for Britain in respect of the 1982 war was the impact on 
economic relations with Latin America as a whole. Britain's policy towards Latin 
America had since 1945 been based on economic considerations; viewing Latin 
America as a source of important raw materials and a market (sometimes viewed
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as a potential market) for exports and investment. A 1982 post-Falklands
20government report confirmed these priorities. In fact the war simply acted as 
another factor which contributed to the already diminishing trade between Britain 
and Latin America. The value of British exports to Latin America fell from $110,358 
million in 1980 to $92,012 million in 1983. Not surprisingly the value of British 
exports to Argentina showed the sharpest reduction; from $403 million in 1980, to 
$65 million in 1982, to $7 million in 1983. During this period Latin America never 
took more than 2 per cent of British exports. The value of British imports from 
Latin America also dropped steadily from a 1980 total of $115,971 million to $99,712 
million in 1982, increasing slightly in 1983 to a value of $100,309 million. However 
even by 1983 Latin America did not account for two per cent of Britain’s imports. 
British imports of Argentine goods fell from $271 million in 1980 to $0.3 million in 
1983.21
British trading interest in Latin America was limited therefore. While the 
potential of Latin American markets was acknowledged as was the possibility that 
Latin American oil may become a sought after commodity after British oil runs out 
there were no immediate or important commercial interests in the late 1970s/early 
1980s which Britain, unlike the Federal Republic of Germany for instance (see 
below), had to take into consideration in devising a policy towards the sub-region of 
Central America.
Compared to commercial interests, British investment interests in Latin 
America - both in terms of direct investment and loans - were more important. 
However the level of British direct investment was low compared to what it had 
been in for example in 1930 when some 35 per cent of all British overseas direct
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investment was in Latin America. By 1974 the percentage share had fallen to 4.5 
percent, before showing a moderate increase to 7 per cent in the period 1978-
99
1981. The most important British economic interest in the region as a whole
however was in relation to the financial flows from British banks to Latin American
governments. Both the Midlands and Lloyds, two of the 'Big Four* British clearing
banks were owed substantial amounts by Brazil, Argentina and Mexico; so much so
that a default by all three countries would have probably resulted in disaster for
either of these banks but particularly the Midland which in October 1983 was owed
$3.6 billion by these three debtors - amounting to $1.1 billion more than its capital 
23assets. Mrs. Thatcherfs government was well aware of the need to support Latin 
American debt rescheduling because of the ramifications for the British (and 
international) banking system, particularly since the 1982 Mexican debt crisis when 
that country seemed on the point of default. The British government however 
responded in an ad hoc manner. In terms of policy towards Argentina after the 1982 
war the British government supported rescheduling of some of that country's debts
Ai
but opposed the involvement of British banks in that rescheduling.
The point here is that 1982 and 1983 were crucial years for British 
perceptions of Latin America. Britain was involved in a war in which it achieved 
military success but which in its aftermath risked damaging British economic 
interests. The war also indicated that the US government could not be relied on to 
act automatically in support of Britain, particularly if it felt its own interests were 
at risk. The Grenada incident also contributed to the understanding that while the 
US and Britain might agree on strategic priorities, the policies chosen to implement 
those strategic priorities might be different. It also publicly showed that Mrs.
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Thatcher’s government, despite the Thatcher/Reagan ’special relationship’ was 
conceived of, by the US, as the ’junior partner'.
There is no doubt that Latin American, including Central American policy, 
continued to be a low priority for the British government. However, inter alia, these 
distinct British interests and the differentiation with US interests allowed for some 
difference of approach from that of the US to Latin America, and the conflict in 
Central America, by the British government.
(ii) Policy towards the Central American conflict 1979-1985
British strategic, political and economic interests in the five republics were
few.
From 1979, with the advent of the Conservative government the approach, 
like that of the Reagan administration elected in 1980 was anti-Communist. Unlike 
the White House it seemed to accept that social injustice was the root cause of 
political instability which contributed to creating the conditions for Soviet and 
Cuban intervention. (Ironically, by 1983 Cuba provided the largest single market for 
British exports out of the five Central American markets, the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and itself and was Britain's second largest source of imports - after Costa 
Rica.)25
In 1981 official government policy to Central America was summed up as 
follows.
’The aim of British policy is as far as possible to offer assistance to friendly
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governments of the region to help in their development in a just and equitable
fashion. We have an important interest in ensuring the unimpeded operation of the
Panama canal and have made a sustained effort to bring Belize to independence in
circumstances which will guarantee that country a secure future. The area has long
been characterised by violence, instability and conflict, unequal distribution of
wealth, great privilege coexisting with great deprivation and poverty. The alleviation
of these conditions is an urgent priority for the governments of the region, in which
they are entitled to expect assistance from the international community. We share
the widespread concern about the inherent instability of the region, and the
opportunities which it creates for Cuban and by extension Soviet, intervention. We
consider that our interests are served by encouraging an awareness of the long term
2fidangers of Communist subversion.'
British trade with the five republics was minimal. In 1983 total British exports
to Central America amounted to 37.8 million pounds. In that same year Britain's
27imports from Central America totalled just 50.1 million pounds. British aid was 
conditioned by both development and political priorities. Between 1980 and 1985, 
Honduras, as the poorest country in the region, received the highest amount of 
British bilateral aid at $26.1 million. Costa Rica, certainly not the next poorest, 
received the second largest amount of aid, valued at $3.8 million during the same 
period. El Salvador ($1.1 million) Nicaragua ($0.8 million) received much smaller 
amounts of development aid. Guatemala received almost nothing - just $0.1 
million.^®
Although Nicaragua as the second poorest country in Central America and as
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the country judged by British aid agencies to make best use of aid monies (two of
the government's aid criteria) it was not allocated similar sums of aid to that of
Honduras. (In fact the Labour government of 1974 to 1979 gave a t least double the
aid to the dictator Somoza's government in Nicaragua compared to that given by the
09Conservative government to the Sandinista government after 1979.) The British 
government's view was that
'The administration of aid had to take account of the political environment 
as well as economic considerations... there could be no question of further 
development assistance from the UK whilst Nicaragua appeared to be headed on a
O A
path towards a one party Marxist state.
However the important point here is the contrast between the British and the 
US approach on aid to Nicaragua. After 1980 US no further aid was allocated for 
Nicaragua. British bilateral aid to Nicaragua did continue throughout the period of 
the Conservative government; thus indicating at least a degree of independence from 
US tutelage. This independence should not however be overstated. In economic 
terms, the British government, while denying the practice officially, appears to have 
supported the US in multilateral economic institutions like the Inter-American Bank
Ol
for development and the World Bank in its policy of blocking loans to Nicaragua.
In political terms the British government also demonstrated a limited 
although arguably a significant independence from the US government. Britain's 
official approach to the Central American conflict was that 'we believe that any 
solution to the conflicts in Central America must be political, not military*. This
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was not the same approach as that of the US but was the view adopted by the 
European Community the following year in Stuttgart (see Chapter 4). This was also 
the view of the Contadora group which the British government supported from its 
inception in 1983 (see Chapter 1). In 1986 Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe told 
the House of Commons that 'The United States Government are well aware of our 
views' after he had informed the House that the British government did 'not believe 
that the problems of Central America can be solved by armed fo rc e '.^
This divergence of views combined with the British foreign policy priority of 
maintaining as good relations as possible with the US led to a somewhat ambiguous 
British policy towards Central America. On the one hand Britain was the only 
European state  to accept the invitation from the US to send observers to the 1982 
Salvadorean elections; these were the elections that the European Parliament had 
judged as insupportable (see Chapter 4 ) .^  The British government also followed 
the US lead by refusing to send observers to the 1984 elections in Nicaragua - 
despite the fact that every other European government and the European Parliament 
decided to recognise the validity of the Nicaraguan democratic process and sent 
observers. In addition, on the rare occasions that Mrs. Thatcher commented on 
the Central American crisis she staunchly reiterated the US point of view, taking 
US assumptions as her base the then Prime Minister stated in 1985 that 'Britain's 
attitude to Nicaragua will depend on the extent to which (the) country is prepared 
to reduce the level of armaments, to put an end to its interference in the affairs of
o c
its neighbours, and to establish genuine pluralist democracy.'
On the other hand in practice, as in the Council of the European 
Communities, the British position was a little more 'nuanced' than Mrs. Thatcher's
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statements might suggest. Contrary to the common opinion of the British Left, the 
British government and its representatives, expressed views within the arena of 
public diplomacy which were not automatically supportive of the US on this 
issue. The Nicaragua solidarity campaign for instance noted that various votes 
took place within the UN Security Council and the General Assembly and that
O Q
'Britain has almost always either abstained or voted with the United States'. The 
interesting point, given British overall foreign policy priorities, and given US 
pressure on its allies to support its line on Central America (see Chapter 1) is that 
Britain abstained so many times, to the extent that on at least one occasion the US
OQ
was completely isolated in a Security Council vote and had to use its own veto. 
Britain also supported UN resolutions in 1985 (and outside the time frame of this 
study - in 1986) condemning human rights abuses in El Salvador - the latter a close 
ally of the US.40
There were some allegations during the Irangate investigation that Mrs. 
Thatcher and/or senior government officials had given covert support to the US 
funded military operation against Nicaragua but these were never p ro v e d .B u t  
an important difference with US policy was that the British government did not 
participate in and did not support the use of military means to bring an end to the 
conflict.
Various sub-national groups attempted to persuade the British government to 
change policy either to closer links with the US or to a more complete disassociation 
with US policy. Winston Churchill MP supported the former tendency visiting 
President Reagan in April 1985 to campaign for increased support for the 
c o n t r a s t  The solidarity campaigns, the Labour and Liberal parties, various
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churches, many Labour-controlled local authorities and the major aid agencies 
campaigned for a more independent policy.'**'* Although the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office at times received more letters on Central America than any 
other foreign policy issue there is no evidence that the solidarity lobby had a major 
impact on government po licy .H ow ever that is not to say that these efforts were 
insignificant. The existence of such a lobby may have been a factor in maintaining
4 c
the rather distanced government position from that of US policy.
British government wariness in respect of US policy appears to have come 
about because of its concern that international law should be respected and in 
particular that it was not appropriate for the United States to be funding 
mercenaries who were dedicated to the violent overthrow of an internationally 
recognised sovereign state. The British government did not consider that the 
revolutionary movements in Central America were a major threat to US security 
interests. It was also concerned about the wider international implications of the US 
attitude to the conflict. One British scholar noted that
'The British fear has been that the US administration's overt sponsorship of 
the Contras could not only lose the United States the high moral ground in relation 
to the Soviet Union, but also establish a precedent having dangerous repercussions 
on international stability elsewhere'.**®
Central America was of low policy salience for Britain. Within that context 
British policy had differentiated itself from that of the US before the formulation 
of a Community policy to the region. The 1982 effort by Britain within the Council
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to exclude Nicaragua from Community aid (see Chapter 4) may have been partly a 
product of an international obligation that the British government felt it owed to the 
US in respect for US support during the Falklands/ Malvinas war. By contrast the 
1983 Grenada incident may have helped push Britain back to what it. may have 
considered as a more balanced policy; of anti-revolution but by the use of more
Ay
moderate means than those employed by the United States. The ECfs San Jos6 
process provided a low risk means of pursuing a policy towards Central America 
which was slightly a t variance with that of the United States. However it should be 
emphasised that Central America was of less than marginal importance for Britain. 
If the EC had not instituted its multilateral approach it is unlikely that British policy 
makers would have considered such a policy necessary. This was a different position 
than that taken by the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Federal Republic of Germany and Central America
The Federal Republic of Germany had no important economic or strategic 
interests in the region but developed and maintained a political interest in Latin 
America and in Central America throughout this period. This interest was 
maintained despite the change in government in 1982 when the Social Democrats 
(SPD) led by Chancellor Schmidt were replaced by a Christian Democrat (CDU) 
government led by Chancellor Kohl. Continuity in FRG foreign policy was 
maintained partly because of the presence of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of the Free 
Democratic party (FDP), as Foreign Minister in both SPD and CDU governments.
One major difference between Germany and France, Britain and Spain in
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terms of the relationship with the wider Caribbean and Central America region, was 
that Germany had not been a colonial power. Although this meant that Germany did 
not suffer from post-colonial conflicts and could therefore act as a ’neutral’ power 
this same factor also meant that Germany's ties with the region were 
correspondingly weaker. In terms of the relationship with Latin America as a whole 
links were predominately economic although in terms of relative political priority 
one commentator has argued that compared to Britain and France 'Germany is the
JQ
one that attaches most political importance to Latin America'.
The defining characteristic of FRG involvement was the dominance of non­
governmental organisations in German activities in Central America. This was partly 
because of the FRG's 'special' position in world politics which in this period still 
made West German governments ultra sensitive to international fear of a possible 
resurgent and powerful G erm any.N on-governm ental activity also became 
important because the Latin American region as a whole was a low priority for FRG 
foreign policy-makers and thus the non-governmental organisations, particularly the 
powerful and prosperous political foundations, filled the political vacuum to become 
influential foreign policy actors in Latin and Central America.
The German 'special' position in world politics was also reflected in its 
preference for multilateral initiatives. Participation in collective Community foreign 
actions was particularly important for Bonn governments because of the 'alibi and 
legitimation functions' provided by Community foreign policy. Participation in an 
EC foreign policy network helped to shift blame for unpopular decisions to an 
amorphous entity in Brussels and at the same time provided evidence that the FRG 
was a 'legitimate' democratic nation.
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Despite the continued recognition by German governments that Central 
America was part of the US fsphere-of-interest1, political Elites and their leaders 
became increasingly concerned that the Western Alliance might be threatened by 
precipitate US military action in Nicaragua and attempted to promote peace 
initiatives to try to forestall any such action.*** FRG policy towards the Central 
American conflict was of active support for multilateral peace initiatives such as 
Contadora and the EC's own San Tosfe process. German Christian Democratic opinion 
was generally hostile to the Sandinista government but did not support the use of
COmilitary means to resolve the conflict.
(i) General regional interests and policies
The Federal Republic's strongest institutional link to the wider Caribbean and 
Central America region was indirect, via its membership of the European 
Community and the Community's treaty-based relationship with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of Nations (the ACP). Since 1984 Germany's formal 
links with Central America also were implemented via the EC by way of the San 
Jos6 process which was instigated by Foreign Minister Genscher (see Chapter 4). The 
Federal Republic's own direct political interests with the Caribbean and Central 
America - a t least up until the intensification of the Central American conflict in 
the early 1980s were negligible. Bilateral links were mainly channelled via aid 
relationships and from 1982 the Kohl government gave priority to the Dominican
M
Republic, Jamaica, Haiti, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras.
The FRG's approach to Latin America up until 1969 and the advent of the
319
Brandt government was that the region should be considered as the 'exclusive 
domain' of the United S ta te s .^  There were no radical changes in the strategic 
direction of policy towards Latin America after 1970 although the tenor of the 
FRG's diplomacy became more confident and assertive - expressing some 
independence of the US. By 1979 when Chancellor Helmut Schmidt visited Latin 
America both left and right wing political forces appeared supportive of a more high
ce
profile West German involvement in Latin America.
The reason for the renewed interest in Latin America was partly for economic 
reasons although Latin America itself provided more of a potential market for West 
German trade and investment than an important actual market. Latin America 
provided only a small market for the FRG's exports - just over 3 per cent of the 
FRG's exports went to Latin America in 1979. Similarly only a small percentage of 
the Federal Republic's imports came from Latin America - about 3.5 per cent in 
1979. Latin America's share of the FRG's world trade remained low and in fact 
diminished between 1973 and 1979. Latin America was more important for West 
Germany in terms of foreign direct investment (fdi) although that importance 
steadily declined. In 1955, 26.6 per cent of all West German fdi went to Latin 
America. By 1974 the proportion fell to 12.9 per cent, staying a t about that level 
for the next six years. Neither was the Federal Republic as involved in Latin 
America in terms of private bank loans as was Britain and France. In 1983 West 
German banks were owed some seven and a half billion dollars by Latin America - 
compared to just over 27 billion dollars to British banks and nearly 17 billion dollars
FO
to French banks. Latin America has also fared badly in terms of the FRG's 
allocation of development aid worldwide; receiving 'the smallest share of German
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bilateral assistance’.^ ® The principles of West German aid priorities which were 
based on alleviating poverty were maintained by both the SPD and CDU governments 
although the Kohl government in practice has adopted more political criteria for the
on
allocation of aid. This shift could be most closely seen in the FRG’s response to
the Central America conflict (see below).
The change in direction of West German policy cannot therefore be explained
in a purely economistic manner. The West German offensive (such as it was) in Latin
America of the late 70s/early 1980s seems to be better explained as a function of
a number of factors including the Federal Republic’s increased economic power
worldwide, the pre-existing German cultural connections in Latin America and the
fact that Latin America had less direct colonial links with other European nations
fitleaving the diplomatic field relatively free for West German initiatives. West
German motivations for increasing involvement were complemented by the
receptivity of Latin American glites because of their desire for German capital and
trade and their political desire to obtain some diversification of dependence away
from the United States but within the Western camp. The Brazilian government in
particular attempted to build a working relationship with the FRG which could help
62counter US dominance. The most controversial aspect of this policy was the
decision by the FRG in 1975, despite opposition from the US, to sign a $5 million
agreement with Brazil to provide civilian nuclear technology to the latter 
6*1country.
What also changed in the 1970s and 1980s was the increased activity and 
visibility of West German non-governmental actors in Latin America. These included 
Chambers of Commerce, trade unions, churches, human rights and solidarity groups.
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The most important however were the political parties and the Stiftungs 
(foundations) attached to the major parties. The four state  funded Stiftungs are the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation attached to the SPD, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
attached to the CDU, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation attached to the FDP and 
the Hans Seidel Foundation attached to the Christian Social Union (CSU) - the CSU
(iAbeing the Bavarian affiliate of the CDU. In Latin America the most active of 
these non-governmental actors were the Social Democrats and the Friedrich Ebert
ce
Foundation and the Christian Democrats and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
Their mission in the late 1970s included support for 'self-help organizations, adult
education, personnel recruitment, training, and production in the mass media as well
as the promotion of regional research capabilities' within a framework of promoting
(56the 'survival of democratic forces'.
These political groups worked closely with their Latin American counterparts
and via their respective transnational party internationals - the Christian
Democratic World Union (CDWU) and the Socialist International (SI). After Willy
Brandt the ex-West German Chancellor was elected President of the Socialist
International in 1976 he made a deliberate effort to recruit Latin American Socialist
parties and to encourage some of the more radical Latin American political parties
to cooperate with the SI as observers (for example the FSLN attended SI meetings
from 1978). Between 1975 the Latin American membership grew from 3 to 14 and
in 1977 the SI formed the Regional Committee on Latin America and the 
67Caribbean. The CDWU is the umbrella organisation for the European Christian 
Democratic Union and its sister organisation the Caracas based Christian 
Democratic Organisation of America (ODUCA). Christian Democracy was a potent
force in Latin America from the late 1940s, with the first Christian Democratic 
President of a Latin American country being Eduardo Frei of Chile (1964-1970). In
CO
1982 ODUCA comprised 19 political parties or movements.
The participation of West German political parties in these transnational
organisations enhanced the prestige of the political parties concerned but according
to an influential West German review of relations with Latin America in 1984 led
'to a disproportionate concentration of the German activities vis-a-vis Latin
America a t the subgovernmental level' which contributed to a 'lack of coordination
g q
between governmental and subgovernmental activities . According to the same 
report this was most marked in respect to the Central American conflict of the 
early 1980s.^®
(ii) Policy towards the Central American conflict 1979-1985
The Federal Republic, like Britain, had no significant strategic, economic or
political interests in the five republics. During this period the change of government
in 1982 might have been expected to bring about a sharp change in policy towards
Central America but overall strategy remained fairly consistent. The West German
approach to the conflict was complicated by the dominance and powerful influence
of the two main non-governmental actors - the CDU and the SPD. Nevertheless
these two political protagonists had much in common and less division than might
71be expected between them in terms of their Central American policy. The 
common ground between the two major political parties formed a base for the 
Foreign Minister's initiative which evolved in 1984 into the EC's San Jos6  process.
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In outlining the objectives of the policy Christian Democrat Alois Mertes drew
attention to the analysis - shared by both major parties - of the reasons for the
conflict. He argued that the FRG's policy 'is aimed a t combatting the deeper causes
of the conflicts in Central America. These lie - and I repeat a truism - in economic
backwardness, social injustice, and political tyranny. These factors have given rise
72to instability and have opened the region to the influence of revolutionaries.*
In 1984 Foreign Minister Genscher elaborated on the policy which would 
encourage the resolution of the conflict by peaceful means and would involve the 
Federal Republic in the preferred multilateral approach.
'Exactly because it is a m atter of securing and maintaining - by peaceful 
means - economic stabilization, social justice, national sovereignty, and social 
pluralism in a geostrategically important region ridden by crises and conflicts, our 
friends in Central America need the partnership of the European Community. If we 
refuse this partnership, or if we are too fainthearted or even only too indecisive in 
our political and economic involvement, we will be abandoning the peoples of this 
region to growing destabilization and the burden of severe social problems. We are 
faced with the danger that Central America will become the arena of a heightened 
East-West conflict.
Both Mertes and Genscher followed these comments with references to the 
United States sharing the German analysis. However as has been noted (see Chapter 
1) the dominant view within the Reagan administration was that the conflict was 
primarily the responsibility of aggressive Soviet/Communist expansion. The other
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major difference between the FRG and the US (as between Britain and the US) was 
the emphasis given by both the German government and the major political forces 
to resolving the conflict by peaceful means.
The FRG was the most important of the EC countries as a trading partner for 
Central America and along with the Netherlands, the most important source of
7  Abilateral development assistance from the EC member states. In 1980 the FRG
disbursed ODA worth $36.1 million to Central America - compared to Britain's
$21.2 million and France's $1.9 million. In 1982 the equivalent figure for the FRG
was $32.2 million compared to $3.0 million from Britain and $11.3 from France. The
1985 West German ODA contribution to Central America totalled $30.9 million,
compared to $1.7 million from Britain and $11.5 million from France.^**
Shifts in the distribution of West German development aid during the period
reflected the different priorities within Central America of the Social Democrat and
Christian Democrat governments. The Kohl government chose not to fully disburse
the DM160 million promised by the Schmidt government to Nicaragua although aid
was never completely cut off to that country. Christian Democrat West
Germany allocated less aid to Nicaragua between 1982 and 1984 ($19.9 million) than
Socialist France ($25.7 million) although compared to Conservative Britain ($0.2
77million) its programme of ODA was munificent. The major difference between 
Christian Democratic West Germany's aid policies and those of its EC partners 
France and Britain however was in its approach to El Salvador and Honduras. In the 
years 1982 to 1984 inclusive the Federal Republic donated $7 million dollars to 
Christian Democrat President Duarte's government in El Salvador. This compared 
to $0.1 million from France and $0.3 million from Britain. Although a civilian Head
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of State was not elected in Guatemala until 1985 - Christian Democrat Vinicio 
Cerezo - the Federal Republic also aided Guatemala between 1982 and 1984 by way 
of $14.7 million in ODA. This compared to a total of ODA from France to 
Guatemala in the same period of $1.0 million and nothing from Britain.78
The Social Democratic government had favoured the Sandinista government
within Nicaragua while the Christian Democrats, not surprisingly, leaned towards
their homologues in Guatemala and El Salvador. The political foundations carried out
work throughout Central America. All four foundations operated in Nicaragua and
Honduras and all except the Hans Seidel Foundation were active. In Costa Rica all
four Foundations were active. In 1984 only the Naumann Foundation was active in
7QGuatemala and only the Adenauer Foundation operated in El Salvador. However 
there was no exact correspondence between West German government and political 
party policy and party loyalties. Both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic 
governments supported Social Democratic governments in Costa Rica. In addition, 
the Social Democratic party, although out of government in 1982, became 
increasingly critical of the Sandinistas after that date.®® The SPD defined their 
relationship with the FSLN as one of Critical solidarity1.®*
As with Britain however, the important point is that the FRG took a different 
approach to the conflict than its NATO partner, the United States. Tensions between
OO
the Schmidt government and the US were particularly apparent on this issue. But 
both the SPD and CDU governments continued to aid the Sandinista governments 
despite direct US appeals not to do so. The Kohl government accepted the US 
government's argument that revolutionary Nicaragua was supporting the 
destabilisation of El Salvador by aiding the revolutionaries in that country.®® Like
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the Thatcher government in Britain however it chose to maintain some links with the 
Nicaraguan government while expressing public disapproval for Sandinista policies. 
Both SPD and CDU governments also sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
Christian Democrat Minister of State a t the Foreign Office, Alois Mertes, in a 
discussion which was generally supportive of the United States argued that the 
’credibility of the leading Western power will remain intact if, while still preserving 
all necessary options, the United States subordinates military power to the primacy 
of politics in Central America - that is, if it continues to give top priority to the 
search for durable political solutions.'®^
The Christian Democratic view of US policy to Central America was that it 
has sometimes been misguided. Ottfried Hennig, the CDU’s Minister of State for 
Inter-German Affairs commented in an article published in 1987 that fin the course 
of the past 100 years, the United States has committed many mistakes vis-&-vis 
Latin America. The traditional U.S. policy of demonstrating economic and military 
strength has often antagonized its smaller and weaker neighbours; another kind of 
policy would have been more appropriate.1^
The most important reasons for West German differences with US policy to 
the Central American conflict included the perceived threats both to the Western
oe
Alliance and to the FRG's policy of Ostpolitik to its Eastern neighbours.00  These 
concerns about US policy to Central America were in addition to Federal Republic 
reservations about the Reagan administration's aggressive approach in respect of 
other foreign policy issues such as Afghanistan issue and to the imposition of martial 
law in Poland. For some the US appeared to be damaging its (and the West's) 
credibility by engaging in military actions which appeared to be bordering on
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87illegality and perceived by wide sectors of global opinion as unjust. In response
to these factors the German leadership saw its role as devising a policy which could
prevent the United States from becoming more directly involved in the Central
American conflict which in their opinion would lead to 'incalculable1 consequences
for the Atlantic Alliance.®®
Bonn governments with their own experience of living with nearby
Communist states did not share the US interpretation that revolutionary movements
in Central America formed a major security problem for the US. They considered
that the US was overreacting to what was essentially a localised conflict.®® In
addition the governments of the FRG recognised the need for social change in that
region and could accept a 'formula of long-term stability, while accepting instability
in the short run'.®®
Central America was of itself a low foreign policy priority for the FRG.®*
The significance of the Central American conflict for the FRG was because of the
questions raised in respect of US handling of the crisis. Neither Social or Christian
Democrats agreed with the US analysis of the primary reasons for the Central
America crisis as being due to external Communist subversion. Both considered that
qosocio-economic problems were the primary cause of conflict. Both parties also 
disagreed with the US military based approach to the region. The main cause and 
consequence of West German involvement in the region therefore was the increasing 
questioning of the capabilities the US as the leader of the Western Alliance.®® The 
EC's San Jos6 process was in some senses a foreign policy instrument which could 
be utilised to moderate US policy and in so doing safeguard the integrity of the 
Western Alliance.
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France and Central America
The primary interests of France in the region were strategic and political and
related to the security and stability of its three overseas d6partements: Guadaloupe,
94Martinique and French Guyana. A secondary interest was the maintenance and 
support for French language and culture. In order to pursue this objective France 
maintained links with the French and French Creole speaking islands of the 
Caribbean including Saint Lucia, Dominica and particularly Haiti and provided
OR
development aid for these small states.
France under De Gaulle, in line with its independent and sometimes overtly
anti-US foreign policy, had briefly attempted to court Latin America but without
much tangible success. Successive administrations displayed little  interest in Latin
America but retained the Gaullist heritage in respect of attempting to maintain a
Qfiforeign policy independent of the USA. In terms of relations with the South the
97links with Africa remained top priority for all French administrations.
President ValGry Giscard D’Estaing, leader of the Democratic Union of 
France (UDF) and elected in 1974, improved relations with the US but in 1981 he 
was replaced as President by the Socialist Frangois Mitterand. Policy towards 
Central America changed from that of a pro-US position to an overtly critical 
stance in respect of US policy - but only briefly. By 1983 the French Socialist 
President was advocating a critical line in respect of his revolutionary colleagues 
in Central America. From 1983 French foreign policy also displayed a markedly 
Atlanticist posture.
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The Socialist government's Central America policy was distinctive in that it 
actively promoted a 'third-worldist' orientation to the problems facing Central 
America. The Socialist Party (PS) rejected the view that the conflict was caused by 
Communist subversion but considered that the crisis was because of instability 
caused by socio-economic inequalities and poverty. The Mitterand approach to the 
South was that 'to strengthen world peace the Third World must be taken out of the 
East-West conflict so that they be given a chance to develop rather than remaining
QQ
pawns in the great power conflict.
The Mitterand government's intervention In the early 1980s in the Central 
American conflicts in open support of the revolutionary movements in El Salvador 
was not well received internationally, even in Latin America and Europe. Its 
subsequent more cautious policy replaced these bilateral French initiatives to 
support for and participation in multilateral approaches. Consequently the Mitterand 
government supported the Contadora peace process and was a leading proponent of 
the EC's San Jose process. M. Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister from 1981 to 
1984 was appointed European Commissioner responsible for Central America and 
development issues in 1985. Commissioner Cheysson took an active interest in 
Central American issues and was a major influence in the development and 
implementation of the EC's policy towards the region (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
However this influence should not be overstated. The Community's analysis of the 
causes of the conflict and the convergence around an agreed Community policy took 
place during Commissioner Cheysson's interregnum in office.
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(i) General regional Interests and policies
As an ex-colonial power France had historic and profound links with the 
Caribbean region and the mainland area of Central and South America. Three of its 
ex-colonies - Guadaloupe, Martinique and french Guyana - had become 'overseas 
d&partements' of France in 1946 and as such were considered by successive French 
governments as an integral part of France. The bulk of French aid to territories in 
the region went to these three dfepartements with the result, among other things, 
that inhabitants of these territories had a higher standard of living than the citizens 
of Central America and the independent Caribbean states. France considered its 
policies as representative of a 'responsible* attitude by an ex-colonial power. 
However its reasons for maintaining strong links these former colonies were as much 
strategic and parochial as altruistic and enlightened. Martinique and Guadaloupe 
provided convenient bases for nuclear weapons shipments to the nuclear testing 
facilities in the Pacific. French Guyana was the location of Centre Spatial Guvanais 
(CSG), the rocket launching facility for French and European space satellites. One 
author has called the CSG 'the most important strategic asset of France
q q
overseas'. In this sense French security interests in this region were far from 
trivial.
Like the United States, France wished to discourage the extension of Soviet 
influence in this area. Post war French governments had also flirted with the idea 
of offering a Western (ie. French) alternative to both superpowers. De Gaulle had 
made a well-received tour of Latin America in 1964 capitalising on both French and 
Latin American anti-US opinion. De Gaulle's tour had brought little concrete
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benefits for France or Latin America except for perhaps the opening of markets for 
French arms sales to the region.^® However successive French governments 
including that of Giscard D'Estaing maintained a policy towards Latin America that 
a t least hinted that France offered an 'alternative1 as an ally and model of 
development to that of the superpowers. To this end although Giscard D'Estaing 
favoured relations with 'moderate' Latin American governments, he fostered 
diplomatic contacts with governments in Latin America and the Caribbean of 
varying ideologies. The French Socialist government differed little from previous 
French governments in its strategic approach and continued to conceive of France 
as offering a 'Third way'. The difference between Mitterand and Giscard was that 
the former supported Leftist political parties although the Mitterand government did 
not completely sever its ties with the dictatorships of the region including 
Chile. 101
The French Socialist government differed with the United States over the 
appropriate means to achieve the same ends, that is to prevent the countries of the 
region becoming too close to the Soviet Union. The French preferred to offer 
support to those movements for change in the South in order to prevent them looking 
to the Soviet Union for succour. Mitterand argued that
'Communism is born out of misery and, if the West does not show more
understanding, the people will take their weapons and address themselves to others,
that is to say the Soviet Union. Thus we will end by pushing into the opponent's
camp people who are not the natural adversaries of the West, but who will become
102that by the logic of the situation which we impose on them.'
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One of the results of this policy was the 1982 promise made by Mitterand 
(which in the end was not honoured) to support the Socialist government in Grenada 
led by Maurice Bishop should that island be the subject of 'external 
a g g r e s s i o n . T h e  Mitterand government consolidated its links with Cuba and 
criticised President Reagan's exclusion of Grenada and Cuba from the 1982 
Caribbean Basin Initiative.*®* Mitterand however did not pursue unilateral 
initiatives at the expense of his European allies. President Mitterand did not hesitate 
to actively support the Thatcher government when it sought the EC member states' 
solidarity over the Falklands/Malvinas dispute in 1982.*®^
It would also be a mistake to overstate the differences between the Mitterand 
and Reagan administrations on defence and security issues. There was certainly 
sharp disagreement over these respective governments approach to the Central 
American conflicts (see below). In other respects Franco-US cooperation on security 
issues was better than it had been at any time since the second world war. In Africa, 
the most important region for France in terms of the South, Franco-US relations in 
respect of defence policy 'were the closest in 25 years'.*®® The Mitterand 
government, particularly after 1983, adopted a high profile Atlanticist position, 
supportive of West European participation in the Western Alliance and conscious of 
the 'vital' role played by the United States within that Alliance.*®^ In January 
1983 President Mitterand publicly emphasised France's commitment to the Atlantic
1 AO
Alliance in a speech to the Bundestag in Bonn. °
If the strategic and political interests were important for France its economic 
interests in Latin America and the Caribbean were insignificant. By 1981 Latin
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America received only 2.8 per cent of French imports and just 2.6 of French exports
1 Q Q
went to Latin America. Brazil was the major market for French exports in
1982 but the relative unimportance of even this market could be demonstrated by
the fact that in the period 1980 to 1983 the combined market of Martinique and
Guadaloupe received more French exports than Brazil.**® Latin America was
however an increasingly important export market for France in one sector. France
became the major West European arms supplier to Latin America throughout the
1970s and early 1980s and saw the value of its arms sales continue to rise in this
period. Between 1978 and 1982 French arms sales to Latin America were worth
$1900 million compared to arms exports worth $750 million from Britain and $400
million from the FRG.***
The history of French investment disasters in Latin America particularly in
the abortive attem pt by a French company to build a Panama Canal may have
contributed to the lack of interest in Latin America by French investors in the post 
112war period. Between 1979 and 1981 France provided some 6 per cent of Latin 
America’s fdi - compared to 7 per cent from Britain and another 7 per cent from the
1 1 o
FRG. Guy Hermet, former Director of France's prestigious research 
institution, the FNSP, called France a 'second rank industrial and commercial 
partner' in respect of Latin America.**^ In terms of indirect investments via 
bank loans as has been noted above French banks were only second to British banks 
in terms of their exposure. The French response to the 1982 debt crisis was to join 
with other Western leaders to try to find a multilateral solution to the
l i e
problem. u Given France s low profile in the region as a whole - even under the 
early years of the Mitterand government - it might have been somewhat of a
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surprise for France’s allies that county would adopt an opposite posture with respect 
to the Central American conflict.
(ii) Policy towards the Central American conflict 1979-1985
As with Britain and the Federal Republic, France had no major direct
interests in any of the five Central American republics.
Giscard's approach towards the region had been critical of the revolutionary
movements and had accepted the US analysis of the conflict being the product of
Soviet expansionism. While in opposition the PS had strongly criticised Giscard for
118his pro-US line and for his support of Salvadorean President Duarte. The
Socialist Party formed close links with the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
led by Guillermo Ungo - a component of the revolutionary opposition to the
Salvadorean government and also a member of the Socialist International since 
1171978. The Giscard government had somewhat mixed relations with the
revolutionary Nicaraguan government which came to power in July 1979. It delayed
establishing diplomatic relations until December 1989 although it did contribute
emergency food aid in the immediate post-insurrectionary period. The Giscard
government signed an agreement with the Nicaraguan government in November 1980
118for financial credit worth 50 million francs.
In 1981 after the election of the Socialist government the heritage of Gaullist 
anti-US sentiment and the PS1 ’Third-Worldist’ orientation converged in the 
expression of a Central American policy which directly challenged - or so it seemed 
to the US - US security interests in this region. Interviewed in Le Monde in July
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1981, Mitterand commented that
fI have serious reservations, not to say more, about United States policy in 
Central America.. What is happening there is not Communist subversion but 
resistance to misery and indignity. When [these people] cry for help, I would like 
Castro not to be the only one to hear them.1**^
The shift in policy from Giscard to Mitterand was reflected in the redirection 
of bilateral aid within Central America. In 1980 El Salvador had received $0.5 
million dollars from France. In 1982 it received nothing and in the entire period 1980 
to 1985 it received just $0.9 million. By contrast Sandinista Nicaragua also received 
$0.5 million in 1980 but in 1982 French bilateral aid reached $8.5 million to 
Nicaragua. In the period 1980 to 1985 Nicaragua received a total of $34.6 million of 
bilateral French aid. This sum was more than three times the amount allocated to 
Honduras ($10.1 million), the next largest recipient out of the five republics of 
French aid during the same period. By comparison between 1980 and 1985 Costa 
Rica received $4.0 million and Guatemala received $2.0 million from France.
The new Socialist government made a number of dramatic gestures in support
of the revolutionary movements in the region in 1981. Regis Debray, a French
academic associated with Che Guevara and Castro was appointed as special adviser
to the President on Latin America. The widow of the murdered ex-President of
Chile, Salvador Allende was given prominence a t Mitterand's Presidential 
121inauguration. In August 1981 France and Mexico issued a joint declaration 
which among other things recognised the revolutionary opposition in El Salvador as
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a frepresentative political force*. This declaration was signed jointly by Claude
Cheysson the then French Foreign Minister and Jorge Castaneda the Minister for
122Foreign Affairs for Mexico. France, like the European Parliament, did not
recognise the 1982 Salvadorean elections as 'free and fair1, instead continuing to
12*1argue that the revolutionary movement was 'supported by the population'. ° 
The most controversial decision of the new administration was the secret 
deal, signed on December 21 1981 and made public in January 1982, to sell 
Sandinista Nicaragua $15.8 million worth of arms supplies. Foreign Minister
1 9  ACheysson stated that he had agreed the sale 'with reticence'. These supplies
included helicopters, patrol boats, transport trucks, rocket launchers and rocket 
12*?rounds. ° Even though the French government argued that the sale had been to
encourage the Nicaraguans to look to the West for support not to the Soviet Union
and that anyway the amount involved was tiny (France was for instance in the
process of completing a $1 billion arms deal with Iraq) the US reacted vigorously.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig informed Cheysson that the deal was 'a stab in
the back' for the US and would encourage the Sandlnistas to continue to export
revolution to El Salvador. In the end the m atter was only resolved a t a private
Franco-US Presidential summit in March 1982 when the French agreed to
indefinitely 'delay' delivery of the arms shipments already agreed for Nicaragua and
12finot to contemplate any further military support for the Sandinistas.
Neither of these two initiatives won the French Socialist government much 
credibility internationally although arguably the PS managed to consolidate its 
backing from the Left at home (this was the period when French Communists were 
in the government). Nine Latin American states including Venezuela, Colombia and
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Argentina signed a statement in September 1981 criticising the Franco-Mexican
127declaration for interfering in the internal affairs of El Salvador. Only the 
Netherlands in Europe supported the French. ° France’s allies were also worried 
about the Nicaraguan arms deal. Apart from the US, Spain and even Mexico,
1 2QFrance s erstwhile partner on Central American issues, expressed concern.
French Central American policy changed in 1982 because of these two
diplomatic failures and because events in Central America forced a reevaluation. By
late 1981 it had become obvious that the Salvadorean revolutionaries’ ’final
offensive’ - designed to convince incoming President Reagan that there was ’an
irreversible situation in El Salvador’ - had failed. The Salvadorean revolutionaries
were still fighting but the Salvadorean government, backed by Reagan, was engaging
130in a campaign of brutal counterrevolution. The French government also began
to perceive the Nicaraguan government as having moved too far to the Left and
therefore abandoning commitments made to the establishment of pluralist
131democracy and non-alignment. In 1984 Regis Debray commented that in this
new style relationship with the Sandinistas 'it is up to us to make them aware of the
zones of influence that exist: to import Lenin into the back-yard of the United
132States is dangerous for the people of Nicaragua themselves'.
By late 1982 therefore the French government was expressing more cautious 
views on Central America. From late 1982 French policy to Central America was 
mobilised via multilateral initiatives. The 1984 expressions of condemnation for the 
US mining of Nicaragua’s ports were in this context exceptional as opposed to 
representative of French Central American policy. Although the French government 
made a highly publicised offer to clear the mines from Nicaragua’s ports this offer
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was made through the Contadora group and in fact the minesweepers never 
1 0*1
materialised. When the French refused to take part in the economic boycott 
of Nicaragua announced in 1985 it did so in the company of all its West European
1 Q4partners within the EC. Claude Cheysson continued to disagree with US 
analysis of the Central America problem and to disagree with the US chosen means 
for handling the problem but by February 1983 the French Foreign Minister's public 
statements demonstrated a reluctant acceptance of the reality of US dominance and 
sensitivities towards the region. In a speech to the National Assembly Cheysson 
stated that
'The government cannot follow the honourable member of Parliament when
he recommends that more pressure be exerted on the Reagan administration to make
it change its policy in Central America. France canf of course, deplore the fact that
the trends it promotes are not taking place as rapidly as it hopes. But rather than
exert pressure, it would prefer to continue its diplomatic action with respect to
135Washington, which it hopes to convince.'
France's main reason for becoming involved with Central America in 1981 
was to try to offer support for revolutionary movements to prevent them from 
turning to Communism. French Socialist policy drew on a Gaullist, anti-US 
heritage and a history of French Socialist party involvement with the revolutionary 
movements while they had been in opposition. The French Socialists were also new 
to government in the post-war period and their inexperience may have contributed 
to the initial diplomatic debacles on Central American issues.
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France was able to make a rapid change in at least the tone of foreign policy 
because the Central American region was of little real interest for French foreign 
policy makers. France was not willing to jeopardise Atlantic relations by continuing 
to publicly challenge the US in a region which US policymakers considered as vital 
for their security. Nevertheless French governments did not agree with the US 
interpretation of the reasons for conflict in Central America and continued to 
support Nicaragua by way of development assistance in order to try to dissuade the 
Sandinistas from adopting pro-Soviet orientation. The European Community's San 
Jos6 process provided a useful vehicle whereby France could continue to apply 
diplomatic persuasion to the US to change its policy and at the same time become 
less vulnerable to US retaliation for opposing its perceived vital security interests.
Spain and Central America
Spain's links with Central and Latin America and the Caribbean were based 
on common language and culture and on an economic interest which was greater for 
Spain than for the other states reviewed in this chapter. Strategic interests were 
limited up until the Gonzalez government of 1982. Those that existed after 1982 
were indirect in that they pertained to Spain's position as a member of the Atlantic 
Alliance (formalised when Spain joined NATO in 1982). Spain's political interest in 
the region ranged from the 'rhetoric' of Franco to the more instrumental policies 
of the transitional governments whereby Spain attempted to gain international 
influence as a 'middle power' and Latin America as the former colonial territory was 
seen as a 'natural' object of this influence. The Gonzalez government adopted a low
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profile in its dealings with Latin America and focussed its political interest and
\V7
activities on Central America.
Spain's particular potential locus of influence with Latin America in the 1980s 
was as an example of a society which had undergone a peaceful transition from 
dictatorship to democracy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Spanish 
Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) led by Felipe Gonzalez, had developed links with 
many of the Latin American parties and movements struggling against dictators of 
their own. The PSOE's membership of the Socialist International facilitated contacts 
with those Latin American parties which were represented as members or observers 
in the SI. However, unlike the French Socialists, once in government in 1982 the 
PSOE adopted a restrained approach to Latin American revolutionary movements. 
Socialist Spain's foreign policy was dominated by its twin foreign policy priorities 
which were to stay in NATO and therefore to maintain reasonable relations with the 
US and at the same time to ensure a smooth entry by Spain into the European 
Community. 139
The Central American conflict drew a response from the Spanish Socialist in 
government because the domestic and international ramifications of the conflict 
threatened the aforementioned foreign policy priorities. 1^ 9 Socialist Spain 
therefore adopted a policy towards Central America which stressed support for the 
Contadora initiative and which attempted to dissuade the US government from 
military intervention in Nicaragua. The Gonzalez government adopted a critical 
attitude towards the Nicaraguan revolution because of its concerns that the 
revolution was not fulfilling its commitments in respect of introducing pluralist 
democracy at home and non-alignment in that country's foreign policy. 1^ 1 The
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PSOE government gave strong support to the Contadora peace initiative from its 
inception in 1983. It was also a participating member of the EC’s San Jos§ process 
from the founding meeting in 1984 despite the fact that Spain only formally acceded 
to the EC in 1986.
(i) General regional interests and policies
Spanish cultural influence in Latin America stemmed from its history as the 
region’s first major colonising power. Obviously this colonial link also had negative 
consequences. When the Spanish empire disintegrated in the 1820s the newly 
liberated states of Latin America rejected the former metropole and turned towards 
industrialised states like Britain and the United States as potential allies. The 
Dominican Republic was almost the last of the vestiges of Spanish Empire to become 
independent in 1865 although it took a war with the US for the last remaining 
colonies, Puerto Rico and Cuba, to be lost to Spain, and gained by the US. However 
a cultural rapprochement took place between Spain and Latin America in the early 
part of the twentieth century after what the US calls the Spanish American war of 
1898 and the Spanish call the Cuban war. This historical event has had a profound 
impact on the attitude of Spain to the Central America problem of the 1980s. 
According to the PSOE’s first Foreign Minister Fernando Mor§n, the feeling was that 
'Cubans and Spaniards were defeated together' by the US which was consolidating 
its hegemony in the Western hemisphere.
From the 1930s Spain's own internal conflicts and the post-war isolation of 
the Franco regime lessened Spain's ability to play an important part in international
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relations, even in terms of Latin America. Franco’s attempted to decrease the
regime's isolation by encouraging better links with Latin America and the visible
results of this policy were the high numbers of Latin American students studying in
1Spain and the increased economic linkages. The Franco regime promoted the 
concept of hispanidad which was meant to imply a common heritage between Spain 
and Latin America. The most durable legacy of this now politically redundant idea 
(because of its association with Franco) was the recognition given to Castro's Cuba 
and the economic and diplomatic links which were established and maintained with 
Cuba despite opposition from the U S.*^
The first of the two transitional Union of the Democratic Centre (UDC) 
governments which took Spain from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy and 
which was led by Adolfo Su&raz (1976-1981) instigated an activist policy towards 
Latin America which was viewed by some in Latin America as 'excessively 
medd le some ' .Su&rez '  policy may have been seen as meddlesome because it 
would have uncomfortable implications for Latin America's dictators. For it was 
Su&rez' government, not the later socialist government which started the process 
whereby parties and movements struggling against dictatorship in Latin and Central 
America to look to democratising Spain as a model for their own development.*^® 
Calvo Sotelo's short-lived government (1981-1982) was less vocal in respect of Latin 
America. The Gonzalez government by contrast, although it advanced a 
comprehensive Latin American policy, in practice subordinated Latin American 
policy to other more important foreign policy goals. The policy objectives included 
the promotion of democracy, human rights, economic development for Latin 
America, the institutionalisation of an Ibero-American community and the
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celebration of the Columbian quincentenary.*^ Spanish activity in support of 
these objectives was however limited and achievements limited.
Spain's attitude to Latin America prior to the Gonzalez government's 
reorientation of foreign policy towards the West (Europe and the US) was to a 
certain extent reflective of the neutralist position which it had adopted vis a vis the 
rest of Europe throughout the twentieth century. This position was demonstrated in 
respect of the Spanish position on the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. Spain did not 
adopt the same line as Britain and the other member states over the question of the 
Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982. Instead Spain supported the rights of Argentina to 
these islands.*^® One of the reasons that Spain was not constrained to follow the 
European line was because it had not yet joined the EC and was under no obligation 
to support EPC or Community decisions. Another reason for Spain's support for 
Argentina and its opposition to Britain was because it perceived certain analogies 
between the status of the Falklands/Malvinas and the status of Gibraltar.
Another aspect of the Spanish relationship with Latin America since 1976 is
the activist role of King Juan Carlos who by 1990 had visited every Latin American
14Qcountry except Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua and Paraguay. ^ King Juan Carlos 
criticised Latin American dictators in their own countries and in recognition of his 
activism was awarded UNESCO's 'Simon Bolivar' prize in 1983. The King's role as 
an emissary for Spain and for democracy was supported by both Right and Left wing 
governments.***® This cross-party support for the King's activist external role in 
Latin America is indicative of the national political consensus that existed on Latin 
American policy and which continued to operate with the PSOE in government.
In economic terms Latin America was an important market for Spain.
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Throughout the 1970s the percentage of Spanish By 1982 ten per cent of Spain's 
exports went to Latin America and eleven per cent of Spain's imports came from the
1 Cl
sub-continent. Cuba was an increasingly important trading partner for Spain. 
In 1970 Cuba took 11.7 per cent of Spain's Latin American exports. By 1986 Cuba 
received 14.9 per cent of all Spanish exports to Latin America. Part of this increase 
reflected diminishing overall trade volumes between Spain and Latin America but 
the increase was significant in at the same time as Spanish exports to Cuba were 
increasing the level of imports from Cuba was diminishing. In other words Cuba 
became a more important trading partner for Spain than Spain was for Cuba.*^ 
By the mid 1980s some 85 per cent of Spain's overseas investment was in 
Latin America. Spanish investment was mainly situated in five countries, the most
1 CO
important by far being Puerto Rico. By 1985 Spanish investment in banking
and manufacturing amounted to around two and a half billion pesetas in Puerto Rico
compared to around half a billion pesetas in Argentina, a quarter of a billion pesetas
in Mexico and an eighth of a billion each in Brazil and Venezuela. Spain's
commercial banks were relatively highly exposed to Latin American debtors but
adopted policies - backed by successive governments - to minimise risk to the
banking system. Spanish governments demonstrated a 'guarded comprehension' of
Latin America's difficulties in respect of paying the debts but they did not support 
155debt repudiation.
Spain's economic links with Latin America might have been expected to push 
Spain into a pivotal role in terms of the development of a West European strategy 
towards Latin America. Spain had developed relations with governments of both the 
right and left in Latin America and could possibly have acted as interlocutor for
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Latin America. Spain in fact during the early 1980s made claims that it would be
able to act as a 'bridge* to Latin America once it entered the European 
1 wCommunity. It also insisted on an additional protocol to the Spanish treaty of 
Accession to the European Community in respect of Latin America (see Chapter 3). 
In practice however the Gonzalez government in particular allowed policy towards 
the sub-continent to become a residual m atter for Spain compared to the grand 
foreign policy strategy of incorporating Spain firmly within 'Europeanist' and 
'A tlanticist' economic and defence institutions. It should be no surprise 
therefore that Spain's policy towards the Central America conflict in the 1980s was 
also subordinated to its broader foreign policy goals.
(ii) Policy towards the Central American conflict 1979-1985
Spain had no direct strategic interests and minimal direct political interest
in the five republics. There was only one conjunctural bilateral problem in this
period as Spain broke off diplomatic relations with Guatemala in 1980 because of the
destruction of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City by the Guatemalan military
which had pursued dissident peasants and students who had occupied the 
1building. ° Relations were however restored in 1984 when the Guatemalan
1government admitted responsibility.
Spain also had limited economic interests in Central America. It was not until 
1986 that Spain figured as a source of foreign investment for any of the republics. 
In that year Costa Rica received just under three million pesetas but this only 
amounted to 0.01 of Costa Rica's total foreign investment for that year. Spain
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1 61was also a minor arms supplier to Nicaragua.
Spain’s UDC government had adopted a relatively progressive policy in 
respect of Central America. However there were great expectations from within the 
Spanish polity (not just from the Left) and from Central America (particularly the 
revolutionary governments of Nicaragua and Cuba) that the Gonzalez government 
would adopt and uphold a policy towards the Central American conflict which would 
encourage other West European governments to oppose US policy in the region and 
give more active support to the liberation struggles of Central America. In practice 
because of the high priority given by Gonzalez to other foreign policy goals and as 
a response to US pressure, the PSOE in government
'attempted to steer a middle course between acceptance that the United 
States has legitimate security interests in the Caribbean and Central America and 
arguing that the roots of the Central American conflict lie in indigenous social, 
economic and political factors rather than the East-West conflict.' °
One of the reasons that there had been an expectation of a high profile
governmental involvement by the PSOE in Central America was because of Felipe
Gonzalez' prominent role within the Socialist International. In 1980 the SI had
established a 'Committee for the Defence of the Nicaraguan Revolution' which was
chaired by Gonzalez - the European members of which included Willy Brandt, Olof
Palme, Frangois Mitterand and Bruno Kreisky. The SI had offered public
support to the FSLN since 1978 going so far as to set up a fund to support the
164Nicaraguan revolutionaries. However the Si's Committee to defend the
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Nicaraguan revolution had barely time to constitute itself before the SI split on
i c e
policy towards the revolution. From 1981 one group within the SI led by
Portuguese leader Mario Soares, the Venezuelan leader of Acci6n Democrdtica
Carlos Andr§s P6rez and the Costa Rican Partido de Liberacidn Nacional (PLN) led
by Daniel Oduber expressed concern that the FSLN was neither pluralist nor non-
aligned (see section on the FRG above). By 1982 even those in the SI that had been
supportive of the Sandinistas began to express a more qualified support for the
l fifiNicaraguan revolution. When the PSOE became the government in Spain in 
1982 there was therefore little  pressure on Gonzalez from the SI to take anything 
other than the cautious line which he in fact displayed towards the Central America 
conflicts. The PSOE's policy towards Central America after 1982 was consistent 
with the SIfs new approach which was of a general defence of the principles of 
international law.
'Peace in Central America, an objective of Socialist International policy, 
along with the defence of sovereignty, the right to self-determination and respect 
for the principle of non-intervention, is vital to the entire continent1.
There is some evidence to suggest that Spain's decision not to send high level
observers to the 1984 Nicaraguan elections was influenced by Gonzalez' acceptance
of the more hard-line anti-Sandinista position adopted by the Carlos Andres P§rez 
1R8faction in the SI. In turn Gonzalez' caution in respect of the Sandinistas was 
refracted back into what became official SI policy. The President of the SI, Willy 
Brandt, continued to oppose the 'policy of destabilisation, economic blockade and
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military attacks which are steps towards a war of intervention1 but by the mid-1980s
was also stating that 'democratic pluralism, non-alignment and a mixed economy,
the declared objectives of the Sandinista revolution, and a firm demand of the
Socialist International, have not yet been fully realised. 1
It was only in the early 1980s that Spain became an international aid donor
rather than an aid recipient. In 1983 Spain's international aid budget totalled just
170$208 million with Equatorial Guinea the largest recipient. This meant that
Spain was not able to offer substantial financial inducements (or threaten aid
cutoffs) to support its policies in Central America. This did not prevent the PSOE
government from attempting to provide some economic backing to their public
support for the Contadora peace process. In 1984 the 'Plan for Integrated
Cooperation' with Central America was instituted with an initial budget of $1.4
million (rising to about $6  million by 1987). Costa Rica received the largest amount
of support although Nicaragua and Honduras were also beneficiaries. Costa Rica's
position as the major recipient reflected the PSOE's commitment to supporting
171democracy in the region. '
Socialist Spain resisted invitations from all sides,including Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and the United States, to become involved in the Central American conflict as 
a mediator. Gonzalez rejected this role for Spain by arguing 'between whom could 
we mediate? Between Nicaragua and El Salvador? Between the Salvadorean 
government and the guerrillas? It is too complicated. Between those countries and 
the United States? Between Castro and everyone e lse? '* ^
Instead the PSOE government preferred to actively support multilateral 
initiatives such as the Contadora process and the EC's San Jos6 process. The
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Contadora Group met in Madrid (see Chapter 4) and was awarded Spain’s prestigious
173Prince of Asturias Prize in 1984. The EC’s efforts were supported not just
because of its intrinsic merit but because Spain conceived of this initiative as
providing the foundation for a more substantial EC relationship with Latin
America. The EC’s activity was also welcomed because it provided the
economic means to support foreign policy objectives which Spain shared but which
because of its relatively economically underdeveloped status the country could not
effectively implement.
Spain did not support the Reagan administration's attempts to isolate and
delegitimise the Sandinista government. This was because the PSOE regarded this
policy as counterproductive both in terms of its affects on the Nicaraguan revolution
and in terms of its potential affects on the Western Alliance. Spain viewed the
United States policy towards Nicaragua as immoral and unethical and no better than
17*5the Soviet Union’s approach to Afghanistan. 1 ° Miguel Angel Martinez, President 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament stated on this issue that
'We belong to the West because we believe that the values which support our 
way of life and our political systems are superior to all others. And we do not think 
that, in mining ports, financing counterrevolutionary armies and supporting regimes 
which tolerate the existence of Death Squads, one defends the West. By doing that 
one only saps its foundations.'wo
More important for Spain were the implications for Spain and the Atlantic 
Alliance. The view from Spain was that Reagan's policies could encourage a
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radicalisation of the Nicaraguan revolution which in turn might lead to a direct US
intervention in Nicaragua. This would be 'a course that would have devastating
implications for bilateral Spanish-American relations and for the Atlantic 
177Alliance1. The major anxiety was that the latent anti-US mood within the 
Spanish public would erupt, thus threatening continued Spanish membership in 
NATO. 178
Central America was not a high priority foreign policy issue for any of the 
post-Franco Spanish governments. While many expected that the government of 
Felipe Gonzalez would adopt a high profile policy towards the region this did not 
occur. Central America remained a problem for the PSOE government because of 
the implications for Spain’s most important foreign policy goals. Spain was 
particularly concerned to prevent a US invasion of Nicaragua and looked to the EC’s 
San Jos6  process to provide support for the Contadora (and later the Esquipulas) 
peace negotiations in both diplomatic and economic terms.
Conclusion
These four member states, with the possible exception of Britain, had no 
important strategic or economic interests in Central America such as to provide the 
impetus for an involvement in the region. The Federal Republic of Germany and 
Spain had indirect but important political interests at stake in respect of Central 
America in that both were fearful that precipitate US action in Central America 
might cause domestic discontent and therefore threaten the cohesion of the US led 
Western Alliance.
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The four member states, including Britain, also took a different attitude to 
the revolutionary movements of the region than their ally the United States. None 
of these four states were pro-Communist or pro-Soviet but considered that the 
revolutionary movements could be contained by a judicious mix of positive and 
negative diplomatic and economic sanctions. All four of these states and all the 
major political parties disagreed with the United States in terms of the political 
analysis as to the roots of the conflict and all disagreed with the Reagan 
administration’s preference for the military instrument. None accepted the Reagan 
policy which was to isolate and delegitimise the Sandinistas in government.
These states and their respective political parties differed however in terms 
of the vehemence with which they held these views and in terms of the emphasis 
that they placed on other factors as additional causes of the conflict. For instance, 
Britain, the closest of the states to the US, may have been more likely to accept the 
US position but for the fact, inter alia, that British foreign policy makers could not 
go along with a foreign policy position which would have meant supporting 
Guatemala as part of a Central American alliance against Nicaragua.
By the mid-eighties the member states had enough in common to form the 
nucleus of what became the Community’s distinctive approach to Central America. 
However for none of the states was Central America a priority area and as has been 
has been demonstrated in the previous chapter it took an activist Commission and 
Parliament to mobilise the Community and articulate the policy.
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Further explanations
This chapter has indicated that the member states had their own reasons as 
to why a Community policy towards Central America should be developed and 
supported. If the Community’s policy towards Central America can only be explained 
by considering as part of the equation the interests and policies of the member 
states it cannot only be explained only by a consideration of these factors.
The conclusion to this thesis considers the disparate factors involved in an 
attem pt to offer a satisfactory explanation of EC policy towards Central America 
in the 1980s.
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Conclusion
The previous chapters have reviewed the background to EC policy towards 
Central America in the 1980s and have highlighted both causes and mechanisms of 
EC policy towards this particular area of the world. This conclusion draws together 
the various strands of the presentation and the argument in order to chart the course 
of and summarise the reasons for EC intervention in Central America. This 
conclusion also assesses how effective the EC was in meeting its objectives. It 
considers the significance of the policy in practical and theoretical terms.
In practical terms the discussion relates to the importance of EC activity in 
Central America in the context of its impact on outcomes in international relations 
and to the impact of the Central America policy on the process of EC foreign 
policymaking in general. In theoretical terms the discussion relates to how this study 
might contribute to a more profound understanding of the nature of EC foreign 
policy and its method of operation.
The first argument presented is that the Community had a significant if 
difficult to measure impact on events in Central America. The second is that 
Community foreign policymaking became more cohesive because of the experience 
of developing and implementing the Central America policy but that the impact was 
uneven and more significant in some areas than others.
EC foreign policy
European Community foreign policy developed as an admixture of ’external
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relations* responsibilities (derived from the Treaties) and European Political 
Cooperation (originating in agreements made by the member states) to the extent 
that this hybrid approach to foreign policy making became institutionalised in the 
Single European Act of 1987.
Ostensibly, much of the controversy relating to the nature of any future 
’European union' has been in respect of foreign policy and defence and security 
m atters with member states like Britain, Denmark and France reluctant to concede 
decision-making powers to a non-national authority like the Commission in these 
areas of 'high politics'. In practice however, even the most anti-federalist of the 
member states has permitted and sometimes encouraged the development of a 
common EC foreign policy in respect of some international problems. Britain for 
instance has been a strong exponent of the development of EPC and was the 
beneficiary of the 'blurring' of Community/member state decision making in the 
Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982.
In a sense therefore the polemics as to whether or not member states have 
been asked to 'surrender' sovereignty (continued in the debate over the ratification 
of the 1991 Maastricht Treaties) to the Community reflect a non-debate. The 
question of EC foreign policy is not a m atter of the renunciation of sovereignty of 
the individual states. Since 1954 and the failure of the European Defence Community 
there has never been any question of member states being asked to renounce 
decisionmaking capacities in respect of control over their respective militaries 
except perhaps in limited circumstances and through agreement (as with the NATO 
Treaty). Given its unique trajectory (pragmatic and cautious developments marked 
by incremental procedural change) it also seems unlikely that an EC foreign policy
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will emerge as exactly analogous to that of the nation sta te  in terms of being fully 
comprehensive or more centralised. In other words EC foreign policy is likely neither 
to encompass every international relationship that could be entered into by the 
member states and the Community nor to be controlled by the Commission at the 
expense of the Council.
Nevertheless, in terms of understanding the nature of the foreign policy 
decisionmaking capacities of the EC there is a wide spectrum of intermediate 
possibilities between that of autonomous state decentralised decisionmaking and a 
completely centralised Community decisionmaking. To the extent that this case 
study can provide the basis for generalisations it may help to elucidate some of 
those possibilities. It may also provide the basis for a judgement as to whether the 
EC is (as is often implied is the ideal) becoming more like a state-type international 
actor. Conversely this study might provide a base to help assess if one can talk 
about a linear fprogressivistf development of EC foreign policy making at all - at 
least in the sense that the EC is 'developing1 so as to become the aforementioned 
state-type actor.
EC foreign policy and Central America
The EC's involvement in Central America was of comparatively recent 
origins. The Community's interest in this region appeared surprising for a number 
of reasons not the least being its lack of interest in Latin America as a whole since 
1957 (see Chapter 3). This study has characterised the period 1957 to 1979 as one 
of EC 'apathy' towards the region. The EC's displayed some awakening interest in
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Latin America after 1979 with visits to the region by EC commissioners. EC 
'awareness' of Latin America as a foreign policy issue was partly due to the 
international salience of the Central American revolutions and revolutionary 
movements after the Sandinista victory in 1979 and partly as a response to the scale 
of the humanitarian problems in post-revolutionary Nicaragua and the notorious and 
widespread human rights abuses in the rest of Central America, particularly in El 
Salvador.
It took the Mexican debt crisis and the Falklands/Malvinas war of 1982 to 
transform EC 'awareness* (1979-1982) of Latin America into at least incipient 
'activism'. Initially EC activism vis a vis Latin America was propelled by the fear 
of losing Latin American markets, sources of supply and political influence (to the 
Soviet Union) given Latin American hostility to Western European countries because 
of their stance on the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. But Community activism was 
sustained - not by events in South America - but by the revolutions in Central 
America and more importantly the international ramifications of those revolutions.
The EC's Central America policy developed as a series of ad hoc measures 
between 1975 and 1981. But by 1982 the institutions of the Community, the member 
states and the major political parties were demonstrating a convergence of interest 
and policy so as to make possible a consensus which allowed for the emergence of 
an institutionalised, cohesive EC policy towards Central America in the mid­
eighties. A substantial Community intervention in Central America took place from 
1983 through to 1990. There were a multiplicity of major and minor objectives of the 
policy. This was not surprising given that there were a number of different actors 
involved in the formulation of Community policy towards Central America. However
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the various actors (the institutions, member states and political parties) appeared 
to share two main objectives - to a greater or lesser extent.
The first of the major objectives was to try to contain the Nicaraguan 
revolution through a form of ’constructive engagement*. The EC offered positive 
inducements in terms of economic support for the Sandinista government and 
diplomatic support for the peace process. It became an active partner in the 
Contadora and Esquipulas peace process - the second of which included amongst its 
aims the 'democratization* of Nicaragua. The Community was anxious to prevent 
Nicaragua from becoming too reliant on the Soviet Union and in this sense conceived 
of the Central American problem as a potential cause of East/West conflict.
The Community's fear of Central America as a flashpoint for a major 
superpower conflict underlay the gradual formulation of the second more important 
goal of the EC's intervention which was to prevent the United States from direct 
military intervention in Nicaragua. The EC considered that such an action would not 
only promote a regional problem to the level of an international conflict which 
would involve both superpowers, but that it would also do serious damage to the 
Atlantic Alliance. US policy towards Central America, especially Nicaragua, was 
viewed as mistaken and dangerous with potentially harmful repercussions in respect 
of the stability of the Alliance. In this sense it was international factors which over­
determined EC policy towards Central America in the 1980s.
Some indication of the applicability of this observation can be gained through 
an analysis of why EC interest in Central America diminished from 1990 onwards. 
The November 1989 collapse of the Berlin wall marked the end of the Cold war and 
the victory of the US over the USSR in that war. In this sense any regional conflict
374
could no longer be a source of East-West conflict given there was no longer an 
international system characterised by an East-West struggle for predominance. From 
1990 therefore Central America reverted to the status of a minor regional conflict, 
unhampered by any significant international ramifications.
Another consequence of the changing international or systemic conditions was 
that both the EC and the US redirected their policy priorities towards Asia and 
Eastern Europe. The rapid and unpredictable changes in these two areas brought an 
element of uncertainty to the international system such that the EC and the US 
were precipitated into more collaborative working arrangements than had previously 
been the norm.* This redirection of EC priorities may well reinforce a re­
consolidation of the US as the unquestioned dominant power in Central America.
The changing international conditions also caused the revolutionary
movements of Latin and Central America to reconsider their strategy. With the
demise of the Soviet Union and the Socialist regimes in East Europe there was little
chance of future material support for liberation movements however just their cause
might be. Many of these revolutionary movements, with the major exception of
Sendero Luminoso in Peru, judged that negotiations had become a viable option for
at least the partial achievement of ends which had hitherto only seemed attainable 
oby military means. This shift in thinking coincided with the 1990 electoral defeat 
of the Sandinistas which also provided another reason for the diminution in EC 
interest in Central America. This was not because the EC had ever had as a major 
policy objective the overturning of the Sandinista government (although some of the 
member states and political parties would not have been averse to that outcome) but 
was mainly because the Sandinista electoral defeat was another factor likely to
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encourage the United States to take a less belligerent attitude to Central America. 
The 1990 victory of the more pro-US Nicaraguan president Violeta Chamorro meant 
that a major US foreign policy objective, to replace the ’present structure’ of the 
Nicaraguan government, had been achieved.
Only one Socialist state was left in 1990 in Latin and Central America. This 
was Castro's Cuba which economically was struggling to survive after its aid and 
trade relations with the Soviet Union were disrupted. Thus revolutions and the 
frictions between the EC and the US which had arisen about the best way to deal 
with theses revolutions, were no longer an important policy issue for the EC in Latin 
America.
The two major objectives of EC policy were therefore achieved. Nicaragua 
did not become a Soviet client state in the sense that it did not evolve into a ’second 
Cuba' in the region. The US did not Invade Nicaragua and thus the regional conflict 
did not escalate into a full scale international crisis. No western European 
government had been put in the position of having to cope with angry public opinion 
because of a US invasion of Nicaragua and in this sense the serious questioning of 
US leadership of the Alliance, which had taken place in the early and mid 1980s, had 
abated.
The important question is to what extent the EC’s policies and activities vis- 
a-vis Central America contributed to the desired outcomes being achieved. Did EC 
policy m atter?
The answer to this question is inevitably speculative given that the Central 
American crisis was a complicated regional issue with international ramifications 
which throughout the 1980s ensured the involvement in major or minor roles of the
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superpowers, the major western industrialised nations, the eastern European
countries (in terms of economic support for Nicaragua), the Latin American nations
and other third world countries. The crisis also involved as important actors
subnational and transnational groups - not just within Western Europe - but also and
probably crucially (although this factor is not within the scope of this study), such
groups within the United States. A complete assessment as to what extent EC policy
made a difference would have to consider the relative weight and interreaction of
all these actors and this task remains to be done. Of particular interest would be
some scholarly investigation of the impact of the various agents of US public opinion
(of the right and left) which, from the evidence available, would seem to have had
some impact in terms of moderating the Reagan and Bush administrations* foreign
3
policy towards the region.
Nevertheless there is some counterfactual evidence which suggests that the 
EC had some influence in respect of achieving its desired outcomes in Central 
America. During the Reagan and Bush administrations actual invasions of small 
countries were preceded by systematic diplomatic campaigns to delegitimise and 
isolate their leaderships (Bishop in Grenada and Noriega in Panama). The 1986 
bombing of Libya was also preceded by a campaign to depict Libya as an *outlaw* 
state. A similar campaign was launched against Iraq's Saddam Hussein subsequent 
to the Kuwaiti invasion and prior to the US led Gulf war. With the exception of 
Grenada these campaigns succeeded to the extent that international public opinion 
for the most part supported US action against these countries.
The European Community did not accept this US strategy in respect of 
Nicaragua although the US had actively tried to persuade them to do so. Not only
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did the EC refuse to go along with US policy but it actively campaigned to 
implement an alternative policy which both accepted the legitimacy of the 
Sandinista government and attempted to persuade the US government of what the 
EC considered to be a mistaken policy. To the extent that US policy had relied on 
international legitimation as a necessary component of any strategy which involved 
military intervention in another country, the EC's policy constituted a problem for 
US policymakers. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the US government 
developed a strategy and expended resources to try to persuade the west Europeans 
to change their policy (see Chapter 1). This does not mean to say that EC policy 
prevented a direct US military intervention in Nicaragua of itself. However the 
argument is that the impact of EC policy was not negligible in terms of a 
contribution to the meeting of European Community objectives.
EC policy was however only one part of the equation. The EC's desired 
outcomes were achieved because of a combination of factors internal and external 
to itself and Central America.
The first objective - of 'containing' or 'moderating' the Nicaraguan revolution - 
was achieved in that the Sandinistas did not adopt a one-party, non-pluralist 
political and economic system. At the same time however EC hopes were 
disappointed in that neither were the Sandinistas persuaded adopt a purely, western 
representative model of democracy. The 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas - 
in a sense the ultima ratio of containment policies - was certainly not achieved 
because of EC activity but because the Nicaraguan electorate thought that the more 
pro-US Chamorro had a better chance of both ending the war and (with US help) 
reviving the economy.
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The second objective - of the prevention of direct military intervention in 
Central America - was achieved because of a number of factors. These included 
Nicaraguan military preparedness, Latin and Central American diplomacy, the 
international campaign against US policy and US domestic opposition to their own 
government’s policy towards Central America. An important factor was the changed 
post-Cold war context of international relations.
EC policy formed a part of the international opposition to US policy. The 
EC’s contribution was significant in that it provided diplomatic support to Latin and 
Central American diplomacy and also a ’legitimate’ opposition to US policy.
Another way in which EC policy 'mattered' was that its insistence on a 
regional solution to the conflict which included Sandinista Nicaragua had the effect 
of giving significant international legitimacy to the revolutionary government. US 
attempts to diplomatically isolate the Sandinistas failed largely because their major 
allies in Europe actively campaigned against this aspect of US policy. The Contadora 
Group and Central American presidents were thus given highly influential backing 
from the Europeans in the pursuit of their plans for a negotiated, non-exclusive (ie. 
inclusive of Nicaragua) plan for peace.
Central America and EC foreign policy making
If EC policy had a significant if difficult to measure impact on the Central 
American crisis what impact did the Central American crisis have on the practice 
of EC foreign policy making?
It has already been noted that in one case of EC foreign policymaking in
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respect to Latin America, that is in the EC reaction to the Falklands/Malvinas 
dispute, ’external relations* and EPC responsibilities were merged so as to enable 
the EC to offer a fairly cohesive (at least over the short term) policy. However 
there were few longlasting effects on EC foreign policymaking of this brief period 
of foreign policy engrenaee. Perhaps the major residue was a lingering intimation 
that the institutions and the member states could if necessary act together should 
interests and motivations coincide. Of course the fact that the EC could act 
cohesively and coherently was not a remarkable state of affairs in itself. The EC had 
developed a pragmatic way of working in respect of various foreign policy issues 
ranging from the CSCE to GATT and had learned to 'manage* the convergence of the 
two areas of foreign policy competence (see Chapter 2). What was interesting in 
respect of the Falklands crisis however was that the EC response a) involved a 
serious international crisis, b) was concerned with an area of 'high politics' and c) 
risked placing the EC in an oppositional position to its closest ally, the United 
States.
The EC's involvement with Central America in the 1980s also displayed the 
aforementioned characteristics. Central America was a major international problem 
which by the mid-eighties was commonly understood as a 'crisis'. The 'high politics' 
of security (for the United States and the Central American states) were at issue 
and military force was the chosen instrument of aggression and defence of the major 
participants. Lastly, the Community chose an approach to the problem which brought 
both the Community and member states into conflict with its most trusted ally.
In terms of the immediate affect on EC foreign policymaking, the 
involvement in Central America had the practical affect of further blurring the lines
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of competence between external relations and EPC; between the responsibilities of 
the Commission and the responsibilities of the Council. Prior to the SEA when both 
the member states and the Commission were charged with achieving ’consistency* 
between the two areas of competence, the EC was in fact operating a relatively 
cohesive foreign policy in a major international crisis without much domestic 
controversy. Contrary to theory, the Commission, supported by the Parliament, 
acted as initiator in this particular foreign policy of the Community. (This is not to 
say that the Commission could have sustained a different policy from that of the 
Council in respect of Central America.) Another notable development in terms of 
the impact of the Central America policy on Community foreign policymaking was 
the institutionalisation of Commission involvement along with the member states via 
the political and economic dialogue which took place on a regular basis with the 
Central American states and the Central American Common Market. Here the 
Commission was overtly involved as a political as well as an economic partner in 
relations with third countries.
What this study indicates therefore is that sovereignty, in the sense of 
centralised decisionmaking powers, can relatively easily be divided between the 
member states and the Community provided there is no maior divergence of interest 
or policy between the member states or provided that a convergence of interest 
between them can be achieved. In either case the Commission is in a relatively 
powerful position as the institution most capable of facilitating convergence among 
member states. This observation is pertinent because the Commission does not suffer 
the two disadvantages incurred by the Presidency whose official responsibility it is 
to negotiate consensus where possible. These two disadvantages are the short term
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nature of the Presidency and the ’pull1 factor of national interest. All these factors 
tend towards a role for the Commission as at least potentially more of an initiator 
of action and indeed as an international actor itself in order to carry out action 
agreed via the Community mechanisms. In a sense the Maastricht Treaty has ratified 
this development in Community foreign policymaking in that the 1991 Treaty on 
Political Union specifically allows for common actions to be pursued bv majority 
vote in the Council once a common foreign policy has been agreed.^ Given that 
since the SEA the Commission has of right been part of the foreign policymaking 
process in EPC, the move to common action by majority vote will probably have the 
affect, inter alia, of strengthening the Commission’s role within foreign 
policymaking.
In a negative sense the study confirms the continuing 'democratic deficit' in 
Community foreign policy making. The European Parliament was a vociferous 
participant in ’lobbying’ terms in respect of the Central America policy but never 
achieved an institutionalisation of its status in respect of foreign policymaking.
This case study also indicates some of the limits to an effective EC foreign 
policy. The Central American policy can be perhaps judged as relatively successful 
in meeting objectives but this was only because after 1982 all the major participants 
(Community institutions, member states and major political parties) shared common 
objectives which were underpinned by a convergence of interest. In this particular 
case the Commission was able to mobilise the various actors, which together 
comprise the conglomerate whole which is the Community, along the lines of the 
Community's view of itself (philosophy) as an international actor. It is difficult to 
foresee a future situation where such unanimity could be achieved. The Community's
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lack of effectiveness in the 1992 Yugoslavia crisis is illustrative in that the various 
member states have not been able to reconcile their different interests and 
objectives and because of the degree of divergence neither the Commission nor the 
Council has not been able to pull together a policy around which the various 
constituent units of the Community could converge.
The experience of the Central America policy in institutional terms was to 
bring to prominence the role of the Commission and at the same time emphasise the 
peripheral nature of Parliamentary involvement in Community foreign policy.
In terms of the capability of the Community as a composite international actor 
the experience of the Central America policy was to highlight the possibilities and 
a t the same time give evidence to the limitations of the EC. Provided the various 
actors involved within the EC conglomerate were at least passively united, the 
Commission could mobilise the resources of the Community in trade, aid and 
diplomatic terms, in order to pursue a particular foreign policy. But even with this 
level of convergence around agreed objectives it was not possible for the EC to 
coordinate activities of the member states and the Community. An example was aid 
policy. Here the Community managed to agree a formula whereby Community aid 
followed the directions of the ECfs foreign policy. It was never however able to 
achieve the coordination of Community and member state  aid to Central America. 
This was also true of the diplomatic instruments of EC policy. Although both the 
Council and the Commission were able to 'speak with one voice' on Central 
America, that voice once translated into national dialects was able to either add or 
detract in terms of emphasis to various aspects of the policy. One example is the 
British condemnation of the Sandinistas as Marxist aggressors - which can be
383
compared to the (Socialist) Greek government's depiction of Sandinista Nicaragua 
as a 'model1 society.
A major problem elucidated by this study is that should only one of the major 
actors (Britain for most of 1982) wish to block a particular common action the 
Community foreign policymaking process comes to a halt. This problem will ng£ be 
overcome by the Maastricht Treaty as member states retain the power to amend 
their decision to allow common actions to be governed by majority voting (Article 
C3).
The implementation of the Community's Central America policy indicated 
that at least in certain circumstances the Community could put into practice its own 
foreign policy philosophy. This had two major aspects. The first was the explicit 
commitment to principles which included the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
a commitment to pluralist democracy on the western model and an increasing 
emphasis on the political and economic virtues of regional integration. The second 
aspect of the EC's foreign policy philosophy was a quest for autonomy vis-a-vis its 
major ally, the United States.
In the short term, EC foreign policy philosophy was probably vindicated by 
the successful implementation of the Central American policy which allowed the 
Community to portray itself as an international actor possessing a distinct 
international mission. In this way EC foreign policymaking was given a more 
substantial foundation. However it is too early to make assumptions about any 
possible longlasting affects on EC policy. The international context changed so 
dramatically in 1990 so as to make (arguably) an EC/US partnership more necessary 
than it ever had been. There have been few occasions since 1990 when the EC has
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considered it useful to take a contrary view to the United States on major 
international issues (agricultural trade being the major exception). But what the 
Central America policy may indicate is that the EC now has relatively more 
capability to act as a discrete and if necessary oppositional actor vis-a-vis the 
United States. The EC, given different international circumstances, may therefore 
be expected to take a more independent line in certain foreign policy issue areas 
than it was prepared to do prior to the 1980s.
This study does not provide evidence to indicate that EC foreign policymaking 
is moving in a progressivist fashion towards some outcome whereby the EC will 
assume the capabilities and capacities of a nation state. This is not mainly due to 
the fact that the EC does not possess the direct use of the military instrument. 
Many small states do not possess an effective military instrument but maintain some 
form of foreign policy. The EC's 'international actorliness' will not develop in an 
way analogous fashion to that of the nation state  because there is no centralised 
administrative authority (government) which can make authoritative decisions on the 
allocation of resources within and without Community territory. The reliance of 
Community foreign policymaking on negotiation and bargaining within the polity in 
order to make a decision and on repeated negotiations every time a decision needs 
to be altered in a major way, limits the EC's foreign policy capabilities and 
consequentially its effectiveness. This study does indicate however that EC foreign 
policymaking and implementation cannot be dismissed as irrelevant and in certain 
cases, as in Central America, it has played a significant role in international 
relations. This is why further understanding or theorising about the nature of EC 
foreign policy may be useful.
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Theoretical implications of this study
This concluding section utilises the three standard ways of approaching
international relations theory in order to elicit some observations about EC foreign
5
policy in the light of the above study.
The substance of this study at once confirms and denies some central Political 
Realist presumptions of the state. The state is conceived here as the most 
significant actor in international relations partly because of its centralised control 
over foreign policy instruments in particular the use of military force. The 
references to such disparate states as the United States and Nicaragua confirm that 
what they had in common was their appreciation of the value of the military 
instrument in the pursuit of foreign policy. Yet Political Realism, a t least in its 
archetypal form, has difficulties in understanding the complexities of an 
international system where international organisations like the EC can play an 
important foreign policy role and where subnational or domestic constituencies can 
have a substantial influence on the foreign policy making process and therefore on 
foreign policy outcomes. Political Realism almost by definition excludes an 
understanding of foreign policy making which considers domestic factors as salient 
and understands the idea of sovereignty as ’indivisible1. In these respects the second 
of the common approaches to international relations, that of pluralism, may have 
more to offer in respect of this particular study.
Much of the literature which seeks to analyse and theorise about EC foreign 
policy can loosely be classified as falling within the pluralist paradigm. It is
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concerned with processes and outcomes of integration and with understanding how 
decisions are made within the foreign policy making process particularly within the
7
field of European Political Cooperation.* Within the framework of this approach, 
the points of interest raised by this study are firstly the external relations/ EPC 
analytical dichotomy and secondly the nature of EC foreign policy.
This study indicates that the pervasive analytical distinction between external 
relations and EPC is not of great utility. In fact an analysis which sought to 
maintain the distinction would have great difficulty in fully comprehending the 
Central America policy particularly given the Commission’s visibly political role. 
The argument here is that this distinction has probably little general utility in any 
case given the now increasingly bicephalous Community - evident even in the 
sensitive areas of foreign policy making.
This study also permits certain tentative generalisations to be made about the 
nature of Community foreign policy. Firstly the Community does possess a foreign 
policy which is more than just a mechanism for coordinating policies on an ad hoc 
basis. The gradual development of the Community's ability to make and implement 
foreign policy was recognised in the Maastricht Treaty with the recognition that a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) exists which is something more than 
EPC and that this CFSP should be consolidated and extended.
Secondly, the CFSP will not be limited because of its lack of 
comprehensiveness. It is perfectly feasible that the subsidiarity principle should 
apply to foreign policy making as much as other aspects of Community decision 
making. In other words if the member states consider that a policy is most 
appropriately carried out at member state level this is likely to continue. Conversely
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should the member states consider that a policy is more appropriately carried out 
by the institutions of the Community (for instance policy towards CSCE, GATT, 
ASEAN) a CFSP could be substantial and effective.
Thirdly the EC has shown that it in certain circumstances it has an ability to 
act autonomously of its allies within the international system. The EC has not acted 
autonomously of its component member states but it has shown an ability to develop 
a policy which is somewhat a t variance from that of the member states. For 
instance both Mitterand?s France (from the Left) and Britain (from the Right) 
developed policies towards Central America which were a t least initially at variance 
with the Community’s ’even-handed’ approach. By the mid-1980s both France and 
Britain had more or less adopted the Community’s more centrist policies on Central 
America thus indicating a degree of Community independence (and effective 
diplomacy) which contributed to the molding of member state  foreign policy.
This study indicates that to operate effectively it was necessary for the 
interests and policies of the Community institutions, member states and major 
political parties to converge around an agreed set of objectives. For Community 
cohesion to take place around a common foreign policy this study indicates that the 
the aforementioned convergence needed to be mobilised and institutionalised by 
activist Community institutions - in this case initially the Commission and the 
Parliament and later the Council. In this sense Community foreign policy cohesion 
arises out of institutionalised convergence of interest and policy. It might be possible 
to conclude, again drawing on this case study, that, all other things being equal, the 
effectiveness of the future CFSP, with effectiveness defined as the ability to attain 
objectives, will be a function of the extent of its cohesion. In other words, the CFSP
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is likely to be more effective the more the interests and policies of the institutions 
of the Community, the member states and the political parties converge, the more 
the institutions can actively work to mobilise a Community interest and policy, and 
the more that Community interest and policy can be institutionalised. An important 
caveat to the above conclusion is that some of the participants carry more weight 
than others - in particular the member states and the Commission. However the 
Parliament and the political parties are seeing an increase in their powers and have 
not refrained from using them (for instance the 1988 blocking of the Israeli trade 
protocols).
There are both positive and negative implications arising from the above 
conclusions. The positive aspect is that the definition above allows for a scale of 
likely effectiveness to be envisaged. Simply because all the member states for 
instance did not agree on a policy (for instance Britain and Greece in respect of the 
former Yugoslavia) that would not mean to say that some degree of effective CFSP 
could not be devised and implemented. Conversely however, the negative aspect of 
the above conclusion is that any one of the major participants (institutions, member 
states, major political parties) could in most circumstances block a policy desired 
by the other participants (Greece in respect to the recognition of Macedonia). Thus 
any effectiveness quotient of a future CFSP, particularly with an enlarged 
Community, is likely to remain low, except perhaps in times of major international 
crisis whereby all the participants consider their interests equally threatened 
(perhaps in a major war in the middle east). In a crisis whereby the interests are too 
divergent (eg. the 1992 Yugoslav war) it is unlikely therefore that the EC could be 
an effective actor.
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There are however two types of foreign policy situation in which the above, 
rather stark, scenario could be mitigated. In these cases effectiveness could be 
increased in spite of lack of unanimity. The first instance is in times of non-crisis. 
The major participants might be more inclined and have more time to bargain over 
interests in order to try to increase cohesion and maximise effectiveness. Of course 
this will depend again on the scale and scope of divergence and the nature of issues 
a t stake. For instance the Community has probably achieved an adequate 
compromise on banana policy which will satisfy the diverse interests of the 
Community participants, if not the banana producing countries. This was partly 
because for the Community participants at least, EC banana trade was a 'non-crisis' 
issue.
The second type, of foreign policy situation is that of multilateral diplomacy. 
The Central America case study indicates that EC participants were willing to 
negotiate interests between themselves in respect of coming to an agreement with 
a multilateral partner because divergent interests and objectives could be 
accommodated within an overall package. For instance the EC set as one of its aims 
the establishment of ’democracy1 in Central America. Both Socialist and Christian 
Democrats were able to agree to this objective as both had in mind different ’target' 
states’. The Socialists were at least initially keener to see the establishment of 
democracy in the rightwing, authoritarian regimes of the region in particular in 
Guatemala and El Salvador. The Christian Democrats were for their part anxious to 
promote the establishment of western style democracy in Nicaragua. Implicit trade­
offs could be made. For instance in return for Socialist recognition of President 
Duarte as a legitimate leader the Christian Democrats could accept the legitimacy
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of President Ortega.
The approach to the study of International Relations commonly termed 
'pluralism' is useful insomuch as it has no difficulty accepting international 
institutions as valid international actors and it understands the importance of the 
relationship of decisionmaking processes to foreign policy outcomes. What pluralism
Q
is therefore useful for is what Robert Cox has called 'problem-solving' theory.
The alternative offered by Cox, of 'critical theory' - an approach which 
without much difficulty can be seen as having its intellectual origins in the 
'structuralist' paradigm - may add something further to the examination of EC 
foreign policy. Cox's critical theory can be used to understand what has been 
characterised in this study as the anti-revolutionarv nature of EC foreign policy. 
Here the EC's policies of containing the Central American revolutions by peaceful 
means and the use of non-military positive and negative sanctions can be 
counterposed to the US policy of counterrevolution which actively, through the use 
of military force and economic embargoes, aimed to overthrow a revolutionary 
government. The concept of 'anti-revolution' is of a policy aimed to maintain 
international hegemony by the EC, not necessarily on its own behalf, but on behalf 
of an international (though not necessarily homogeneous) ruling class. Thus the EC 
would have an interest in maintaining the integrity of the institutions of 
international hegemony, for instance NATO and the G7. These ideas might help to 
explain why the overriding concern of the EC within its Central America policy was 
to 'moderate' the actions of the US and, as argued above, to maintain the stability 
and credibility of the western alliance.
Cox's concept of hegemony is drawn from the Gramscian notion of dominance
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and/or leadership enforced by consent as much as by coercion.^ In this sense the 
anti-revolutionary method used by the EC can be seen as a more efficacious 
hegemonising mechanism than the USf crude use of force. Thus the second and as is 
argued here the most important objective of EC Central American policy - of 
restraining the US - can be further brought into focus. Here the EC was perhaps 
encouraging the US leadership to employ methods which would be more beneficial 
for the western alliance as a whole, in order for the alliance, not individual 
countries, to maintain hegemony in the international system.
One rather cynical interpretation of the EC/US relationship in respect of the 
Central America crisis is that there was somehow an undeclared division of labour 
between the two. The US employed military threats and the EC offered diplomatic 
and economic inducements.*® This explanation makes light of the evidence that 
West European elites of all political persuasions were seriously concerned about US 
policy towards the region during the Reagan administration (see Chapter 6). It is also 
reminiscent of a vulgar Marxist argument which would credit the actions of EC and 
US leaders as crudely derivative of their position as somehow more or less 
automatically representative of a presumably homogeneous ruling class. A more 
sophisticated structuralist interpretation however could well allow for a shared 
strategic interest (ie. anti-Communism) but also allow for differences between the 
two sides of the Atlantic Alliance as well as for differences within those two sides.
The argument here is that ’Pluralism1 and 'Structuralism* as approaches to the 
study of international relations are the most fruitful theoretical prisms through 
which to view the EC's Central America policy. The last - structuralism - may have 
more to offer partly because its has been so rarely used in the explanation of
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/Community foreign policy.
It is hoped that a ’critical* approach to understanding Community foreign 
policy has been presented in this study. Further studies of Community foreign policy 
may benefit from the utilisation of the under-exploited resources available within 
the structuralist approach and perhaps in particular from 'critical theory'.
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Notes to Conclusion
1. In February 1990 the president of the European Council, Charles Haughey and US 
president, George Bush agreed an institutionalisation of EC/US contacts. This was the 
first time in the sometimes troubled history of EC/US relations that such an agreement 
had been reached. See Commission of the European Communities, ’The Week in Europe*, 
WE/8/90, (London: Commission, 1 March 1990).
2. Jenny Pearce, ’Liberal Democracy or Socialist Democracy? - Dilemmas for the Left 
in Central America’, unpublished paper given in Brussels at a seminar on Change in 
Latin America - Solidarity in Europe. 9-10 May, 1991.
3. Brief mention is made of the US public’s opposition to their country's involvement 
in the Central American conflict in Richard J. Barnet, The Rockets' Red Glare: When 
America Goes to War - The Presidents and the People. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990).
4. See Article C in 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in 
Conference of the representatives of the governments of the member states, Draft 
Treaty on European Union. CONF-UP 1862/91, Brussels, 13 December 1991, p. 106. See 
also 'Common Foreign and Security Policy', in Commission of the European 
Communities, Background Report: Briefing Note., on the intergovernmental 
conferences. ISEC/B33/91, London, 19 December 1991, p. 7.
5. Banks, 'The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in Light and Groom (eds), International 
Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, pp. 7-26.
6. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
7. See for example de Schoutheete, La Cooperation Politique EuropSenne: J.K. De Vree, 
P. Coffey and R.H. Lauwaars (eds), Towards a European Foreign Policy. (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987);Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework 
of Supranational Diplomacy?: and Pijpers, Regelsberger and Wessels (eds) in 
collaboration with Edwards, European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
8. Robert W. Cox, ’Social Forces, States, and World Orders’, in Millennium. Vol. 10 No. 
2, 1981, pp. 126-55, reprinted with postscript in Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and 
its Critics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
9. Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method', in Millennium. Vol. 12 No. 2, 1983, pp. 162-175.
10. For one version of this argument see Whitehead, ’The Identity of the New Europe 
and the San Jos6 process’, in Roy, The Reconstruction of Central America, p. 147.
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